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INTRODUCTION
A jury recently awarded a single plaintiff $28 billion in punitive
damages. That's billion, as in nine zeros-all to one person. Given
the frequent reports of multimillion dollar verdicts, 2 it is easy to be-
come desensitized to "skyrocketing 3 punitive damages awards. But
J.D., Notre Dame Law School; Associate, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, D.C. The
views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and not Arnold & Porter LLP or any of
the firm's clients." J.D., Washington University School of Law; Associate, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington,
D.C.
I Bullock v. Philip Morris Inc., No. BC249171, 2002 WL 31833905 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18,
2002), appeal docketed, No. B164398 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2003). The $28 billion award, later
reduced by the trial court to $28 million, was more than four times the combined total of all
reported punitive damages jury awards in California from 1991 to 2000. SeeJ. Clark Kelso &
Kari C. Kelso, An Analysis of Punitive Damages in California Courts, 1991-2000, at 6, available at
http://www.cjac.org/research/ (reviewing punitive damages jury awards reported in Westlaw's
CalioriaJury Verdict Reporterdatabase) (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, Verdicts Swelling from Big to Bigger, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 2002, at Al
(reporting recent punitive damages verdicts of $28 billion, $3 billion, $290 million, and $271
million); David Hechler, Tenfold Rise in Punitives, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 2003, at C3 ("There were
five verdicts of at least $500 million and 22 of at least $100 million [in 2002] .... In 1991, 38
verdicts topped $20 million; in 1996, it was 66.").
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Awards of punitive damages are sky-
rocketing. As recently as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an
appellate court in a products liability case was $250,000. Since then, awards more than 30 times
as high have been sustained on appeal." (citation omitted)); accord, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET
AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HowJURIES DECIDE 1 (2002) ("Over the past two decades, our country
has experienced a dramatic increase in the incidence and magnitude of punitive damages ver-
dicts rendered by juries in civil litigation."). Others are quick to counter, however, that re-
search on the overall patterns of awards indicate that juries impose punitive damages infre-
quently and rarely in headline-grabbing amounts. See Brief Amici Curiae of Certain Leading
Social Scientists and Legal Scholars in Support of Respondents at 1, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003) (No. 01-1289) [hereinafter Research Amici Brief] ("A
broad social science consensus exists that juries perform rationally in punitive damages cases.
Juries award such damages infrequently and in comparatively modest amounts."); see alsoJenni-
fer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50
BUFF. L. REV. 103, 159 (2002) ("Archival research examining overall patterns of awards find that
punitive damages are infrequently awarded, moderate in size, awarded in response to
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when a jury awards one person nearly double NASA's annual
budet4 -an amount larger than the GDP of more than 100 na-
tions-it does not take a constitutional scholar to recognize that
6something is awry with juries and punitive damages.
Although the debate over the existence and extent of a punitive
damages "crisis" rages on, courts,7 scholars,' and even some oppo-
nents of punitive damages reform9 have recognized that the vague
outrageous conduct, and often reduced post-trial."). Even if rare, however, headline-grabbing
awards, like the $28 billion award noted above, provide insight into jury decision making:
That juries account for over 98 percent of these blockbuster awards is a striking statis-
tic. Jury trials account for about 68 percent of all civil cases .... The difference between
the observed 98 percent share of blockbuster awards by juries and the expected share of
68 percent jury awards is statistically significant, indicating that juries awarded a dispro-
portionate share of the blockbuster awards.
Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, The Harvard John
M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 362, at 8 (May 2002), at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ (identifying fifty-three punitive damages
awards of at least $100 million from 1985 to 2002).
See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 8 (2003) (reflecting NASA's $15 billion budget in 2003), available at
http5//w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2OO4/pdf/budget.pdf.
See The World Bank, World Development Indicators Database: Total GDP 2002, at
http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/GDP.pdf (July 2003) (listing at least 124 nations
with a GDP less than $28 billion in 2002).
6 That said, scholars have published a wealth of studies that suggest juries are ill-equipped
to arrive at fair and consistent punitive damages awards. See generally SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note
3 (integrating and synthesizing independent lines of research). The issue, however, continues
to be hotly debated. See generally Research Amici Brief, supra note 3 (amici brief of university
professors and researchers criticizing research in SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3 and summariz-
ing competing research); Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil
Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1497, 1515-22 (2003) (discussing debate over punitive dam-
ages jury research); see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An
Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 743 (2002) (comparing judge and jury performance in
awarding punitive damages and arguing that concerns about juries are unwarranted).
See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994) ("Jury instructions typically
leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a
defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases
against big businesses, particularly those without strong local presences."); TVT Records v. Is-
land DefJam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (providing a detailed
overview of current punitive damages issues, including jury instructions, and noting that "[w]ith
juries guided by such expansive latitude and minimal instructions confining the exercise of
their discretion, erratic or unpredictable punitive awards are bound to result").
See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 3, 11-14, 142-70 (suggesting that vague instructions
permit juries to use inconsistent or improper considerations in setting the amount of punitive
damages awards, but also questioning whether more detailed instructions would result in more
consistent and rational jury decision making); see also Andrew L. Frey, No More Blind Man's Bluff
on Punitive Damages: A Plea to the Drafters of Pattern Jury Instructions, LITIGATION, Summer 2003, at
24 ("[I]t is crystal clear that the current vague and incomplete instructions given to juries in
many states virtually ensure capricious outcomes.").
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA") generally has opposed punitive
damages reform. See, e.g., ATLA, Fact Sheet: Punitive Damages Are Rarely Awarded, The Amounts
Are Small, and Judges, Not Juries, Are More Apt To Give Them, http://www.atla.org/
ConsumerMediaResources/Tier3/press_room/FACTS/pundam/udges.punitives.bjs.aspx (last
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and incomplete instructions juries typically receive all but invite arbi-
trary results.'
In 1991, however, the U.S. Supreme Court approved the use of
skeletal jury instructions, so long as the jurisdiction affords
comprehensive post-verdict review. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Haslip," the Court recognized that procedural due process requires
"adequate guidance from the court and "reasonable constraints"1 3
on the jury's discretion. At the same time, the Court upheld punitive
damages instructions that Justice O'Connor found "'scarcely better
than no guidance at all,' ' r and that Justice Scalia characterized as
"not guidance but platitude. '"15
After Haslip, the Court spent the next decade addressing the con-
stitutional standards for post-verdict review, including the "guide-
posts" courts should use to determine whether an award violates sub-
stantive due process. 16  As for jury instructions, the Court either
visited Feb. 5, 2004) ("While tort 'reform' advocates claim that punitive awards are out of con-
trol .... The truth about punitive damages is that the current system works fairly."). In a Su-
preme Court amicus brief in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct.
1513 (2003), however, ATLA urged the Court to overrule prior decisions upholding substantive
due process post-verdict limits on punitive damages, in part, because "[p] rotection against arbi-
trary and excessive punitive awards is best accomplished by requiring that the factors that are
relevant to assessing an appropriate amount of damages be submitted to juries, accompanied by
clear and specific instructions." Amicus Curiae Brief of the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America in Support of the Respondents at 3, State Farm (No. 01-1289).
10 Jury instructions typically provide guidance on the standards for both imposing punitive
damages and calculating the amount of an award. See generally SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at
11-13. This Article analyzes only the sufficiency of instructions regarding the calculation of the
amount of an award.
11 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
12 Id. at 18.
13 Id. at 20.
14 Id. at 48 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989) (Brennan,J., concurring)).
15 Id. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
16 See discussion infra Part I.C-F. For an explanation of the distinction between procedural
and substantive due process, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES (1997), which provides:
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the govern-
ment must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic proce-
dural due process issues concern what kind of notice and what form of hearing the gov-
ernment must provide when it takes a particular action.
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an
adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, sub-
stantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the govern-
ment's action .... [An] example of the distinction between procedural and substantive
due process can be found in challenges to large punitive damage awards. Procedural
due process requires that there be safeguards such as instructions to the jury to guide
their discretion, and judicial review to assure the reasonableness of the awards. Substan-
tive due process prevents excessive punitive damages awards, regardless of the proce-
dures followed.
Id. at 419-20.
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expressly avoided the issue 7 or implicitly adhered to a core premise
in Haslip: instructional deficiencies can be remedied through post-
verdict protections.'8
Following the Supreme Court's lead, most courts have upheld
scant jury instructions as constitutionally sufficient.' 9 These courts
rarely considered whether the challenged instructions provided
meaningful constraints on the jury's discretion, but simply measured
the instructions against those approved in Haslip." Although several
state legislatures have enacted various limits on punitive damages,"'
most jurisdictions continue to use model jury instructions that pro-
vide little more than the "Haslip-minimum."22 Jurisdictions using
model instructions that go beyond Haslip often add factors that are
more likely to promote improper awards than constrain unbridled
jury discretion.
After years of neglect, the jury instruction issue recently resur-
faced in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell24 Al-
though State Farm focused principally on refining the post-verdict
"guideposts," the decision also signaled that it is time to reevaluate
how courts instruct juries on assessing punitive damages. In State
Farm, the Supreme Court noted increasing "concerns over the impre-
cise manner in which punitive damages systems are administered.",
25
And for the first time, the Court stated that a specific punitive dam-
ages instruction must be given to the jury; the 'Jury must be in-
structed.., that it may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to
punish a defendant for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction
where it occurred."
26
In so doing, the State Farm Court rejected Haslip's premise that
minimal jury instructions necessarily can be remedied by post-verdict
review. Simply stated, if post-verdict review was always a sufficient
check on jury discretion, there would be no need to require
17 See discussion infra Part I.C.
18 See discussion infra Part I.D-F.
19 See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
20 See discussion infra Part II.B. 1.
21 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 615 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pro-
viding an appendix listing state legislative limits on punitive damages, including statutory caps);
see also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 n.6 (2001) (up-
dating Justice Ginsburg's list of states that have added punitive damages caps). For a recent
overview of various state legislative limits on punitive damages, see Victor E. Schwartz & Leah
Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards: Turning Compensation into "Punishment,"
54 S.C. L. REv. 47, 56-58 (2002).
2 See discussion infra Part II.A.
23 See discussion infra Part II.A.
24 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
25 Id. at 1520.
26 Id. at 1522-23.
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instructions on constitutional limits. More importantly, by requiring
courts to instruct the jury on a substantive punitive damages limita-
tion, the Court linked substantive due process with procedural due
process requirements. This convergence of substantive and proce-
dural due process suggests that the core limits on punitive damages,
traditionally considered only post-verdict, influence pre-verdict pro-
cedural requirements and therefore should be provided to the jury in
the first instance.
Part I of this Article traces the pre-State Farm evolution of the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence applying due process limitations to pu-
nitive damages awards. This part discusses the Court's approach to
both procedural and substantive due process, as well as the issues that
emerged as the Court struggled to find its voice on whether and how
the Constitution imposes limits on punitive damages. It also high-
lights the shift in the Court's focus from analyzing primarily just the
amount of a punitive damages award to also considering whether an
award is based upon improper considerations. Part II explores how
the Court's punitive damages decisions have influenced jury instruc-
tions. This part offers an overview of the model punitive damages in-
structions used in each state and by the federal courts, and of Haslip's
legacy on due process challenges to jury instructions.
Part III analyzes State Farm in depth, emphasizing how the Court
resolved several battleground issues regarding judicial application of
substantive due process limits on punitive damages and thereby pro-
vided workable standards that can be conveyed to the jury. Building
on this foundation, Part IV examines State Farm's impact on jury in-
structions. This part argues that the Court's instructional mandate
and heightened concern about punitive damages procedures re-
quires courts to revisit the concepts of "adequate guidance" and "rea-
sonableness" under Haslip. It also argues that there is no sound rea-
son to instruct juries on only one substantive due process protection
and not on others. Part V concludes with an overview of the informa-
tion juries should now be given after State Farm so that they can better
meet their difficult task of translating moral outrage into dollar fig-
ures.
I. DUE PROCESS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES BEFORE STATEFARM
The Supreme Court's consideration of the due process limits on
punitive damages is of recent vintage. From 1991 to 2001, the Court
issued five key decisions27 that attempted to provide a constitutional
27 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion); Pac. Mut. Life Ins.
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framework for an area that has been the subject of "long-enduring
debate."28 By most accounts, that effort failed.
The Court initially addressed procedural due process in 1991,
concluding in Haslip that states must employ procedures that place
reasonable constraints on a jury's discretion in awarding punitive
damages. 3' The Court determined that no "bright-line" test should be
used to evaluate the sufficiency of a jurisdiction's procedures for all
cases.31 Instead, it held "that general concerns of reasonableness and
adequate guidance from the court.., properly enter into the consti-
tutional calculus."
3 2
Just two years later, in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp.,s3 a plurality of the Court recognized substantive due process
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). Additionally, cases in the 1980s laid the groundwork for the
Court's recognition of due process limitations on punitive damages. See Browning-Ferris Indus.
of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989) ("[D]ue process imposes some lim-
its on jury awards of punitive damages, and it is not disputed that a jury award may not be up-
held if it was the product of bias or passion, or if it was reached in proceedings lacking the basic
elements of fundamental fairness."); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988)
(declining to address due process claim that punitive damages were clearly excessive because
the issue was not raised in state court proceedings); see also discussion infra Part I.A.
28 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 8. A New York district court recently discussed in detail the "still unre-
solved" debate over the propriety, functions, and limits of punitive damages, noting that "[t ] he
questions yet unsettled in this dispute continue to vex litigants, courts, legislators and members
of the general public, and thus present formidable challenges to our legal system." TVT Re-
cords v. Island DefJam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
29 Courts, practitioners, and scholars alike have criticized the lack of guidance imparted by
this decade of opinions. The Wyoming Supreme Court, for instance, has described the Su-
preme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence as "tortured." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Shirley, 958
P.2d 1040, 1043 ('Wyo. 1998). One state trial court judge commented that "it has become clear
that the Supreme Court will not provide definitive rules to guide trial courts in assessing and
reviewing punitive damage awards." Douglas G. Harkin, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore:
A TrialJudge's Guide tojury Instructions and Judicial Review of Punitive Damages Awards, 60 MONT. L.
REv. 367, 370 (1999). Practitioners likewise have concluded that the Court's decisions "'estab-
lished no real standard at all.'" Bruce J. McKee, The Implications of BMW v. Gore forFuture Puni-
tive Damages Litigation: Observations from a Participant, 48 ALA. L. REv. 175, 224 (1996) (quoting
Arthur Bryant, Of Trial Lawyers for PublicJustice, inJohn W.R. Murray, U.S. Supreme Court Rules
on 10 Punitive Damages Awards, LAW. WKLY. USA, at 1 (June 3, 1996)). Other practitioners have
described the decisions as an "indecisive mish-mash." Oliver S. Howard, Symposium Transcript:
Punitive Damages, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 937, 942 (1997); accord Mark A. Klugheit, "Where the Rubber
Meets the Road": Theoretical Justifications vs. Practical Outcomes in Punitive Damages Litigation, 52
SYRACUSE L. REV. 803, 804 (2002) ("[B]oth the trial juries which are asked to consider punitive
damages and the courts which are expected to review those awards still do so without standards
they can meaningfully apply."). Scholars, too, have noted that the Court's pre-State Farm juris-
prudence left courts "puzzled" and the "[d]ecisions of lower courts.., in disarray." SUNSTEIN
ETAL., supra note 3, at 244.
3o Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18; see also discussion infra Part I.B.
3 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 ("We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright
line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit
every case.").
32 Id.
33 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
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limits on punitive damages, including the prohibition against "grossly
excessive" punitive awards.34 As with procedural due process, the
Court disavowed any bright-line rule35 for reviewing whether an award
is constitutionally excessive, relying again on a general reasonable-
ness test to be applied on a case-by-case basis. Without concrete
standards, courts cobbled together the fact-specific determinations in
Haslip and TXO into de facto tests for procedural and substantive due
37process review.
In 1996, however, the Court attempted to give further guidance
for post-verdict substantive due process (excessiveness) review. In
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,s8 the Court identified three
"guideposts" that courts should use to determine whether a punitive
damages award comports with substantive due process: (1) the rep-
rehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the relationship be-
tween the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive
damages award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases.3 9 The "BMW guideposts" quickly became part of
the punitive damages vernacular. But the guideposts left plenty of
room for interpretation, leaving lower court decisions in a state of
disarray.' Aside from the problems with the guideposts, courts prac-
tically ignored a separate constitutional limitation announced in
BMW an award may violate due process not only if its size is grossly
excessive, but also if the award is based on improper considerations.
Finally, with all the attention on the BMWguideposts, pre-verdict
procedural protections were left by the wayside. Although the guide-
posts provided criteria to assist post-verdict review for substantive due
process violations, the Court never identified similar constitutional
benchmarks to assess instructions under procedural due process.
Moreover, the Court never addressed whether the BMW guideposts
had any effect on procedural due process requirements at trial, such
34 Id. at 458; see also discussion infra Part I.C.
35 TXO, 509 U.S. at 458.
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 658 (8th Cir. 1995) (using various factors
from TXO and Haslip such as harm to the plaintiff, reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,
and "potential harm to others" to assess the constitutionality of the punitive damages award).
517 U.S. 559 (1996); see also discussion infra Part I.E.
39 BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
40 See sources cited supra note 29.
41 See In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 2004 WL 170354, at *14 (D. Alaska Jan. 28,
2004) ("Most of the courts considering the constitutionality of punitive damages awards have
ignored this first step in the analysis."); see also White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1013 n.56
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding the "first step" should be analysis of state's interest and rejecting ar-
gument that analysis of punitive damages awards begins with guideposts), amended on denial of
reh'k, 335 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2003).
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as whether juries should be instructed on the guideposts or other
constitutional limits on punitive damages. Complicating matters, the
Court's 2001 decision in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group42 held that appellate courts should conduct de novo review of
punitive awards under the guideposts. As a result, trial and appellate
courts independently review punitive damages awards using factors
that in most cases the jury never considered.
All of this set the stage for the Court's recent decision in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.43 There, the Court sug-
gested that substantive due process limits on punitive damages influ-
ence procedural due process constraints on jury discretion, such as
the adequacy of jury instructions.44 State Farm also resolved many of
the ambiguities surrounding the substantive limits, thereby providing
clearer standards to develop complete and accurate jury instructions.
To understand where State Farm has taken us, we first must under-
stand where we've been. The following section reviews in detail the
cluster of decisions leading up to State Farm.
A. Leaving Due Process Issues for "Another Day":
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw and Browning-Ferris
Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court had several opportunities to ad-
dress whether due process places limits on punitive damages awards.
Yet each time, the Court declined to address the issue as either not
properly raised below46 or unnecessary to resolve the appeal.
47
42 532 U.S. 424 (2001); see also discussion infta Part I.F.
43 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
See discussion infra Part III.
45 See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989);
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S.
813 (1986); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1991) (discussing Brown-
ing-Ferris, Bankers Life, Aetna, and other cases where the "Court and individual Justices thereof
on a number of occasions... expressed doubts about the constitutionality of certain punitive
damages awards"). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of punitive damages be-
fore the 1980s, see generally Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive
Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983).46
See, e.g., Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 277 ("[The Due Process argument] must await another
day. Because petitioners failed to raise their due process argument before either the District
Court or the Court of Appeals, and made no specific mention of it in their petition for certio-
rari in this Court, we shall not consider its effect on this award."); Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 76
("[T]hese claims were not raised and passed upon in state court, and we decline to reach them
here.").
47 See Aetna, 475 U.S. at 828-29 ("These [due process and Eighth Amendment] arguments
raise important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved; however, our disposi-
tion of the recusal-for-bias issue makes it unnecessary to reach them.").
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While the Court refused to tackle the issue head-on, several Jus-
tices expressed due process concerns regarding punitive damages. In
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, Justice O'Connor wrote
separately to express her concern that Mississippi's "standardless"
punitive damages system may violate due process:
Under Mississippi law, the jury may award punitive damages for any
common law tort committed with a certain mental state .... Although
this standard may describe the required mental state with sufficient pre-
cision, the amount of the penalty that may ensue is left completely inde-
terminate. As the Mississippi Supreme Court said, "the determination of
the amount of punitive damages is a matter committed solely to the au-
thority and discretion of the jury." This grant of wholly standardless dis-
cretion to determine the severity of punishment appears inconsistent
with due process.50
A year later, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Dis-
posal, Inc.,51 the Court recognized that "[t]here is some authority in
our opinions for the view that the Due Process Clause places outer
limits on the size of a civil damages award made pursuant to a statu-
tory scheme," but did not reach the due process issue.52 Justice Bren-
nan,joined by Justice Marshall, wrote separately to clarify his willing-
ness to hear a due process challenge. Justice Brennan was
particularly troubled by the punitive damages jury instruction used at
trial. The Vermont district court had instructed the jury that in as-
sessing the amount of punitive damages it need only consider "the
character of the defendants, their financial standing, and the nature
of their acts. 54 Justice Brennan criticized this instruction as provid-
ing "scarcely better than no guidance at all." 5 He acknowledged that
48 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
49 AlthoughJustice Scalia joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence, he did not agree with her
due process analysis. In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia explained that he agreed with
Justice O'Connor only in that the Court should not exercise discretion to hear the due process
claims presented by the defendant. Id. at 89 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50 Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted). Despite her concerns, Justice O'Connor agreed with the Bankers Life majority that the
due process question had not been properly presented for review. Id. ("This due process ques-
tion, serious as it is, should not be decided today. The argument was not appellant's principal
submission to this Court.").
51 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
52 Id. at 276-77 (citation omitted). In Browning-Ferris, the Court rejected an Eighth Amend-
ment Excessive Fines Clause challenge to punitive damages awards. Id. at 262-76. The Court
held that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply "when the government neither has prose-
cuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded." Id. at 264.
I5 d. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion on the understanding
that it leaves the door open for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition
of punitive damages in civil cases brought by private parties.").
Id. at 261-62 (citation omitted).
55 Id. at 281 (Brennan,J., concurring).
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the instruction correctly stated Vermont law,56 but concluded that
"the instruction reveals a deeper flaw: the fact that punitive damages
are imposed by juries guided by little more than an admonition to do
what they think is best. "
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens, agreed with Justice
Brennan's concerns about the procedures used by the trial court re-
garding punitive damages, and reiterated the views she expressed in
Bankers Life.58 Because the issue had not been properly raised below,
however, all members of the Court agreed that the due process "in-
quiry must await another day.'59 That day came two years later.
B. Procedural Due Process and the General "Reasonableness" Test:
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,6° the Court faced a
properly presented due process challenge to a punitive damages
award. In an opinion authored by Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens, the
Court held that punitive damages are constrained by procedural due
process but that the "common law method" for assessing punitive
damages used in Alabama was constitutionally sufficient.6 ' Haslip laid
the foundation for all future punitive damages cases by the Supreme
Court. First, the majority's approval of Alabama's minimal jury in-
structions on punitive damages established a benchmark against
56 The Court determined that Vermont law governed the propriety of the punitive damages
claim because the award was based on a state law tort claim. Id. at 261; see also id. at 278 ("In a
diversity action, or in any other lawsuit where state law provides the basis of decision, the pro-
priety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question, and the factors the jury may
consider in determining their amount, are questions of state law.").
57 Id. at 281 (Brennan,J., concurring).
58 Id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor
explained:
I share Justice Brennan's view that nothing in the Court's opinion forecloses a due proc-
ess challenge to awards of punitive damages or the method by which they are imposed,
and I adhere to my comments in [Bankers Life], regarding the vagueness and procedural
due process problems presented by juries given unbridled discretion to impose punitive
damages.
Id. at 283 (citation omitted).
Id. at 276-77; see also id. at 281-82 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Since the Court correctly
concludes that Browning-Ferris' challenge based on the Due Process Clause is not properly be-
fore us, however, I leave fuller discussion of these matters for another day."); id. at 283
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I do, however, agree with the Court
that no due process claims--either procedural or substantive-are properly presented in this
case .... ").
60 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
61 Id. at 16-17 ("[W]e cannot say that the common-law method for assessing punitive dam-
ages is so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional."). Justice
Souter did not participate in the decision.
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which future procedural due process challenges would be measured.
Second, in addition to finding procedural limits on punitive dam-
ages, the decision hinted that substantive due process also places lim-
its on the appropriate size of an award. Finally, the concerns raised
by Justice O'Connor's dissent and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in-
fluenced the Court's later approach to due process limits on punitive
damages.
1. The Majority Opinion
In Haslip, the plaintiffs brought a fraud claim in Alabama state
court against their insurance company after the company's agent
misappropriated the plaintiffs' insurance premiums and then con-
cealed that the plaintiffs had lost coverage.6 The jury returned a ver-
dict for the plaintiffs" and awarded the lead plaintiff $200,000 in
compensatory damages and $840,000 in punitive damages.64  The
Alabama Supreme Court upheld the award.
In the U.S. Supreme Court, the defendant challenged the puni-
tive damages award "as the product of unbridled jury discretion and
as violative of its due process rights., 66 The Court began by discussing
the well-established "common-law method for assessing punitive
awards 6 1 that was used by Alabama and many other states. The
common law method is a three-tiered approach under which "the
amount of the punitive award is initially determined by [1] ajury in-
structed to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter
similar wrongful conduct. The jury's determination is then [2] re-
viewed by trial and [3] appellate courts to ensure that it is reason-
able., 69 Given its long pedigree, the Court held that the common law
approach, as a general matter, was not unconstitutional.70
That said, the Court noted its concern "about punitive damages
that 'run wild' 7 ' and recognized that, even when the common law
method is employed, a defendant nevertheless may be deprived due
62 Id. at 4-7.
63 Id. at 6.
64 Id. at 7 n.2. The jury returned a general verdict for the lead plaintiff in the amount of
$1,040,000. Id. The Supreme Court assumed that "not less than $840,000" was for punitive
damages. Id. The other plaintiffs were awarded total sums ranging from $10,288 to $15,290.
Id. at 7.
65 Id. (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1989)).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 15.
68 Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying notes 388401.
69 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15.
70 Id. at 17 ("[W]e cannot say that the common-law method for assessing punitive damages is
so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional.").
71 Id. at 18.
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72process. The Court declined, however, to create specific constitu-
tional standards for all cases, choosing instead to adopt a general
"reasonableness" and "adequate guidance" test to be applied on a
case-by-case basis:
We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line be-
tween the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unaccept-
able that would fit every case. We can say, however, that general con-
cerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the
case is tried to ajury properly enter into the constitutional calculus.73
With this standard in mind, the Court analyzed the Alabama common
law procedures that resulted in the $840,000 punitive award.
a. Jury Instructions
The Court first assessed the adequacy of the jury instructions. The
trial court's instructions told the jury little more than the punishment
and deterrence purposes of punitive damages.4 While acknowledg-
ing that the instruction provided the 4ury with wide discretion in set-
ting the amount of punitive damages, 5 the Court concluded that the
instruction provided reasonable constraints on the jury's discretion. 6
The instruction did so, the Court determined, in three ways: (1) it
"enlightened the jury as to the punitive damages' nature and
72 See id. ("One must concede that unlimited jury discretion--or unlimited judicial discre-
tion for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's
constitutional sensibilities.").
73 Id.
74 Id. at 19. In its entirety, the challenged jury instruction provided:
Now, if you find that fraud was perpetrated then in addition to compensatory damages
you may in your discretion, when I use the word discretion, I say you don't have to even
find fraud, you wouldn't have to, but you may, the law says you may award an amount of
money known as punitive damages.
This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is not to compensate the plain-
tiff for any injury. It is to punish the defendant. Punitive means to punish or it is also
called exemplary damages, which means to make an example. So, if you feel or not feel,
but if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff, whatever plaintiff
you are talking about, has had a fraud perpetrated upon them and as a direct result they
were injured and in addition to compensatory damages you may in your discretion award
punitive damages.
Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages is to allow money re-
covery to the plaintiffs, it does to the plaintiff, by way of punishment to the defendant
and for the added purpose of protecting the public by detering [sic] the defendant and
others from doing such wrong in the future. Imposition of punitive damages is entirely
discretionary with the jury, that means you don't have to award it unless this jury feels
that you should do so.
Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must take into consid-
eration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and neces-
sity of preventing similar wrong.
Id. at 6 n.1 (alteration in original).
75 Id. at 19.
76 Id. at 20.
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purpose"; (2) it "identified the damages as punishment for civil
wrongdoing of the kind involved"; and (3) it "explained that their
imposition was not compulsory."" These three components, referred
to in this Article as the "Haslip-minimum," later were used by courts
as the constitutional benchmark for punitive damages instructions.
The Court justified its approval of these minimal instructions on
two main grounds. First, the Court explained that juries often exer-
cise discretion based on amorphous legal concepts.78 Under Ala-
bama's system, the jury's discretion in determining punitive damages
was no greater than the discretion typically given to juries in other
areas of the law.79 Second, the Alabama system provided a post-
verdict check on the jury's discretion by requiring courts to apply de-
tailed factors in assessing the validity of punitive damages awards. s
The instruction thus reasonably accommodated the defendant's in-
terest in "rational decisionmaking" and the state's interest in deter-
rence and retribution.81
b. Trial Court Review
The Court next assessed the second tier of Alabama's common
law system-review of a punitive award by the trial court.s2 The Court
noted that the Alabama Supreme Court established a procedure to
evaluate the excessiveness of a punitive damages award. The Ala-
bama multifactor test allowed trial courts to consider: (1) the "cul-
pability of the defendant's conduct"; (2) the "desirability of discour-
aging others from similar conduct"; (3) "the impact upon the
parties"; and (4) the "impact on innocent third parties." The Court
77 Id. at 19.
78 Id. at 20 ("The discretion allowed under Alabama law in determining punitive damages is
no greater than that pursued in many familiar areas of the law as, for example, deciding 'the
best interests of the child,' or 'reasonable care,' or 'due diligence,' or appropriate compensa-
tion for pain and suffering or mental anguish.").
79 Id.
80 Id. at 20-24. The Court noted that Alabama's post-verdict standards for evaluating puni-
tive awards "distinguishe [d] Alabama's system from the Vermont and Mississippi schemes about
which Justices expressed concern in [BrowningFerris and Bankers Life]." Id. at 21 n.10. In both
Browning-Ferris and Bankers Life, the Justices' core criticism was the vague jury instructions used
by the trial courts in each case. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486
U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also
supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text (discussing Browning-Ferris and Bankers Life).
Hasip, 499 U.S. at 20. This language suggests that the Court implicitly applied part of the
Mathews v. Eldridge procedural due process test. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35
(1976) (explaining the test for procedural due process claims); see also infra note 117. In her
dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that Alabama's system failed the Mathews test. Haslip, 499 U.S.
at 53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also infta notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
82 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20.
83 Id.
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found that the Alabama test "ensures meaningful and adequate re-
view by the trial court whenever a jury has fixed the punitive dam-
ages."8
c. Appellate Review
The Court further considered Alabama's system for appellate re-
view of punitive damages awards.85 The Court noted that the Ala-
bama Supreme Court undertook both a "comparative analysis", 6 and
,, • ,,87 •
a "substantive review to ensure that the award did not exceed an
amount that met the goals of punishment and deterrence. 8 The
Court favorably recited seven factors that the Alabama Supreme
Court had adopted in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby89 to determine whether
a punitive award was excessive. 9° These "Green Oil factors" played an
influential role in later punitive damages cases.
Based on this analysis, the Court held that Alabama's punitive
damages system "impose[d] a sufficiently definite and meaningful
constraint on the discretion of Alabama factfinders in awarding puni-
tive damages."91
d. Wealth and Ratio
Finally, the Court touched on two other issues that would take on
significance in later cases. First, the Court noted that in determining
the amount of a punitive damages award, "the factfinder must be
guided by more than the defendant's net worth."12 Second, the Court
acknowledged that substantive due process may also limit the size of a
84 Id.
85 Id. at 20-21.
86 Id. at 21 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1987)).
87 Id.
88 Id.
8539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989).
9 The "Green Oil factors" are as follows:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and
the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually
has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the dura-
tion of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and
frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful
conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of having the defendant also
sustain a loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation;
(f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be
taken in mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for
the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22.
91 Id. at 22.
92 Id.
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punitive damages award.93  Specifically, the Court suggested that re-
gardless of the procedures used, the sheer size of a punitive damages
award might "cross the line into the area of constitutional impropri-
ety."94 But the award in question-which constituted a 4 to 1 ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages-while "close to the line," did not
cross it.
95
2. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia argued that the common law method for assessing
punitive damages, which grants the jury vast discretion, is too firmly
rooted in history and practice to violate due process.96 According to
Justice Scalia, as long as a jurisdiction uses the traditional common
law method and does not violate the Bill of Rights, procedural due
process is satisfied. At the same time, Justice Scalia criticized the
majority's case-by-case "reasonableness test," finding that it "perpetu-
ates the uncertainty that our grant of certiorari in this case was in-
tended to resolve."98 Further, Justice Scalia criticized the Alabama
jury instruction approved by the majority as "not guidance but plati-
tude,"99 and found that no discernable standards governed Alabama's
system of post-verdict review.'00 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia concurred
in the judgment because it comported with the historical practice of
leaving the determination of punitive damages to the jury.
3. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice Scalia that the historical ac-
ceptance of the common law method for assessing punitive damages
foreclosed a due process challenge in the case. But he did not
agree that conformity with historical practice always barred a due
93 Id. at 24. A plurality of the Court recognized a substantive due process right two years
later in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993). See discussion infra
Part I.C.
See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24.
95 Id. at 22-23.
96 Id. at 25 (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority rejected Justice Scalia's approach: "It
would be just as inappropriate to say that, because punitive damages have been recognized for
so long, their imposition is never unconstitutional." Id. at 18. Justice O'Connor also took issue
with Justice Scalia's "static notion of due process," finding that "[d]ue process is not a fixed no-
tion." Id. at 60 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
97 Id. at 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
s Id. at 24.
99 Id. at 37.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 24-25.
102 Id. at 40 (KennedyJ, concurring).
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process challenge. Rather, in some circumstances, an award of pu-
nitive damages assessed under the common law method could violate
due process if the award was "returned by a biased or prejudiced
jury.",0 4  He also disagreed with the majority's reasonableness test,
stating5 that a "bias or prejudice" inquiry would provide firmer guid-
ance.
4. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
Justice O'Connor issued a vehement dissent, arguing that the jury
instructions used by the Alabama trial court violated procedural due
process. Addressing the common law method for instructing juries,
Justice O'Connor noted that states typically provide only vague in-
structions on how to determine the amount of punitive damages.' 6
Such instructions, Justice O'Connor said, are inherently and constitu-
tionally flawed:
In my view, such instructions are so fraught with uncertainty that they
defy rational implementation. Instead, they encourage inconsistent and
unpredictable results by inviting juries to rely on private beliefs and per-
sonal predilections. Juries are permitted to target unpopular defendants,
penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and redistribute wealth.
Multimillion dollar losses are inflicted on a whim. While I do not ques-
tion the general legitimacy of punitive damages, I see a strong need to
provide juries with standards to constrain their discretion so that they
may exercise their power wisely, not capriciously or maliciously. The
Constitution requires as much. 107
Justice O'Connor concluded that these perils materialized in
Haslip.l0s She reasoned that the instructions violated due process un-
der two separate theories.
First, Justice O'Connor opined that the punitive damages instruc-
tion"0 failed the void-for-vagueness doctrine."' The trial court's
103 Id.
104 Id. at 41.
105 Id. at 41-42.
106 Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("States routinely authorize civil juries to impose puni-
tive damages without providing them any meaningful instructions on how to do so. Rarely is a
jury told anything more specific than 'do what you think best.'").
07 Id. at 43.
1o8 Id. ("As is typical, the trial court's instructions in this case provided no meaningful stan-
dards to guide the jury's decision to impose punitive damages or to fix the amount.").
109 Id.
110 Justice O'Connor criticized the instruction's lack of guidance regarding the imposition of
punitive damages as well as the calculation of the amount of the award. Id. at 44-48. As to the
imposition of punitive damages, the jury had been instructed that "[i]mposition of punitive
damages is entirely discretionary with the jury, that means you don't have to award it unless this
jury feels that you should do so." Id. at 44 (emphasis removed). Justice O'Connor commented
that this instruction was "as vague as any I can imagine. It speaks of discretion, but suggests no
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instruction, which directed the jury to consider the defendant's
wrongful conduct and the goal of deterrence in determining the
amount of the award, was "'scarcely better than no guidance at all.'
112
In contrast, Justice O'Connor contended that there existed objective
criteria-the post-verdict Green Oil factors-that could be used to
help guide juries in making rational punitive damages awards."3 Jus-
tice O'Connor stressed that post hoc application of these factors
could not cure the vagueness of the jury instructions: ' 4 "After-the-
fact review of the amount in no way diminishes the fact that the State
entrusts its juries with standardless discretion. ' 5
Second, Justice O'Connor noted that even if the Court rejected
the vagueness rationale, 6  the Alabama instructions failed the
Mathews v. Eldridge1 7 due process test."" Under the Mathews balancing
criteria on which to base the exercise of that discretion.... [T]he instruction suggests that the
jury may do whatever it 'feels' like." Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 43. Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine:
[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and
standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves
judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited
and what is not in each particular case.
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732
(2000) ("A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First, if it
fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what
conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.").
112 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 48 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt.,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring)). Justice
O'Connor readily acknowledged that the instruction was correct as a matter of state law. Id. at
47. But, she argued, merely stating the objectives of punishment and deterrence without pro-
viding any information on how to achieve those goals prevented rational decision making:
"[T]he trial court's instruction identified the ultimate destination, but did not tell the jury how
to get there. Due process may not require a detailed roadmap, but it certainly requires direc-
tions of some sort." Id. at 49. See supra note 74 for the full text of the instruction.
113 See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 51-52 ("This is not a case where more precise standards are either
impossible or impractical .... In my view... the 'Green Oil factors' . . . could assist juries to
make fair, rational decisions.").
114 Id. at 52.
115 Id.
116 The majority rejected the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to the case: "De-
cisions about the appropriate consequences of violating a law are significantly different from
decisions as to whether a violation has occurred." Id. at 24 n.12.
117 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Supreme Court established a three-part balancing
test for assessing procedural due process challenges:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335. For a pre-Haslip argument that the punitive damages procedures used in most juris-
dictions violated due process under Mathews, see Wheeler, supra note 45, at 278-322; see also
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing same).
118 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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test, Justice O'Connor found that (1) the private interests involved
were enormous, ranging up to millions of dollars; 9 (2) the existing
procedures produced unfair and inconsistent awards, and these prob-
lems could be easily remedied by instructing juries on the Green Oil
factors rather than by post hocjudicial review; r2 and (3) the state had
absolutely no interest in "standardlessjury discretion."''
Justice O'Connor forcefully concluded her dissent by stating:
"Alabama's common law scheme ... provides a jury with 'such skele-
tal guidance,' that it invites-even requires-arbitrary results. It gives
free reign to the biases and prejudices of individual jurors, allowing
them to target unpopular defendants and punish selectively. In
short, it is the antithesis of due process.
C. Substantive Due Process and the General "Reasonableness" Test:
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
Just two years after Haslip, the Court returned to the due process
implications of punitive damages.'2 ' Haslip had answered the issue of
whether procedural due process places limits on punitive awards. 2'
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,'2' a plurality opinion
authored by Justice Stevens, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Blackmun, and Justice Kennedy (in part), expressly stated
what Haslip had only hinted: punitive damages may be so large as to
constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property in violation of substan-
tive due process.
1
21
The decision, however, fueled uncertainty in punitive damages ju-
risprudence. The plurality again refused to establish a bright-line
constitutional test and instead adopted Haslip's procedural due proc-
ess reasonableness test as the standard for whether the size of an
19 Id. at 54.
120 Id. at 54-58. Analyzing the fairness of Alabama's existing procedures, Justice O'Connor
thus challenged one of the core premises used by the majority to justify approval of Alabama's
minimal instructions: "Post hoc review tests only the amount of the award, not the procedures by
which that amount was determined.... Any award of punitive damages rendered under these
procedures, no matter how small the amount, is constitutionally infirm." Id. at 43-44; see also id.
at 55-56 (discouraging further the use of post hoc review).
121 Id. at 58. Justice O'Connor recognized that the states have a substantial interest in deter-
rence and punishment, but have no interest in arbitrary punitive damages awards. States can-
not object to "procedural measures that merely ensure that punitive damages awards are based
on some factual or legal predicate, rather than the personal predilections and whims of indi-
viduals jurors." Id. at 59-60.
122 Id. at 63 (citation omitted).
123 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion).
124 See supra text accompanying notes 66-73.
125 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
126 Id. at 446.
.27 Id. at 454.
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award violates substantive due process. 12 In addition, the plurality's
approach to reasonableness opened the door for future punitive
damages battles. Specifically, the plurality suggested that evidence of
a defendant's wealth and out-of-state conduct could support a puni-
tive damages award. 9  Similarly, the plurality's approval of a punitive
award 526 times the amount of compensatory damages conflicted
with Haslip's suggestion that a 4 to 1 ratio was close to the constitu-
tional line.1
30
Although TXO created confusion, the separate opinions by Jus-
tices O'Connor and Kennedy helped shape the Court's future ap-
proach to punitive damages. Justice Kennedy adhered to his view ex-
pressed in Haslip that the appropriate measure of the
constitutionality of a punitive damages award was not the size of the
award, but whether the jury based its award on permissible considera-
tions. 3' Justice O'Connor likewise believed that due process required
the jury to base a punitive damages award on permissible considera-
tions, but further urged the adoption of objective criteria to measure
the constitutionality of an award.
32
1. The Plurality Opinion
TXO Production Corporation brought a declaratory judgment ac-
tion in West Virginia state court to clear a cloud on the title to an in-
terest in oil and gas development rights. 13  The defendant, Alliance
Resources Corporation, counterclaimed for slander of title, claiming
that TXO had filed a frivolous suit in a bad faith effort to renegotiate. 134
a royalty agreement with Alliance. The jury awarded Alliance
$19,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive dam-
ages. The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the award. 36
In the United States Supreme Court, TXO raised a substantive
due process challenge, arguing that "an award 526 times greater than
the actual damages awarded by the jury-is so excessive that it must
be deemed an arbitrary deprivation of property without due process
of law.' 37 TXO also argued that the jury instructions gave the jury
128 Id. at 456-58.
1 Id. at 462 n.28, 464.
130 Id. at 459.
1 Id. at 467-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
132 Id. at 475-501 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 449.
134 Id. at 450.
'.5 Id. at 451.
136 Id. at 453.
137 Id.
Mar. 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITVTIONAL LAW
unbridled discretion and violated procedural due process, even un-
der the lenient standard set forth in Haslip13
a. Substantive Due Process
The plurality first addressed the substantive due process claim.
The opinion acknowledged prior decisions stating that the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed "substantive limits
'beyond which penalties may not go.""i9  While the parties agreed
that due process imposed limits on the amount of punitive damages,
they urged the Court to adopt standards for determining whether a
particular award violated due process. 14° Alliance favored a deferen-
tial "rational-basis" test,14 ' whereas TXO urged the Court to adopt ob-
jective criteria for substantive due process review. 142  The plurality,
however, declined to adopt any definitive test or factors to assess the
excessiveness of awards under substantive due process principles.43
Instead, the plurality adopted the same amorphous reasonableness
standard used in Haslip to assess procedural due process claims:
In the end, then, in determining whether a particular award is so
"grossly excessive" as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we return to what we said two Terms ago in Haslip: "We
need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line be-
tween the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unaccept-
able that would fit every case. We can say, however, that [a] general con-
cer[n] of reasonableness... properly enter[s] into the constitutional
calculus." 1
44
Using reasonableness as a guide, the plurality first addressed
TXO's primary argument that the punitive award was 526 times the
amount of compensatory damages and, therefore, contrary to the
l3 Id. at 462-63.
1s9 Id. at 453-54 (citations omitted).
140 Id. at 455.
141 Id.
142 Id. TXO proposed a test that would gauge a punitive award against: "(1) awards of puni-
tive damages upheld against other defendants in the same jurisdiction, (2) awards upheld for
similar conduct in other jurisdictions, (3) legislative penalty decisions with respect to similar
conduct, and (4) the relationship of prior punitive awards to the associated compensatory
awards." Id. at 455-56 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 16, TXO (No. 02-215)).
143 Id. at 456. The plurality found flaws with the tests proposed by both Alliance and TXO.
Alliance's rational basis standard was flawed because "any award that would serve the legitimate
state interest in deterring or punishing wrongful conduct, no matter how large, would be ac-
ceptable." Id. TXO's standard, on the other hand, disregarded protections provided by the
judicial process. Id. at 456-57. Moreover, the opinion questioned the validity of a test based on
a comparison to other cases where "no two cases are truly identical, [and thus] meaningful
comparisons of such awards are difficult to make." Id. at 457 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1991) (Kennedy,J., concurring)).
144 Id. at 458 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). For Justice Scalia's criticism of the
reasonableness text, see infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
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general rule that punitive damages should bear a "reasonable rela-
tionship" to compensatory damages.' 5 The plurality recognized that
Haslip indicated that a 4 to 1 ratio "'may be close to the line' of con-
stitutional impropriety.' 46  The plurality, however, rejected TXO's
argument that the high ratio rendered the award unreasonable. The
plurality determined that the "dramatic disparity between the actual
damages and the punitive award" 47 was justified on two grounds: (1)
"the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's conduct
would have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had
succeeded";1 48 and (2) "the possible harm to other victims that might
have resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred." 49 Based
on this potential harm analysis, the plurality implicitly suggested that
the ratio should not be considered 526 to 1, but rather not more than
10 to 11 50 Accordingly, the plurality concluded that the large award
did not "'jar one's constitutional sensibilities.""1
5 1
The plurality's approach played a key role in future conflicts over
the appropriate criteria used in any ratio analysis. Some courts justi-
fied multiple-digit ratios with unrealistic assumptions about the "po-
tential harm" to the plaintiff that could have resulted from the mis-
conduct.' Further, several courts interpreted TXO as allowing
consideration of harm to nonparties in the ratio calculation. 53
b. Wealth and Out-of-state Conduct
Retreating from Haslip's skepticism about the misuse of a defen-
dant's wealth in setting a punitive award, 54 the plurality determined
that the award could be justified in part based on TXO's wealth and
out-of-state conduct.15 5 TXO argued that the evidence of its wealth
145 TXO, 509 U.S. at 459-61.
146 Id. at 459 (citation omitted).
147 Id. at 462.
148 Id. at 460. For Justice O'Connor's criticism of the potential harm analysis, see infra note
202.
149 TXO, 509 U.S. at 460.
150 Cf id. at 462. The plurality did not explicitly characterize the award as a 10 to I ratio.
Rather, it explained that if TXO's fraud had succeeded, Alliance could have lost anywhere from
$1 million to $8.3 million in royalties, effectively resulting in a ratio of not more than ten times
the $10 million punitive award. Id. at 462. The Court later expressly characterized the ratio in
TXOas "not more than 10 to 1." BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996).
1 TXO, 509 U.S. at 462 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 409 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
152 See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 442 (2001)
(discussing the lower court's reliance on "unrealistic" potential harm analysis tojustify punitive
damages award).
153 See sources cited infra note 374.
154 See supra discussion accompanying note 92.
15 TXO, 509 U.S. at 461-62.
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and out-of-state conduct 1 56 allowed the jury to base its punitive dam-
ages award on improper considerations, such as prejudice against
large out-of-state corporations.' 57 Although recognizing that this evi-
dence increased the risk that the jury might act out of bias,"5 the plu-
rality stated that "factors such as these are typically considered in as-
sessing punitive damages.'
59
c. Procedural Due Process
The plurality then turned to TXO's procedural due process chal-
lenge . 6  TXO challenged the punitive damages instruction given to
the jury because it was different from the skeletal Haslip instruction in
two respects.6' First, the instruction allowed the jury to consider "the
wealth of the perpetrator.', 162 Second, it stated that one of the pur-
poses of punitive damages is "to provide additional compensation for
the conduct to which the injured parties have been subjected.' 63 The
plurality recognized the risks posed by these aspects of the jury
156 Id. at 462 n.28.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 464 (noting that "emphasis on the wealth of the wrongdoer increased the risk that
the award may have been influenced by prejudice against large corporations").
5 Id. at 462 n.28. Justices White, O'Connor, and Souter disagreed with the plurality's wealth
determination. See discussion infra accompanying notes 204-07.
160 TXO, 509 U.S. at 462-66.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 463. In its entirety, the challenged instruction provided:
In addition to actual or compensatory damages, the law permits the jury, under cer-
tain circumstances, to make an award of punitive damages, in order to punish the
wrongdoer for his misconduct, to serve as an example or warning to others not to en-
gage in such conduct and to provide additional compensation for the conduct to which
the injured parties have been subjected.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that TXO Production Corp. is guilty
of wanton, wilful, malicious or reckless conduct which shows an indifference to the right
of others, then you may make an award of punitive damages in this case.
In assessing punitive damages, if any, you should take into consideration all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the particular occurrence, including the nature of the wrong-
doing, the extent of the harm inflicted, the intent of the party committing the act, the
wealth of the perpetrator, as well as any mitigating circumstances which may operate to
reduce the amount of the damages. The object of such punishment is to deter TXO
Production Corp. and others from committing like offenses in the future. Therefore the
law recognizes that to in fact deter such conduct may require a larger fine upon one of
large means than it would upon one of ordinary means under the same or similar cir-
cumstances.
Id. at 463 n.29.
163 Id. at 463-64.
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instruction,6 4 but declined to address TXO's procedural due process
challenge because the issue "was not properly presented.',
6 5
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy wrote separately to express his view on the re-
quirements of substantive due process. 66 Justice Kennedy concluded
that Haslip's general reasonableness test was not significantly better
than the tests proposed by the parties: "To ask whether a particular
award of punitive damages is grossly excessive begs the question: ex-
cessive in relation to what?"' Justice Kennedy explained that the
reasonableness standard failed to impose meaningful restraints on a
jury, and instead gave "the illusion of judicial certainty where none in
fact exists.'
6 s
In his view, the proper constitutional inquiry "focuses not on the
amount of money a jury awards in a particular case but on its reasons
for doing so.",6 9 Specifically, Justice Kennedy reiterated his Haslip po-
sition that the proper constitutional inquiry considers whether the
jury based its award on improper considerations, such as "bias, pas-
sion or prejudice."'7 ° Thus, Justice Kennedy observed that it is possi-
ble for a punitive damages award to violate substantive due process
regardless of the amount of the award. 7 '
Consequently, Justice Kennedy looked for any indication that the
jury based its award on improper considerations. He conceded that
there was a "plausible argument"' 2 that the jury based its award on
If4 See id. at 464 (noting that the plurality did "not understand the reference in the instruc-
tion to 'additional compensation'"); see also supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing consideration of wealth).
165 TXO, 509 U.S. at 464. The plurality also rejected TXO's argument that the trial judge's
failure to articulate his reasons for upholding the award violated procedural due process. Id. at
464-65. Finally, the plurality rejected TXO's claim that it lacked "notice of the possibility that
the award of punitive damages might be divorced from an award of compensatory damages."
Id. at 465. The plurality noted that TXO had notice that punitive damages had been upheld in
West Virginia even in the absence of any compensatory damages and, in any event, "the notice
component of the Due Process Clause is satisfied if prior law fairly indicated that a punitive
damages award might be imposed in response to egregiously tortious conduct." Id. at 465-66.
16 Id. at 466 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Ken-
nedy concurred only in the plurality's discussion of the facts and procedural due process.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 467. Justice Kennedy viewed the general reasonableness test as giving a reviewing
court virtually "nothing more than its own subjective reaction to a particular punitive damages
award in deciding whether the award violates the Constitution." Id. at 466-67.
169 Id. at 467.
170 Id.
171 Id. ("When a punitive damages award reflects bias, passion, or prejudice on the part of the
jury, rather than a rational concern for deterrence and retribution, the Constitution has been
violated, no matter what the absolute or relative size of the award.").
17 Id. at 468.
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bias against a large, out-of-state corporation.' 7 Nevertheless, Justice
Kennedy found a more probable explanation for the jury's award: a
legitimate decision to harshly punish TXO because of the willful and
malicious nature of its conduct.1 7 4  While noting that the case was
"close and difficult,"'7 5 Justice Kennedy concluded that "the jury's pu-
nitive damages award did not amount to an unfair, arbitrary, or irra-
tional seizure of TXO's property.,01
3. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, disagreed with the plural-
ity's substantive due process holding.177 Justice Scalia began his con-
currence by restating his Haslip view that due process requires only
the assessment of punitive damages under the common law
method. v17  Because the punitive damages award resulted from this
common law method, Justice Scalia believed due process was satis-
fied.
1 79
Justice Scalia, however, wrote separately to challenge the plural-
ity's determination that the Due Process Clause provides a substantive
right to a reasonable punitive damages award. 8  To say that proce-
dural due process' requires judicial review of punitive damages
awards for reasonableness," he explained, "is not to say that there is a
federal constitutional right to a substantively correct 'reasonableness'
determination."' ' Justice Scalia argued that a substantive due process
right to a reasonable amount of punitive damages rendered the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause superfluous.
8
173 Id.
174 Id. at 469.
175 Id. at 468.
176 Id. at 469.
177 Id. at 470 (ScaliaJ., concurring in the judgment).
18 Id. Justice Scalia noted that the jury was instructed on the purpose of punitive damages,
and the award was reviewed by the trial court and appellate courts. In his view, "[tiraditional
American practice governing the imposition of punitive damages requires no more." Id.
19 Id. Accordingly, Justice Scaliajoined in the judgment, rejecting TXO's claims.
180 Id. at 471 ("Judicial assessment of their reasonableness is a federal right, but a correct as-
sessment of their reasonableness is not."). The plurality took issue with Justice Scalia's charac-
terization of its holding:
Justice Scalia's assertion notwithstanding, we do not suggest that a defendant has a sub-
stantive due process right to a correct determination of the "reasonableness" of a puni-
tive damages award.... A violation of a state law "reasonableness" requirement would
not, however, necessarily establish that the award is so "grossly excessive" as to violate the
Federal Constitution.
Id. at 458 n.24 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
181 Id. at 471 (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment).
182 Id. (arguing that if the Due Process Clause "contains the substantive right not to be sub-
jected to excessive punitive damages, . . . it would surely also contain the substantive right not to
[Vol. 6:3
INSTRUCTING JURIES ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Tongue-in-cheek, Justice Scalia purported to find the plurality
opinion "valuable 1 83 because its lack of meaningful standards did
nothing to change "the traditional ones that ought to govern.' ' 184 He
observed that future cases would "be disposed of simply with the ob-
servation that 'this is no worse than TXO.
''l8 5
4. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
Consistent with her Haslip dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justice White and Justice Souter (in part) ,86 concluded that "neither
this award's size nor the procedures that produced it are consistent
with the principles this Court articulated in Haslip.'
8 7
First, Justice O'Connor emphasized her Haslip position that due
process requires adequate jury instructions."' Justice O'Connor
found that the "vague and amorphous guidance"'88 provided to juries
on punitive damages heightens the risk of "prejudice, bias, and ca-
price." '90 For example, Justice O'Connor noted that while jurors may
be instructed that the goal of punitive damages is punishment and
deterrence, courts rarely educate juries on how to reach these
goals.' ' While conceding that such instructions may satisfy Haslip,
Justice O'Connor concluded that "the lack of clear guidance height-
ens the risk that arbitrariness, passion, or bias will replace dispassion-
ate deliberation as the basis for the jury's verdict."' 2 Justice
O'Connor noted the difficulty of determining whether a punitive
damages award is the result of passion or prejudice, but indicated
be subjected to excessive fines, which would make the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment superfluous in light of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment").
183 Id. at 472.
184 Id. at 471.
185 Id. at 472.
186 Justice Souter joined only in Justice O'Connor's discussion on "permissible considera-
tions" (Part II-B-2), the jury's consideration of TXO's wealth (Part 1I-C), the insufficiency of the
post-verdict review (Part III), and the conclusion (Part IV). Id. at 472. In the end, Justice
Souter took no position on whether substantive due process imposes any limits on the amount
of punitive damages awards.
187 Id. at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 473-75.
189 Id. at 474.
190 Id. Later in her dissent, Justice O'Connor further criticized the lack of reform by the
lower courts after Haslip: "[A] lthough some courts have made genuine efforts at reform, many
courts continue to provide jurors with skeletal guidance that permits the traditional guarantor
of fairness-the jury itself-to be converted into a source of caprice and bias." Id. at 500-01.
191 Id at 474-75.
192 Id. at 475. Justice O'Connor went on to state that "[i]f there is a fixture of due process, it
is that a verdict based on such influences cannot stand." Id. at 475-76.
193 Id. at 476.
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that the award's lack of proportionality may provide one measure of
bias.
194
Second, while Justice O'Connor agreed that substantive due proc-
ess imposes limits on punitive damages,195 she criticized the plurality
for adopting the Haslip general reasonableness test instead of more
objective criteria for assessing the constitutionality of punitive
awards.1 96 Instead, Justice O'Connor concluded that TXO's proposed
test 97 was probative of whether the award violated due process.'8 Ap-
plying the proposed test,19Justice O'Connor concluded that relation-
ship of the punitive to the compensatory award was "dramatically ir-
regular, if not shocking" and "[a]t the very least it should raise a
suspicious judicial eyebrow. 2 0 0 Justice O'Connor acknowledged that,
in some cases, a disproportionate award may be justified by "unreal-
ized harm to the victim" or the "defendant's anticipated gain."20'
However, she concluded that the record in TXO did not support• • 202
these justifications.
Third, Justice O'Connor analyzed whether the jury relied on im-
permissible factors in calculating the punitive damages award: "After
all, due process does not simply require that a particular result be
substantively acceptable; it also requires that it be reached on the
194 Id. at 478-79 ("[C]ourts historically have required that punitive damages awards bear a
reasonable relationship to the actual harm imposed.").
195 Id. at 479-80.
19 Id. at 479 ("The plurality opinion erects not a single guidepost to help other courts find
their way through this area. Rather .... the plurality abandons all pretense of providing in-
struction and moves directly into the specifics of this case.").
197 TXO suggested that -to assess whether an award is grossly excessive in violation of due
process, courts should evaluate "various objective indicators, including the relationship between
the punitive damages award and compensatory damages, awards of punitive damages upheld
against other defendants in the same jurisdiction, awards upheld for similar torts in otherjuris-
dictions, and legislatively designated penalties for similar misconduct." Id. at 481. See also su-
pra note 142 for the plurality's characterization of TXO's proposed factors.
198 TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 481-84. Justice O'Connor went through each one of TXO's proposed factors. First,
she found that the disparity between the $10 million punitive award-"over 500 times actual
damages-surely must cross" the line of "constitutional impropriety." Id. at 482 (citations omit-
ted). Next, she compared the award against other punitive damages awards in West Virginia:
"It is 20 times larger than the highest punitive damages award ever upheld in West Virginia his-
tory for any misconduct." Id. She further noted that the award was 10 times greater than any
punitive damages awards for slander in other jurisdictions. Id. She did not consider TXO's
final factor, comparable statutory penalties in West Virginia.
200 Id. at 481.
201 Id. at 484.
202 Id. Justice O'Connor criticized the plurality's reliance on "potential harm" ratio analysis
as unsupported by the record: "The record demonstrates that the potential harm theory is little
more than an after-the-fact rationalization invented by counsel to defend this startling award on
appeal." Id. at 484-85. Likewise, based on the evidence in the record, Justice O'Connor con-
cluded that the jury did not have evidence of TXO's "potential gain." Id. at 488-89.
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basis of permissible considerations. 2 13 Justice O'Connor determined
that TXO's status as a wealthy, out-of-state corporation exerted an
improper influence on the jury. °4 Unlike the instruction in Haslip,
the TXO instruction directed the jury to consider TXO's wealth and
to "provide additional compensation. 2 0 ' These factors, she con-
cluded, "encouraged the jury to transfer some of TXO's impressive
wealth to the smaller and more sympathetic respondents .... [T]he
instructions practically ensured that this would occur. "201 Justice
O'Connor recognized that consideration of a defendant's wealth it-
self was not unconstitutional, but seemed to suggest that wealth
207should be considered only by the courts during appellate review.
Finally, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality's procedural
due process ruling, concluding that TXO's challenge was both ade-
quately preserved and meritorious. Although the instructions
were similar to those approved in Haslip, Justice O'Connor found the
post-verdict review lacking and unable to cure the instructional defi-
210ciencies.
D. Procedural Due Process Requires Post-verdict Review
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg
One year after TXO, the Court revisited procedural due process in
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg.21  In an opinion authored by Justice Ste-
vens, joined by Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, and Thomas, the Court held that procedural due process re-
quires post-verdict review of punitive damages awards by trial and ap-
pellate courts. While addressing procedural due process, the deci-
sion did not alter Haslip's reasonableness test, but simply determined
that a state generally cannot take away historical procedural checks
on punitive awards.
2 'Z
203 Id. at 486.
204 Id. at 489 ("[I]t seems quite likely that the jury in fact was unduly influenced by the fact
that TXO is a very large, out-of-state corporation.").
20 Id.
I d. at 490.
207 Id. at 492 ("Haslip itself suggests that the defendant's wealth is a permissible considera-
tion, although it does so only in the context of appellate review." (citation omitted)).
2s Id. at 495.
209 Id. at 495-96.
210 Id. at 496-97.
211 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
212 Id. at 432.
213 The unusual nature of the issue allowed several Justices to join the decision. Oregon's
elimination of procedural constraints on punitive damages brought Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor, both of whom were critical of the lack of constraints on jury discretion, into the ma-
jority. Similarly, Oregon's departure from historic common law practices likely prompted Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas to join the majority.
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1. The Majority Opinion
In Oberg, the plaintiff brought a products liability action against an
all-terrain vehicle manufacturer for injuries sustained when the plain-
tiff's vehicle overturned. 4  The jury awarded the plaintiff
$735,512.31215 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive
damages.216 On appeal, the defendant challenged both the award's
excessiveness and Oregon's prohibition against post-verdict review of
the amount of a punitive damages award. The Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed the verdict.
2 18
Although the defendant challenged the size of the award,2 9 the
United States Supreme Court limited its opinion to deciding whether
Oregon's prohibition of judicial review violated procedural due
process under Haslip. Starting with Haslip's premise that the com-
mon law method for assessing punitive damages provides the bench-
mark for constitutional analysis, the Court focused on Oregon's de-
parture from traditional procedures.2
Finding that Oregon's ban on post-verdict review drastically de-
parted221 from the three-tiered common law method for reviewing
punitive damages, the Court considered whether the departure was
justified.22  There had been no social changes nor technological
improvements that would justify reducing judicial checks on punitive
damages.224 To the contrary, the Court determined that "the rise of
large, interstate and multinational corporations has aggravated the
214 Oberg, 512 U.S. at'418.
215 Id. The jury originally awarded $919,390.39 in compensatory damages, but this amount
was reduced by twenty percent because of the plaintiffs contributory fault. Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. At the time of Oberg, Oregon courts could not reduce the amount of a punitive dam-
ages award on the ground of excessiveness. Id. Rather, a court could vacate the judgment only
if there was "no evidence to support the jury's decision." Id. at 419 (quoting Honda Motor Co.
v. Oberg, 851 P.2d 1084, 1096 (Or. 1993)).
218 Oberg, 851 P.2d 1084.
219 Oberg, 512 U.S. at 418. The Court adopted the plurality view in TXO that "the Constitu-
tion imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards." Id. at 420. The Court
further recognized that TXO failed to provide any "standard that will identify unconstitutionally
excessive awards," but decided that Obergdid not present this issue for review. Id.
M Id. at 421 (stating that the opinions in Haslip and TXOsuggest the Court's analysis in Oberg
"should focus on Oregon's departure from traditional procedures").
21 Id. at 426 ("There is a dramatic difference between the judicial review of punitive damages
awards under the common law and the scope of review available in Oregon.").
222 Id. at 430. The Court noted that the abrogation of a common law protection presump-
tively violated due process. Id. "When the absent procedures would have provided protection
against arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication, this Court has not hesitated to find the proceed-
ings violative of due process." Id. (citations omitted).
22 Id. at 431.
n4 Id.
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problem of arbitrary awards and potentially biased juries. 22' 5 For in-
stance, the Court recognized that juries often have wide latitude in
setting the amounts of awards and the presentation of evidence of a
defendant's wealth creates the risk that juries will improperly use
their verdicts to express bias against big business. 26 The Court held
that judicial review is one of the few procedural safeguards the com-
mon law provided against such dangers, and Oregon could not prop-
erly remove that restraint absent a valid justification or adoption of
221substitute procedural protections.
Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiffs (and the dissent's) ar-
gument that other safeguards rendered Oregon's system constitu-
tionally sufficient.228 The plaintiff pointed to four safeguards: (1) the
limitation of a punitive damages award to the amount pled in the
complaint; (2) the clear and convincing standard of proof; (3) the
availability of a pre-verdict determination by the court of a maximum
amount of punitive damages; and (4) Oregon's detailed jury instruc-
tions.2 ' The Court found that none of these safeguards could replace
the need for post-verdict review.230 Regarding Oregon's detailed jury
instructions, the Court recognized that proper jury instructions are
an "important check against excessive awards," but expressed con-
cern that the jury would disregard the instructions and return an im-
properly biased or arbitrary verdict. 231 Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that Oregon's denial of judicial review violated procedural
212due process.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 432. The Court noted that "[p]unitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary
deprivation of property," and explained that jury instructions often provide no real check on
the jury's discretion:
Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and
the presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries
will use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly those without
strong local presences. Judicial review of the amount awarded was one of the few proce-
dural safeguards which the common law provided against that danger.
Id.
227 See id. ("Oregon has removed that safeguard without providing any substitute procedure
and without any indication that the danger of arbitrary awards has in any way subsided over
time.").
228 Id. at 432-35.
229 Id. at 433.
230 The Court reasoned that the cap was no constraint at all since "there is no limit to the
amount the plaintiff can request" in punitive damages in the complaint. Id. While the clear
and convincing standard "is an important check," the Court determined that it only provided a
limit on the imposition of punitive damages, not protection against an excessive amount. Id.
The Court rejected the third safeguard since there was no support for the proposition that
Oregon courts set maximum punitive damages awards in advance of the verdict. Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 435.
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2. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
AlthoughJustice Scaliajoined the majority, he wrote separately to
elaborate on the history of Oregon's departure from the common law
method. 3  Consistent with his adherence to the historical approach
to punitive damages procedures, Justice Scalia concluded that Ore-
gon's departure from the common law method violated due proc-
234ess.
3. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented.3 '
Justice Ginsburg noted that neither Haslip nor TXO "declared any
specific procedures or substantive criteria essential to satisfy due
process," but instead referred to general concerns of reasonable-
ness.23 6  The dissent argued that four pre-verdict mechanisms ade-
quately constrained the jury'% discretion, eliminating the need for
231post-verdict review.
In particular, Justice Ginsburg focused on (1) the limit of a puni-
tive damages award to the amount pled in the complaint; 238 (2) the
plaintiffs inability to introduce evidence regarding the defendant's
wealth until after presenting a prima facie claim of punitive dam-
ages; 2 9 (3) the application of the clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard;240 and (4) Oregon's multifactorjury instructions. 41 With regard
to jury instructions, Justice Ginsburg noted that Oregon's multifactor
instructions resembled the seven Green Oil factors that Alabama
courts used to test punitive awards. She noted that Haslip looked to
233 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia explained that Oregon originally had provided a
state-law "reasonableness" limit on the amount of punitive damages, but amended its proce-
dures in 1910 to prevent a court from ordering a remittitur. Id. at 435-36.
234 Id. at 436 ("The deprivation of property without observing (or providing a reasonable
substitute for) an important traditional procedure for enforcing state-prescribed limits upon
such deprivation violates the Due Process Clause.").
235 Id. at 436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2M Id. at 437.
237 Id. at 438-41.
238 Id. at 438. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Oregon law did not preclude a defendant
"from seeking an instruction setting a lower cap, if the evidence at trial cannot support an
award in the amount demanded." Id. at 439.
239 Id. Justice Ginsburg found that this limitation was "designed to lessen the risk 'that juries
will use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses.'" Id. (quoting id. at 432 (majority
opinion)).
240 Id. at 439-40. In Justice Ginsburg's view, the "clear and convincing evidence" standard
"'constrain [s] the jury's discretion, limiting punitive damages to the more egregious cases.'" Id.
at 440 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 58 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing)).
241 Id. at 440-41.
2U Id. at 443.
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the "'procedure, as a whole and in its net effect.'-'2 Justice Ginsburg
argued that the case presented the flip side of Haslip. Unlike Haslip,
where stronger post-verdict review compensated for minimal instruc-
tions, in Oberg the detailed jury instructions244 made up for the lim-
ited 24 5 post-verdict review24  by providing adequate constitutional
guidance to the jury in its assessment of punitive damages.247
E. Defining Reasonableness for Substantive Due Process Through the
"Guideposts": BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
In 1996, the Court shifted its focus back to the substantive due
process limits on punitive damages. In BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore,248 an opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, the Court did two firsts: it articulated
specific post-verdict standards for punitive damages review and it
struck down an award as "'unconstitutionally excessive.'
2 4 9
While announcing "guideposts" to assist the lower courts, the
Court still disclaimed any bright-line test and adhered to its prior rea-
sonableness standard. The lower courts, however, treated the guide-
posts as the definitive constitutional test. Importantly, BMWalso rec-
ognized-as Justices O'Connor and Kennedy previously had urged-
that a proper due process inquiry does not just focus on the amount
of the award, but also considers whether it is based on improper con-
siderations. Although establishing a framework for the constitution-
ality of punitive damages awards, the decision prompted divergent
lower court interpretations and widespread criticism that the Court
had provided no real standards at all.2'
243 Id. at 444 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 851 P.2d 1084, 1096 (Or. 1993)).
244 Id. at 441. Justice Ginsburg observed that jury instructions "are perhaps more likely to
prompt rational and fair punitive damage decisions than are the post hoc checks employed in
jurisdictions following Alabama's pattern." Id. at 444.
245 Although Oregon did not allow post-verdict review for excessiveness, Justice Ginsburg
pointed out that Oregon law did allow limited post-verdict review for lack of evidence to sup-
port the verdict or for instructional error. Id. at 445-46.
246 Id. at 443-44 (noting that unlike Alabama, Oregon does not allow excessiveness review by
the trial court or appellate review to test the award against certain specific criteria).
247 Id. at 450. Finally, Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's view that the common
law provided judicial remittitur of the size of a punitive damages award. Id. at 443-44. In her
view, early American common law suggested that juries were given vast discretion, even to de-
termine the law. An assessment of damages was "exclusively a jury function." Id. at 447. She
also noted that common law did not require Oregon's multifactor instructions. Id. at 448.
248 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
249 Id. at 568 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994)).
250 See infra notes 372-77 and accompanying text.
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1. The Majority Opinion
The plaintiff sued BMW, a car manufacturer, for fraud based on
BMW's failure to disclose that the plaintiffs new car had been re-
painted to cover pre-delivery damage to the vehicle from acid rain.25'
The plaintiff sought $4000 in compensatory damages, 52 and $4 mil-
lion in punitive damages. The plaintiff justified the $4 million puni-
tive request by multiplying the $4000 actual damages by the thousand
similar violations BMW had committed nationwide. s The jury ap-
parently applied this calculation, awarding the full amount of com-
pensatory and punitive damages requested by the plaintiff.
2 54
In post-verdict motions, BMW showed that its nondisclosure policy
was consistent with the laws of roughly twenty-five states and argued
that the jury's $4 million punitive award therefore was improperly
based on lawful conduct.2 5 5 BMW further contended that the award
was unconstitutionally excessive.25 Applying the Green Oil factors dis-
cussed in Haslip, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.2 7 The Ala-
bama Supreme Court, however, agreed that the jury improperly cal-
culated the $4 million punitive award by multiplying the plaintiffs
compensatory damages by the number of similar sales in other juris-
dictions.258 To remedy this error, the Alabama Supreme Court re-
duced the award to $2 million, disclaiming that any portion of the
reduced award had been based on sales that occurred in other juris-
dictions.259
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the
$2 million award was grossly excessive.260 The Court began by answer-
ing the question posed by Justice Kennedy in TXO. "grossly excessive
in relation to what?, 26' The Court determined that the excessiveness
of a punitive damages award must be measured by reference to "the
251 BMW, 517 U.S. at 563 & n.1.
252 See id. at 564 (basing compensatory damage on expert testimony claiming that the value of
a repainted BMW is approximately ten percent less than the value of an undamaged new car).
253 Id.
254 Id. at 565.
255 Id. (stating none of the twenty-five states mandated disclosure of repairs costing less than
three percent of the suggested retail price of a car).
256 Id. at 566.
257 See id. at 566-67 (articulating the factors in Green Oil v. Horsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24
(Ala. 1989), and approved in Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991)).
2 Id. at 567.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 575.
261 See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 466 (1993) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) ("To ask whether a particular award of punitive damages is grossly excessive begs the
question: excessive in relation to what?"); see also supra text accompanying notes 166-76.
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State's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence, '62 and set
forth a two-step process for excessiveness review.
a. Identifying the State Interest
Because substantive due process prohibits awards that are grossly
excessive in relation to a state's punitive damages interests, "the fed-
eral excessiveness inquiry appropriately begins with an identification
of the state interests that a punitive award is designed to serve. 263 In
essence, the Court determined that a punitive damages award based
on considerations that a state has no interest in punishing or deter-
ring necessarily is grossly excessive. The Court held that Alabama
had a legitimate interest in punishing and deterring BMW for
fraud. 64 As a matter of federalism and state sovereignty, however, the
Court determined that Alabama had no legitimate interest in impos-
ing punitive damages with the intent of changing a "tortfeasors' law-
ful conduct in other States."265 Consequently, the Court determined
that Alabama could not alter a defendant's nationwide policies, when
those policies were lawful elsewhere, 26 and a punitive damages award
imposed to do so was improper.
Finally, the Court discussed two issues that would become perti-
nent in later cases. First, while recognizing that an award cannot be
used to punish out-of-state conduct that was lawful where it occurred,
the Court reaffirmed TXO's recognition that a defendant's out-of-
state transactions may be admissible evidence relevant to assessing the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.2 67 The Court, however,
stated that the Alabama Supreme Court "properly eschewed reliance
262 BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 ("Only when an award can fairly be categorized as 'grossly excessive'
in relation to these interests does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
263 Id.
2C64 Id. at 568, 568-74 ("No one doubts that a state may protect its citizens by prohibiting de-
ceptive trade practices and by requiring automobile distributors to disclose presale repairs that
affect the value of a new car.").
265 Id. at 572.
266 Id. at 572-73 ("Alabama does not have the power.., to punish BMW for conduct that was
lawful where it occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or its residents. Nor may Alabama
impose sanctions on BMW ... to deter conduct that is lawful in other jurisdictions." (citation
omitted)).
267 Id. at 574 n.21. The Court explained:
[T] he fact that the Alabama Supreme Court correctly concluded that it was error for the
jury to use the number of sales in other States as a multiplier in computing the amount
of its punitive sanction does not mean that evidence describing out-of-state transactions
is irrelevant in a case of this kind. To the contrary, as we stated in [ 7XO], such evidence
may be relevant to the determination of the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct.
Id.; see also id. at 573 n.19 (noting that extraterritorial conduct remains relevant to assessing the
"defendant's character and prospects for rehabilitation").
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on BMW's out-of-state conduct, and based its remitted award solely
on conduct that occurred within Alabama."261 Second, the Court left
open whether a state could punish out-of-state conduct that was
unlawful in the state where the conduct occurred. 69
b. Excessiveness Standards
The Court then turned to whether the award was grossly excessive
in relation to Alabama's interest in punishing unlawful conduct
within its borders. v° Implicitly responding to Justice O'Connor's dis-
sent in TXO criticizing the lack of objective due process standards,7i
the Court identified three "guideposts" in determining whether an
award is unconstitutionally excessive: (1) the degree of reprehensi-
bility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual
harm or potential harm to the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damaes award
and civil or criminal penalties imposed in comparable cases.
The Court characterized reprehensibility as "[p1erhaps the most
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award,"273 and described a sliding scale of reprehensible conduct: vio-
lent crimes more reprehensible than nonviolent crimes;274 trickery
and deceit more reprehensible than negligence;2  conduct causing
physical harm more reprehensible than conduct causing purely eco-
nomic harm;276 deliberate false statements more reprehensible than
omissions of material facts; 2 77 and repeated conduct more reprehen-
sible than an isolated incident.2 8 The Court cited Justice Kennedy's
268 Id. at 573-74 (citation omitted).
269 See id. at 573 n.20 ("Given that the verdict was based in part on out-of-state conduct that
was lawful where it occurred, we need not consider whether one State may properly attempt to
change a torffeasor's unlawful conduct in another state.").
270 Id. at 574. The Court began its analysis by explaining that a defendant is entitled to "fair
notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of
the penalty that a State may impose." Id.
27 Cf TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 480 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) ("But the course the plurality chooses is, in fact, no course at all. The plurality opinion
erects not a single guidepost to help other courts find their way through this area." (emphasis
added)); see supra text accompanying notes 196-98.
272 BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75.
273 Id. at 575.
274 See id. at 576 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292-93 (1983)).
275 Id. (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 462).
276 See id. (finding that BMW inflicted only economic harm and did not endanger the health
or safety of others). The Court noted that purely economic harm may be more serious when
done intentionally or when the target is financially vulnerable. Id.
277 Id. at 580.
278 Id. at 576-77. The Court noted that a recidivist may be punished more severely: "Cer-
tainly, evidence that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in prohibited conduct while knowing
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TXO concurrence wherein Kennedy found that the defendant's "in-
tentional malice was the decisive element in a 'close and difficult'
,,279case.
Applying these factors, the Court concluded that BMW's conduct
was not sufficiently reprehensible to justify a $2 million punitive
damages award. 28 0 The Court reasoned that the injury to the plaintiff
was purely economic,281 BMW's nondisclosure did not affect the car's
performance or safety,2 2 BMW did not act maliciously,282 and the
company was not a recidivist.
284
The Court then turned to the second guidepost: the relationship
of the punitive damages award to the plaintiffs harm. 28 5 While reject-
ing a "simple mathematical formula,"2 6 the Court referenced the
common law history of double, treble, and quadruple damages,7 and
discussed the ratios of punitive to compensatory damages in Haslip
and TXO.2 1 Haslip, with its 4 to 1 ratio, fit comfortably within the his-
torical framework, and therefore, did not "'cross the line into the
area of constitutional impropriety.' 289 Although the ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages in TXO was 526 to 1, the BMW Court used
TXO's potential harm analysis and characterized the true TXO ratio
as no more than 10 to 1.290 The Court then reasoned that the 500 to 1
ratio in BMWwas "breathtaking, 291 and, quoting Justice O'Connor's
dissent in TXO, "'raise [d] a suspicious judicial eyebrow.'
2 2
or suspecting that it was unlawful would provide relevant support for an argument that strong
medicine is required to cure the defendant's disrespect for the law." Id.
279 Id. at 576 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 468 (KennedyJ, concurring)).
280 Id. at 580.
281 Id. at 576.
282 Id.
283 Id. The Court found that this absence of malice distinguished BMW from the conduct in
Haslip and TXO. Id. at 579.
284 Id. at 576-79. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that BMW should be treated as
a recidivist because the nondisclosure of the car repairs was part of a "nationwide pattern of
tortious conduct." Id. at 576.
285 Id. at 580. The Court explained that its "decisions in both Haslip and TXO endorsed the
proposition that a comparison between the compensatory award and the punitive award is sig-
nificant." Id. at 581.
286 Id. at 582.
287 Id. at 580-81 & n.33.
288 Id. at 581.
289 Id. (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991)).
290 Id. The Court explained that "TXO, following dicta in Haslip, refined this analysis by con-
firming that the proper inquiry is '"whether there is a reasonable relationship between the pu-
nitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the
harm that actually has occurred."'" Id. (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509
U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (plurality opinion) (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21)). See generally discus-
sion supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
291 BMW, 517 U.S. at 583.
292 Id. (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
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Within these traditional common law standards, the Court further
refined the ratio guidepost to discuss circumstances that may justify a
higher ratio. The Court noted that a higher ratio may be justified
where "a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages," 3 where the "injury is hard to de-
tect, 2 94 or where "the monetary value of noneconomic harm might
have been difficult to determine.
Finally, the Court turned to the third guidepost, which compares
civil or criminal penalties for comparable misconduct.296 The Court
explained that this factor, as noted by Justice O'Connor in Browning-
Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., reflected a state's
legislative judgments for appropriate sanctions for the conduct at is-
sue. 7 The Court also reasoned that comparable statutory penalties
and prior judicial decisions should provide a defendant fair notice of
the severity of potential punishment.298  It also noted that in Haslip
the Court had justified the size of the award in part because it was less
severe than the criminal penalty of incarceration available for compa-
rable conduct.299 While not comparing BMW's conduct to criminal
violations, the Court evaluated the punitive damages award in light of
statutory fines for unfair trade practices, concluding that none of the
statutes gave BMW fair notice that its conduct would result in a mul-
timillion dollar penalty.'0
In sum, the Court concluded that "[a]s in Haslip, we are not pre-
pared to draw a bright line marking the limits of a constitutionally
acceptable punitive damages award. Unlike that case, however, we
are fully convinced that the grossly excessive award imposed in this
case transcends the constitutional limit."3°1
293 Id. at 582.
294 Id.
295 Id.
29 Id. at 583.
297 I .
298 Id. at 584.
299 Id. at 583.
3M Id. at 584 & n.40 (citing the caps on civil fines for violations of Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, New Hampshire, and New York statutes).
M Id. at 585-86 (internal citation omitted). The Court left open the appropriate remedy:
"-Whether the appropriate remedy requires a new trial or merely an independent determination
by the Alabama Supreme Court of the award necessary to vindicate the economic interests of
Alabama consumers is a matter that should be addressed by the state court in the first instance."
Id. at 586.
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2. Justice Breyer's Concurrence
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, agreed
that the award violated substantive due process °2 but wrote separately
to explain why Alabama's punitive damages standards failed to pro-
vide significant protection against arbitrary awards.03
Justice Breyer returned to Haslip's emphasis on constraining the
304jury's discretion, noting that meaningful legal standards not only
give parties notice of potential punishment but also help "to assure
the uniform general treatment of similarly situated persons that is the
essence of law itself."05 Although legal standards do not have to be
rigid to satisfy due process, they must provide a real limit on the jury's
discretion. Justice Breyer concluded that the standards the Ala-
bama courts applied were "vague and open ended to the point where
they risk[ed] arbitrary results. 30 7 Although finding that the vague-
ness of those standards alone did not violate due process,0 ' Justice
Breyer determined that it warranted the Court's heightened scrutiny
of the awardY.
Justice Breyer then analyzed the Alabama procedures, concluding
that the Alabama system "provided no significant constraints or pro-
tection against arbitrary results."310 First, the Alabama statute permit-
ting punitive damages failed to distinguish between conduct that may
warrant small awards and conduct deserving large awards.3 1 Second,
Alabama courts applied the Green Oil factors so expansively that the
factors provided no constraint on punitive damages. Third, the
302 Id. at 586 (Breyer, J., concurring) (concluding that the award was "'grossly excessive' in
relation to legitimate punitive damages objectives, and hence an arbitrary deprivation of life,
liberty, or property in violation of the Due Process Clause" (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alli-
ance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993) (plurality opinion))).
3 Id. at 588.
3o4 Id. at 587 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1991)).
305 Id.
306 Id. at 588 ("Legal standards need not be precise in order to satisfy this constitutional con-
cern. But they must offer some kind of constraint upon a jury or court's discretion, and thus
protection against purely arbitrary behavior." (citation omitted)).
307 Id.
308 Id. at 587 ("[T]he Court also has found that punitive damages procedures very similar to
those followed here were not, by themselves, fundamentally unfair.").
3W Id. at 588; see also id. at 596 ("[W]here legal standards offer virtually no constraint, I be-
lieve that this lack of constraining standards warrants this Court's detailed examination of the
award.").
310 Id. at 588.
311 Id. at 588-89.
312 Id. at 589 (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989)). Justice Breyer
criticized the Alabama Supreme Court's expansive application of the Green Oil factors. Id. Jus-
tice Breyer noted that the Alabama court's application of the ratio factor-considering $2 mil-
lion reasonably related to the potential economic harm in Alabama of $56,000-provided no
legal standard that "could have significantly constrained the discretion of Alabama factfinders."
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state courts made no effort to identify any other constraining force
that Green Oil and the statute lacked, such as any economic theory orbasisfor h e _313
basis for the award. FourthJustice Breyer noted that the award was
not supported by historic practice or understanding and was in fact
"extraordinary by historical standards." 14 Finally, Justice Breyer re-
marked that, unlike other states that cap punitive damages, Alabama
lacked any statutory limits that could help constrain unbounded jury
discretion s. s
3. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, stayed true to his view
that the Due Process Clause does not provide any substantive limitson t e am unt of p niti e ,311
on the amount of punitive awards. Justice Scalia described the ma-
jority's opinion as "an unjustified incursion into the province of state
governments." 31 7 In Justice Scalia's view, "a state trial procedure that
commits the decision whether to impose punitive damages, and the
amount, to the discretion of the jury, subject to some judicial review
for 'reasonableness,' furnishes a defendant with all the process that is
'due."'3Ms Although he recognized his view of due process had not
prevailed, Justice Scalia did not feel bound by stare decisis because he
Id. at 590. Likewise, the state court's broad view of the reprehensibility factor made "'reprehen-
sibility' a concept without constraining force." Id. Further, Justice Breyer found that the Ala-
bama courts disregarded the "removal of profit" factor since nothing limited the award to
BMW's $56,000 in profits. Id. at 591. Justice Breyer then addressed the state court's application
of the fourth Green Oil factor, the "financial position" of the defendant. Id. Justice Breyer noted
the relevance of this factor for retribution "[s]ince a fixed dollar award will punish a poor per-
son more than a wealthy one," but less so for deterrence, "given the more distant relation be-
tween a defendant's wealth and its responses to economic incentives." Id. Justice Breyer con-
cluded, however, that a defendant's wealth does not act as a "significant constraint" on punitive
damages:
[Wealth] is not necessarily intended to act as a significant constraint on punitive awards.
Rather, it provides an open-ended basis for inflating awards when the defendant is
wealthy, as this case may illustrate. That does not make its use unlawful or inappropriate;
it simply means that this factor cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such as
"reprehensibility," to constrain significantly an award that purports to punish a defen-
dant's conduct.
Id. Justice Breyer also found the remaining factors provided no restraint or were inapplicable
to the circumstances of the case. Id. at 591-92.
313 Id. at 592-94.
314 Id. at 594.
315 Id. at 595 (contrasting Alabama's lack of a statutory cap on punitive damages with the
statutory limits in Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, and Texas).
316 Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
317 Id.
318 Id.
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believed the majority's approach was both mistaken and unsuscepti-
ble of principled application."9
Justice Scalia also responded to the three sections of the majority's
opinion. First, Justice Scalia took issue with the majority's assertion of
a substantive due process right to a reasonable punitive damages
award.. as lacking any precedential support."' Justice Scalia argued
that the decisions relied upon by the majority "fabricated the 'sub-
stantive due process' right at issue."322
Second, because the Alabama Supreme Court limited the size of
the award to the defendant's in-state conduct, Justice Scalia charac-
terized the Court's discussion of out-of-state conduct as dicta.3 23  On
the merits, Justice Scalia commented that Alabama courts should be
able to "consider lawful (but disreputable) conduct, both inside and
outside Alabama, for the purpose of assessing just how bad an actor
BMW was.2 24
Third, Justice Scalia criticized the three guideposts,3 25 remarking
that they created federal standards for the state law of punitive dam-
ages.3 26  Despite this effect, Justice Scalia found that the guideposts
did not provide any substantive guidance: "[T]he 'guideposts' mark
a road to nowhere; they provide no real guidance at all."27 Finally,
Justice Scalia highlighted the tension between the guideposts andr" 1• 328
jury findings. Justice Scalia found no logical basis for reassessing
the jury's determination on the degree of a defendant's reprehensi-
bility and, in so doing, ignoring the jury's determination that the de-
fendant's conduct was reprehensible enough to deserve punitive
damages.29
319 Id. at 599. Justice Scalia criticized the Court for "federalizing yet another aspect of our
Nation's legal culture," and for creating a "new rule of constitutional law ... constrained by no
principle other than the Justices' subjective assessment of the 'reasonableness' of the award in
relation to the conduct for which it was assessed." Id.
320 Id. at 599-602.
321 Id. at 600-01.
322 Id. at 601.
323 Id. at 604.
324 Id. at 603. The majority agreed and recognized that BMW's out-of-state conduct re-
mained relevant to the assessment of reprehensibility. Id. at 574 n.21.
325 Id. at 604-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
326 Id. at 605.
327 Id. Additionally, Justice Scalia noted that the Court never said the three guideposts were
exclusive, permitting them to be overridden by "unnamed considerations" in future cases. Id. at
606. He concluded that the Court's framework did "nothing at all except confer an artificial air
of doctrinal analysis upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular award of puni-
tive damages was not 'fair.'" Id.
328 Id. at 606-07.
329 Id.
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4. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented,
starting and ending the dissent by arguing that the majority should
leave the issue of punitive damages to the states.3s Like Justice Scalia,
Justice Ginsburg deemed the majority's discussion of the defendant's
extraterritorial conduct dicta, 3' and criticized the decision for its lack
of guidance, saying it leaves lower courts only a "raised eyebrow" as
their principal guide. 332 In short, Justice Ginsburg would leave the
problem of excessive punitive damages awards to the states.333
F. Defining the Standard of Appellate Review:
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group
After BMW, the Court waited five years before again grappling
with punitive damages. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group,3S 4 an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas,
and Breyer, the Court held that the constitutional excessiveness in-
quiry merits "a de novo standard of review., 3 3 5 In the process of de-
termining the standard of appellate review, the Court also (1) recog-
nized that heightened protections were necessary given the Court's
recent recognition of substantive due process limitations on punitive
damages; (2) responded to Seventh Amendment issues concerning
post-verdict review of punitive awards; and (3) provided further guid-
ance on the BMWguideposts.
1. The Majority Opinion
In Cooper Industries, a tool manufacturer sued a competitor for un-
fair competition after the competitor used pictures of the plaintiffs
product in advertising, marketing, and packaging its own similar
product.3 6 The jury awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in compensatory
damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages.37 The district court,
3M Id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 612 ("The decision leads us further into
territory traditionally within the States' domain ....").
3I3 Id. at 607. In Justice Ginsburg's view, the Alabama Supreme Court had remedied the
jury's improper consideration of defendant's out-of-state conduct, and further clarified state law
to ensure that the problem "is not likely to occur again." Id. at 609.
332 Id. at 613.
333 Justice Ginsburg provided an appendix detailing various state legislative constraints on
punitive damages, including caps, bifurcated trials, and split recovery with states. Id. at 614-19.
334 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
335 Id. at 436.
336 Id. at 427-28.
337 Id. at 429.
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applying the BMW guideposts, held that the award did not violate
substantive due process." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the district court did not "abuse its discretion" in declining to
reduce the punitive award.339 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve confusion among the federal appellate courts on the ap-
propriate standard of appellate review.34 °
a. De Novo Review
The Court first noted that punitive damages are "quasi-criminal"
penalties, and a jury's imposition of punitive damages is not a factual
determination, but "an expression of its moral condemnation.
3 4
1
The Court acknowledged that state legislatures have broad discretion
to define or limit punishments for criminal offenses and punitive
damages awards, and decisions within those state law guidelines typi-
cally are reviewed for abuse of discretion.42 But, the Court reasoned,
due process imposes additional substantive limits on governmental
deprivations of life and property.343 The Eighth Amendment, appli-
cable to the states through the Due Process Clause, prohibits exces-
sive fines and cruel and unusual punishments. 344 Similarly, the Due
Process Clause prohibits the states from imposing "grossly excessive"
punishments on torffeasors. "
Because courts must apply a de novo standard of review in analo-
gous cases involving deprivations of life346 and property,3 47 the Court
held that review of a punitive damages award likewise should be de
novo: "Our decisions in analogous cases, together with the reasoning
that produced those decisions, thus convince us that courts of appeals
should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district
courts' determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages
awards.3 48  The Court noted that its decision was consistent with
338 Id.
339 Id. at 431.
340 Id.
341 Id. at 432.
42 Id. at 432-33.
43 Id. at 433 ("If no constitutional issue is raised, the role of the appellate court, at least in
the federal system, is merely to review the trial court's 'determination under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.'" (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 279 (1989))).
344 Id. at 433-34.
34- Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-55 (1993) (plurality opinion)).
346 Id. at 434.
347 Id.
34I Id. at 436. The Court summarized the reasons courts apply de novo review in analogous
cases, including: (1) the imposition of penalties are not questions of fact; (2) the legal concepts
in these areas often are difficult to define and must be considered in the context of a particular
Mar. 20041
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Haslip because there the Court had emphasized the importance of
appellate review in ensuring that a jury's award comports with due
349
process.
b. The Seventh Amendment
The Court further held that because a punitive damages award
does not constitute a finding of fact, de novo appellate review does
not implicate the Seventh Amendment.10 While de novo review of
compensatory damages may run afoul of the Seventh Amendment,
the nonfactual nature of Xpunitive damages permits an independent
review of punitive awards.
c. The Guideposts
Finally, the Court applied the guideposts to illustrate that de novo
review could provide a meaningful constraint on punitive damages.
With regard to the reprehensibility guidepost, the Court found that
the jury may have based the award in part on the alleged copying of
plaintiff's product, which the Ninth Circuit concluded had been a
lawful act under the trademark laws. The Ninth Circuit, however,
"did not consider whether that improper predicate might also have
undermined the basis for the jury's large punitive damages award.'
4
Assessing the ratio guidepost, the Court advised that the trial
court may have determined the ratio by an unrealistic assessment of
the "potential harm" the plaintiff would have suffered had the defen-
dant succeeded in its wrongful conduct. 5 The trial court had calcu-
lated the potential harm by looking at all profits the defendant made
from selling the competing product.3 , 6 The Court found this poten-
tial harm analysis improper because the trial court unrealistically as-
sumed that all of the defendant's profits for a five-year period could
-357be attributed solely to the misconduct at issue.
Regarding the third guidepost, the comparable legislative penal-
ties, the Court took issue with the plaintiff's position that the
case; (3) independent appellate review helps clarify the law; and (4) de novo review tends to
unify precedent and stabilize the law. Id. at 435-36.
349 Id. at 436 n.9.
350 Id. at 437. The Court was responding to issues raised by amicus curiae. Id. The argument
also addressed Seventh Amendment concerns raised injustice Ginsburg's dissent.
351 Id.
352 See id. at 441.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Id. at 441-42.
356 Id. at 442.
357 Id.
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misconduct resulted in multiple violations of the Oregon Unlawful
Trade Practices Act, each of which carried a maximum penalty of
$25,000. The Court noted that the Ninth Circuit expressed no opin-
ion on whether the conduct at issue should be treated as separate vio-
lations or as a single violation, and that the record appeared more
consistent with a "single-violation theory.0
5
8
The Court's analysis of the guideposts, however, was intended not
to prejudge the Ninth Circuit's review on remand, but rather to illus-
trate how the standard of review may impact the constitutional analy-
SS359
2. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Thomas issued a one paragraph concurrence to note his
continued belief that "the Constitution does not constrain the size of
punitive damages awards. 3 60 Justice Thomas stated that, given the
opportunity, he would overrule BMW.Y On the narrow standard of
review question, however, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority.
362
3. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia likewise remained "of the view that excessive puni-
tive damages do not violate the Due Process Clause."3 63 But Justice
Scalia agreed that, based on precedent, de novo review accorded with
the Court's jurisprudence.64
4. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg was the sole dissenter. Relying on the Court's
prior determination that appellate review of a trial court's reduction
of compensatory damages must be governed by an abuse of discre-
tion standard to comport with the Seventh Amendment, Justice Gins-
burg found that the same reasoning should apply to punitive dam-
365ages. Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg concluded that review shouldbe for abuse of discretion.66
358 Id. at 44243.
559 Id. On remand, the Ninth Circuit reduced the $4.5 million punitive damages award to
$500,000. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285 F.3d 1146, 1147 (9th Cir.
2002).
CooperIndus., 532 U.S. at 443 (Thomas, J., concurring).
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Id. (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment).
364 Id. at 444.
65 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
366 Id.
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Justice Ginsburg recognized that the assessment of punitive dam-
ages involves more than the resolution of factual matters, but found
that a jury's verdict requires factual determinations, such as the rep-
rehensibility of the defendant's conduct and harm to the plaintiff.
367 '
Apart from the Seventh Amendment, Justice Ginsburg found that
an abuse of discretion standard made practical sense because trial
courts have a superior vantage to assess evidence, particularly witness
credibility.368  Moreover, Justice Ginsburg determined that the de
novo standard is more complex because it "requires lower courts to
distinguish between ordinary common-law excessiveness and consti-
tutional excessiveness, and to separate out factfindings that qualify
for 'clearly erroneous' review." 369 In the end, however, Justice Gins-
burg concluded, "Complex as it is, I suspect that approach and mine
will yield different outcomes in few cases."37°
II. THE AFTERMATH OF THE COURT'S PRE-STAT71E FARM DUE PROCESS
DECISIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON PUNITVE DAMAGES
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The Supreme Court's pre-State Farm punitive damages cases raised
as many questions as they answered. Courts and commentators re-
peatedly criticized the decisions as providing no workable standards
for post-verdict review.371 But the decisions also affected the devel-
opment of jury instructions. First, the cases failed to provide clear
and complete substantive due process limitations that could readily
be translated into considerations for a jury. Specifically, until BMW
the Court refused to identify any criteria to measure the substantive
limitations on punitive damages. Although BMWs guideposts ap-
peared promising, divergent court interpretations soon gave cre-
dence to Justice Scalia's assessment that "the 'guideposts' mark a road
to nowhere."3 72 For instance, some courts justified an expansive in-
terpretation of the second guidepost by pointing to the 526 to 1 ratio
367 Id. at 444-45. Specifically, Justice Ginsburg pointed to the following factual findings de-
termined by juries in assessing punitive damages: "[T]he extent of harm or potential harm
caused by the defendant's misconduct, whether the defendant acted in good faith, whether the
misconduct was an individual instance or part of a broader pattern, whether the defendant be-
haved negligently, recklessly, or maliciously." Id. at 446. She analogized the award of punitive
damages to awards for pain and suffering: "One million dollars' worth of pain and suffering
does not exist as a 'fact' in the world any more or less than one million dollars' worth of moral
outrage." Id.
W Id. at 445.
369 Id. at 450 (citations omitted).
370 Id.
371 See generally discussion supra Part I.
372 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 605 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See sources
cited supra note 29 for criticism of the lack of guidance provided by the Court's decisions.
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of punitive to compensatory damages upheld in TXO.73 Alternatively,
courts compared the punitive award not just to the harm to the plain-
tiff, but to everyone injured from the conduct at issue. This permit-
ted courts to justify massive ratios and awards for certain types of ac-
tions, like product liability cases, where a defendant's single course of
conduct could injure a large number of people. 374 As a result, ratios
varied widely, leaving many to conclude that the ratio analysis pro-
vided scant guidance in reviewing an award. 75 With regard to the
third guidepost, courts in personal injury tort cases often compared
the conduct at issue to criminal penalties, justifying a virtually
373 See, e.g., United States v. Big D Enters., Inc., 184 F.3d 924, 933 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[W]here
the other [BMWI factors are strong, a 526 to 1 ratio may be appropriate."); United States v. Oak
Manor Apartments, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1054 (W.D. Ark. 1998) ("While this [ 100 to I ratio] is
high, there is no simple mathematical formula that can be applied and the Supreme Court has
upheld a punitive damages award of over 526 times the size of actual damages.").
374 E.g., In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 2004 WL 170354, at *21-27 (D. Alaska Jan. 28,
2004); Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 17 P.3d 473, 489 (Or. 2001) ("Because defendant's tor-
tious conduct was a routine part of its business practice... we also consider the potential injury
that its misconduct may have caused to past, present, and future customers."); Sweet v. Roy, 801
A.2d 694, 715 (Vt. 2002) ("[C]ourts can consider 'the possible harm to other victims' that might
result if similar behavior is not deterred." (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509
U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (plurality opinion))). As one scholar aptly explained:
In many, and perhaps most, modern punitive damages cases-including those involv-
ing mass torts, product liability, consumer fraud, and insurance bad faith-the defen-
dant stands accused of committing an act or engaging in a course of conduct that
harmed a large number of people. In recent decades, as this type of litigation has grown
more prevalent, a curious phenomenon has emerged. The plaintiff's attorney, although
she represents only one (or, at most, a few) of the many victims, will typically ask the jury
to impose punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish the defendant not only
for harming the plaintiff, but also for the full scope of harm that its conduct caused to all
victims and all of society....
As this form ofjury argument has grown commonplace, many courts---giving the mat-
ter little or no thought-have explicitly endorsed the principle that the defendant
should be punished not only for the harm that it caused to the plaintiff, but also for the
harm that it caused to others ....
Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Indi-
vidual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 583-86 (2003) (arguing that punishing for "total
harm" is unconstitutional and that punitive damages awards must be limited to punish the de-
fendant for only the harm caused to the plaintiff) (footnotes omitted).
75 E.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1052 (D. Alaska 2002), vacated sub nom., Sea
Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. 03-35166, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18219, at *2 (9th Cir.
Aug. 18, 2003) (remanding for reconsideration under State Farm); accord Swinton v. Potomac
Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 819 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding "little comfort" in application of ratio guide-
post by other courts). In the first year after the Court decided BMW, a survey found that ratios
approved by state courts ranged up to 500 to 1. Samuel A. Thumma, In the Year Since the High
Court's Landmark Decision in 'BMW,' Federal Courts Have Reduced Punitive Damages Awards More
Frequently Than Have State Courts, NAT'L L.J., June 30, 1997, at B5; see also Collins Entm't Corp. v.
Coats & Coats Rental Amusement, 584 S.E.2d 120, 140 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (noting favorably
one commentator's view that "[allthough the ratio is a factor universally argued, there is no
consistent pattern in its application" (quoting G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Funny
Thing Happened on the Way to the Courthouse, S.C. TRIAL LAw. BULL., Fall 2002, at 12, 13)).
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limitless monetary award when weighed against incarceration.376
Apart from the guideposts, most courts ignored BMWs holding that a
punitive award may violate due process not only if its size is grossl,
excessive, but also if the award is based on improper considerations.
Second, and more fundamentally, the Court failed to address
whether the substantive limitations, such as they were, had any effect
on pre-verdict procedural requirements. The Court all but ignored
the lack of standards for pre-verdict procedural due process and
never resolved whether and how BMWs guideposts and prohibition
on awards based on impermissible considerations affected jury in-
structions.
As a result, most jurisdictions continue to use jury instructions
comparable to those upheld in Haslip or add state law factors more
likely to promote improper awards than constrain unbridled jury dis-
cretion. A review of the instructions used in most jurisdictions-and
judicial challenges to those instructions-bears this out.
A. Model Instructions on Punitive Damages
Most jurisdictions378 have developed model jury instructions-
form jury charges drafted or approved by court or state bar-appointed
376 E.g., Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 99 Cal. App. 4th 1115, 1151 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (compar-
ing a corporate defendant's conduct to manslaughter), vacated, 123 S. Ct. 2072 (2003) (re-
manding for reconsideration under State Farm); see also Bielicki v. Terminix Int'l Co., 225 F.3d
1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Although the punitive damages award is exceptional when com-
pared only to the applicable fines, the authorization of imprisonment in the criminal context
can justify a higher award."). Courts have criticized the third guidepost as "ineffective and very
difficult to employ." Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc., 49 P.3d 662,
671 (N.M. 2002). On remand in BMW, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that "a consid-
eration of the statutory penalty does little to aid in a meaningful review of the excessiveness of
the punitive damages award." BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 514 (Ala. 1997).
For a discussion of these and other problems with judicial application of the third guidepost,
see generally Victor E. Schwartz et al., Selective Due Process: The United States Supreme Court Has
Said That Punitive Damages Awards Must Be Reviewed for Excessiveness, but Many Courts Are Failing to
Follow the Letter and Spirit of the Law, 82 OR. L. REV. 33 (2003).
377 See cases cited supra note 41.
378 A 2002 survey found that all states except Texas and West Virginia have pattern jury in-
structions. Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review
of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 594 (2002) ("Our research indicates that
forty-eight of the fifty states now have pattern or recommended jury instructions, leaving only
Texas and West Virginia without pattern instructions."). Texas and West Virginia, however, re-
cently began to fill this gap. In 2002, the Texas Bar published model instructions. See TEX.
PATTERN JURY CHARGES, GENERAL NEGLIGENCE, INTENTIONAL PERSONAL TORTS (2002). Like-
wise, West Virginia published proposed instructions for a six-month provisional usage and
comment period. SeeW. VA. PROPOSEDJURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL & CRIMINAL TRIALS, Intro-
duction, at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/jury/intro.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). In addi-
tion, many federal courts provide model jury instructions. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
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committees 79-that cover matters arising in a typical lawsuit.38° Model
instructions, sometimes called "pattern," "recommended," "ap-
proved," or "uniform" instructions, are "designed to save time for
judges and lawyers by eliminating the need to write instructions sepa-
rately for each case and also, theoretically at least, to 'reduce the
number of appeals for faulty instructions.' 3 8 2  While litigants may
propose their own instructions, manyjurisdictions require or strongly
encourage use of model instructions.383 Even when use is not man-
dated, courts often are reluctant to depart from the model.8
Model punitive damages instructions traditionally have provided
juries only minimal guidance in determining the amount of an
379 Where available, this Article discusses each jurisdiction's official model instructions-the
instructions developed by court or bar-designated committees. Some jurisdictions, however, do
not have model punitive damages instructions even though they may have model instructions
covering other matters. In those jurisdictions, private parties often publish "unofficial" model
instructions. Because litigants may rely on them, this Article discusses these unofficial instruc-
tions, but will note when the instruction is not the official model.
380 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (7th ed. 1999). Commentators trace the widespread devel-
opment of model instructions to movements in California in the late 1930s and then Illinois in
the 1950s. See ROBERT G. NIELAND, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A CRITICAL LOOK AT A
MODERN MOVEMENT TO IMPROVE THEJURY SYSTEM 4-12 (1979); Kelley & Wendt, supra note 378,
at 593-94. For a historical review of jury instructions, see generally Peter Tiersma, The Rocky
Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language ofJury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1082-85
(2001).
M1 See NIELAND, supra note 380, at 2 (noting trends "designated by several different names-
standard, model, uniform, approved and recommended").
382 Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury Instructions, and Comprehension Issues,
67 TENN. L. REV. 701, 708 (2000) (quoting Peter M. Tiersma, Jury Instructions in the New Millen-
nium, 36 CT. REV. 28 (1999) (internal citations omitted)).
33 See Tiersma, supra note 380, at 1086 ("[M]any states with pattern or standardized instruc-
tions either require or strongly recommend that they be used when available.").
34 See id. (discussing reasons courts may be reluctant to depart from the model, including
judicial suspicion that "instructions offered by the parties are almost always slanted in some way"
and fear that departure from the model may open a floodgate of challenges from prior cases
that used the model instruction). Despite reluctance to depart from model instructions, courts
frequently still warn litigants that the model's use will not create an "error free warranty." W.
VA. PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS, Introduction, at
http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/jury/intro.htm ("[T] here is no 'error-free warranty' that accom-
panies the use of the pattern jury instructions.") (last visited Feb. 5, 2004); see also In re Standard
Jury Instructions-Civil Cases, 797 So. 2d 1199, 1199 (Fla. 2001) ("We express no opinion on the
correctness of these instructions and remind all interested parties that this authorization fore-
closes neither requesting additional or alternative instructions nor contesting the legal correct-
ness of these instructions."). Indeed, courts occasionally have reversed cases based on the trial
court's use of a model instruction. SeeWal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Binns, 15 S.W.3d 320 (Ark. 2000)
(reversing case where jurisdiction's model instruction on the imposition of punitive damages
conflicted with legal requirements of claims at issue). More often, however, courts give weight
to model instructions and caution against modifying the model. See Schaefer v. Ready, 3 P.3d
56, 59-60 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000) ("Use of the [model] is not mandatory, only recommended.
However, any court that chooses to vary from a jury instruction previously approved by the
Idaho Supreme Court, does so with the risk that the verdict rendered may be overturned on
appeal." (citations omitted)).
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award.' 5 As Justice O'Connor recognized in Haslip, "States routinely
authorize civil juries to impose punitive damages without providing
them any meaningful instructions on how to do so. Rarely is a jury
told anything more than 'do what you think best.'"86 Despite calls for
reform,37 many jurisdictions still use instructions comparable to the
common law instructions approved in Haslip. Several jurisdictions,
however, have taken efforts to provide additional guidance to the
jury. The model instructions in these jurisdictions often incorporate
state law considerations, many of which were developed before-and
potentially conflict with-the Supreme Court's recent identification
of constitutional limits on punitive damages.
1. State Model Punitive Damages Instructions
a. States Using Haslip-like Common Law Instructions
Twelve states use model instructions comparable to the Alabama
instructions approved in Haslip.555  In Haslip, the Court upheld Ala-
bama's instructions, which " [I] enlightened the jury as to the puni-
tive damages' nature and purpose, [2] identified the damages as pun-
ishment for civil wrongdoing of the kind involved, and [3] explained
that their imposition was not compulsory."389 Alabama's model in-
struction has not materially changed since Haslip,
The purpose of awarding punitive damages or exemplary damages is to
allow money recovery to the plaintiff by way of punishment to the defen-
dant, and for the added purpose of protecting the public by deterring
385 Commentators repeatedly have noted that the complex or unclear language used in most
model instructions often render the instructions incomprehensible to juries. See generally Du-
mas, supra note 382, at 708 (stating that instructions are "written in... dense, complex lan-
guage"); Tiersma, supra note 380, at 1102-17 (discussing the problem of technical vocabulary).
While many of the instructions discussed in this Article may suffer from similar deficiencies, this
Article focuses principally on the substance of the instruction rather than the clarity of the in-
struction's language.
36 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
387 See, e.g., Thomas M. Melsheimer & Steven H. Stodghill, Due Process and Punitive Damages:
Providing Meaningful Guidance to the Jury, 47 SMU L. REV. 329 (1994) (urging instructional re-
forms). In response to mounting concern regarding the frequency and size of punitive dam-
ages awards, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law established a
Drafting Committee on punitive damages. The Committee drafted the Model Punitive Damages
Act ("MPDA"), a model statute to assist states in developing better procedures for assessing pu-
nitive damages. See MPDA (1996), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mpda/
MPDAFNAL.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). The MPDA proposes a multifactor jury instruction
on punitive damages. See infra note 417. For a proposal of noninstructional punitive damages
reforms, see Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages "Run Wild": Proposals for Reform
by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (1999).
388 These Haslip-like jurisdictions include Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.
M9 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19.
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the defendant and others from doing such wrong in the future. The im-
position of punitive damages is entirely discretionary with the jury. Should
you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must take into
consideration the character and degree of the wrongas shown b 0 the evidence
in the case, and the necessity of preventing similar wrongs.
Model instructions in other jurisdictions likewise simply employ
only the Haslip-minimum. For example, the model punitive damages
instruction used in Illinois-one of the jurisdictions that led the
model jury instruction movement 9 -provides:
If you find that the defendant's conduct was willful and wan-
ton ... and if you believe that justice and the public good require it, you
may, in addition to any other damages to which you find the plaintiff en-
titled, award an amount which will serve to punish the defendant and to
392deter the defendant and others from similar conduct.
Indiana,393 Missouri,9 4 Utah,395 Virginia, 96 and Washington 97 use simi-
lar model instructions.
390 1 ALA. PATTERNJURY INSTRUCTION CIVIL § 11.03 (2003), MAL AL-APJICIV 11.03 (emphasis
added); see also id. § 23.21, WL AL-APJICIV 23.21 (similar instruction for libel cases). The Ala-
bama model instruction for fraud actions, however, fails to include all of the components ap-
proved in Haslip. See id. § 18.09, WL A-APJICIV 18.09 (failing to instruct on the purpose of pu-
nitive damages). Cf supra note 74 (quoting text of Haslip instruction).
391 See NIELAND, supra note 380, at 4-12 (discussing the movement in favor of pattern jury
instructions).
392 ILL. PA1T-ERNJURYINSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 35.01 (2000), WL IL-IPICIV 35.01.
393 See 1 IND. PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 11.100 (2d ed. 1989) ("You may award
punitive damages in any amount you believe will serve to punish the defendant and will deter
the defendant and others from like conduct in the future.").
394 See MO. APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10.01 (6th ed. 2002), WL MAI 10.01 ("[I]f you
believe the conduct of defendant... was outrageous ... you may award plaintiff an additional
amount as punitive damages in such sum as you believe will serve to punish defendant and to
deter defendant and others from like conduct.") (intentional tort cases); id. § 10.02, WL MAI
10.02 (providing similar instruction for conscious disregard negligence cases); id. § 10.04, WL
MAI 10.04 (providing similar instruction for strict liability, product defect or failure to warn
cases); id. § 10.05, WL MAI 10.05 (providing similar instruction for product defect and failure
to warn cases); id. § 10.06, WL MAI 10.06 (providing similar instruction for negligence and
strict liability cases); id. § 10.07, WL MAI 10.07 (providing similar instruction for conscious dis-
regard with specific acts/knowledge cases); id. §§ 4.15-4.16, WL MAI 4.15-4.16 (providing simi-
lar instruction for defamation cases).
395 See MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 27.20 (1993). This instruction provides in
relevant part:
Punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are
awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions
of the defendant were a result of willful and malicious conduct ....
If you find that punitive damages are proper in this case, you may award such sum as,
in yourjudgment, would be reasonable and proper as a punishment to the defendant for
such wrongs, and as a wholesome warning to others not to offend in like manner.
Id.; accord id. § 10.12 (providing same instruction for defamation cases). The Utah model in-
struction for federal civil rights actions, however, instructs the jury to consider the nature of the
misconduct and that "the amount to be awarded must be fixed with calm discretion and sound
reason, and must not be awarded because of sympathy, bias or prejudice." Id. § 15.18.
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A few jurisdictions provide the Haslip-minimum with minor-
albeit equally vague-additions. The Ohio model jury instruction,
for instance, uses the Haslip-minimum, but also instructs the jury not
to act out of passion or prejudice: "If you award punitive damages,
the amount should be fair and reasonable under all the facts and cir-
cumstances. It should not be excessive, nor influenced by passion,
sympathy, or prejudice." Georgia's instruction adds that the
"measure of such damages is your enlightened conscience as an im-
partial jury. ' '39 Vermont's (unofficial) model4°° employs the Haslip-
396 See VA. MODELJURYINSTRUCTION 2D § 9.080 (2003). This instruction provides in relevant
part:
If you find that the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for his damages, and if you
further believe by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant acted with actual
malice toward the plaintiff or acted under circumstances amounting to a willful and wan-
ton disregard of the plaintiff's rights, then you may also award punitive damages to the
plaintiff to punish the defendant for his actions and to serve as an example to prevent
others from acting in a similar way.
Id.
I7 Washington generally bars punitive damages unless authorized by statute. WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. § 64.34.100(1) (West 1994). Accordingly, Washington has no general model in-
struction for punitive damages. See WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCIONS-CIVIL § 35.01 (4th ed.
2002), WL 6 WAPRAC WPI 35.01 (noting lack of general punitive damages instruction). It
does, however, have a punitive damages instruction for civil rights actions, which provides a
Haslip-style instruction:
If you find for the plaintiff, and if you award compensatory or nominal damages, you
may award punitive damages. You are not required to do so. The purposes of punitive
damages are (1) to punish a defendant, and (2) to deter a defendant and others from
committing similar acts in the future.
... You may award punitive damages only if you find that defendant's conduct (1) was
motivated by evil motive or intent, or (2) involved reckless or callous indifference to the
rights of others.
... [Y]ou must use reason in setting the amount. Punitive damages, if any, should be
in an amount sufficient to fulfill their purposes but should not reflect bias, prejudice or
sympathy toward any party.
Id. § 348.02, 'ArL 6A WAPRAC WPI 348.02.
398 1 OHIO JURY INSTRUcTIONS § 23.70, pt. 7 (2002). Consistent with Haslip, this instruction
also provides in relevant part:
Punitive damages may be awarded against the defendant as a punishment to discourage
others from committing similar wrongful acts. You are not required to award punitive
damages to the plaintiff, and you may not do so unless you find by the greater weight of
the evidence that the defendant acted with [fraud, insult or actual malice].
Id. 3t. 2; see also id. § 23.71, pt. 1 (providing similar instruction for tort cases).
1 GA. SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, No. 15 (3d ed. 1996). This instruction
provides in relevant part:
In tort actions there may be aggravating circumstances which may warrant the award-
ing of additional damages called punitive damages.
In order for punitive damages to be awarded, the plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct ....
Punitive damages, when authorized, are awarded not as compensation to a plaintiff,
but solely to punish, penalize, or deter a defendant.
The measure of such damages is your enlightened conscience as an impartial jury.
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minimum approach, but adds an instruction that the punitive award
"'need not bear any relationship to the underlying compensatory
damage award,' 40 1 which facially conflicts with one of the BMW
guideposts.
Finally, a couple of jurisdictions fail to meet even the Haslip-
minimum. Louisiana 40 2 and Michigan 403-which generally bar puni-
tive damages except when permitted by statute-provide model in-
structions that merely direct the jury to consider the nature of the de-
fendant's conduct when setting the amount of the award.
b. States Using 'i-aslip-plus-wealth" Instructions
Ten states plus the District of Columbia use model instructions
that provide the "Haslip-minimum" but add one other principal
400 VT. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 7.46 (John M. Dinse et al. 1993). For a
non-corporate defendant, this instruction provides in relevant part:
[P]unitive damages are awarded not to compensate (plaintifj) for any injury he (she) may
have suffered, but instead to punish (defendant) for his (her) conduct and to deter (defen-
dant) and others from acting in the same way.
As a general rule, punitive damages may be recovered in any action based on a defen-
dant's tortious conduct. However, such damages are not recoverable as a matter of legal
right. Punitive damages may be awarded only when liability of the defendant for actual
damages has been established. Whether punitive damages will be allowed and, if so, in
what amount, is entirely within the discretion of the jury.
Id. For corporate defendants, Section 7.47 provides in relevant part:
If you determine that an award of punitive damages is appropriate, then I instruct that
your award of punitive damages "need not bear any relationship to the underlying com-
pensatory damage award." The underlying premise of punitive damages is to punish (de-
fendant) and send a message to other businesses in this industry, while compensatory
damages are designed to make (plaintif/) whole for the injuries he (she) suffered.
Id. § 7.47. These instructions were drafted by private parties and are not official.
401 Id. § 7.47.
402 Louisiana generally bars punitive damages unless authorized by statute. Int'l Harvester
Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988). Louisiana's unofficial model jury in-
structions reflect this limitation and provide no general punitive damages instruction. See LA.
CIVIL LAW TREATISE, CIVILJURY INSTRUCTIONS § 18.11 (H. Alstonjohnson, III, 2d ed. 2001), WL
18 LACIVL § 18.11 (providing no general instruction). The unofficial instructions, however,
include a model charge for certain statutory claims. These instructions, however, fail to meet
even the Haslip-minimum. See id. § 18.02, WL 18 LACIVL § 18.02 (governing hazardous sub-
stance cases).
403 Michigan generally bars punitive damages unless authorized by statute. See McAuley v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 578 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Mich. 1998). The state allows "exemplary damages"
as compensation to the plaintiff, not as punishment of a defendant. See Peisner v. Detroit Free
Press, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Mich. 1984). Michigan's official model jury instructions re-
flect this limitation, and include instructions only for "exemplary damages" for certain claims.
See 1 MICH. MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 118.21, cmt., available at
http://www.courts.michigan.gov/mcji/MCJI.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). The unofficial
model instructions, however, include a punitive damages charge. See MICH. NON-STANDARD
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 11:01 (2002), WL MI-NSJICV §11:01 ("[Y]ou may add to the award of
actual damages an amount you agree is proper as punitive and exemplary damages.").
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consideration for the jury: the defendant's wealth.4 °4 Consistent with
Haslip, for instance, Arkansas's model instruction advises the jury to
consider the purpose of punitive damages, the nature of the wrong-
doing, and makes clear that punitive damages are not compulsory."
When discussing computation of the award, the instruction adds: "In
arriving at the amount of punitive damages you may consider the fi-
nancial condition of [the defendant], as shown by the evidence." 406
The model instructions in Arizona, 4 7 the District of Columbia,40 8 Flor-i a,' 4Hawii,4 40 411414
.. .410 Mississippi, Nevada
4 1 2 Oregon,4 1 3 South Carolina,
Texas, 4 1 and Wyoming provide similar guidance.
404 These Haslip-plus-wealth jurisdictions include Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming.
405 See ARK. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 2218 (1999). This instruction provides in
relevant part:
Punitive damages may be imposed to punish a wrongdoer and deter others from similar
conduct. In order to recover punitive damages from [defendant], [plaintiff] has the
burden of proving [malice, recklessness, or intentional conduct].
... You are not required to assess punitive damages against [defendant] but you may do
so ifjustified by the evidence.
Id.
406 Id.
407 See REVISED ARIZ. JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL)-Personal Injury Damages 4 (3d ed. 1997).
This instruction provides in relevant part:
If you find defendant liable to plaintiff, you may consider assessing additional damages
to punish defendant or to deter defendant and others from similar misconduct in the fu-
ture ....
The law provides no fixed standard for the amount of punitive damages you may as-
sess, if any, but leaves the amount to your discretion. [However, if you assess punitive
damages, you may consider the character of defendant's conduct or motive, the nature
and extent of the harm to plaintiff that defendant caused, and the nature and extent of
defendant's financial wealth.]
Id.
48 see I STANDARDIZED CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR D.C. § 16.03 (2002), LEXIS 1-16 Civil
Jury Instructions for DC § 16.03. This instruction provides:
If you find that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages, then you must
decide the amount of the award. To determine the amount of the award you may con-
sider the [net worth] relative wealth of the defendant at the time of trial, the nature of
the wrong committed, the state of mind of the defendant when the wrong was commit-
ted, the cost and duration of the litigation, and any attorney's fees that the plaintiff has
incurred in this case. Your award should be sufficient to punish the defendant for his or
her conduct and to serve as an example to prevent others from acting in a similar way.
Id.
409 See FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, § PD2 (2003 Supp.), WL FLPRAC
APP. A PD. This instruction provides in relevant part:
In determining the amount of punitive damages, if any, to be assessed as punishment
and as a deterrent to others .... [y]ou should consider the following:
(1) the nature, extent and degree of misconduct and the related circumstances, in-
cluding the following: whether the wrongful conduct was motivated solely by unreason-
able financial gain; whether the unreasonably dangerous nature of the conduct, together
with the high likelihood of injury resulting from the conduct, was actually known by [de-
fendant] . .. ; whether, at the time of [loss] [injury] [or] [damage], [defendant] . .. had
a specific intent to harm (claimant) and the conduct of [defendant] ... did in fact harm
(claimant), [and]
[ (2) [the] [each] defendant's financial resources; and]
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[ (3) any other circumstance which may affect the amount of punitive damages.]
... You may in your discretion decline to assess punitive damages.
Id. § PD2(d) (2) (internal notes omitted); see also id. § PD2(d)(1) (providing similar instruction
for actions arising before October 1999); id. § PD1 (providing same instructions for bifurcated
cases).
41 See HAW. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.12 (2003), WL HI R CIVJURY Instr. 8.12. This instruc-
tion provides in relevant part:
The purposes of punitive damages are to punish the wrongdoer and to serve as an ex-
ample or warning to the wrongdoer and others not to engage in such conduct.
The proper measure of punitive damages is (1) the degree of intentional, willful, wan-
ton, oppressive, malicious or grossly negligent conduct that formed the basis for your
prior award of damages against that defendant and (2) the amount of money required to
punish that defendant considering his/her/its financial condition. In determining the
degree of a particular defendant's conduct, you must analyze that defendant's state of
mind at the time he/she/it committed the conduct which formed the basis for your
prior award of damages against that defendant. Any punitive damages you award must
be reasonable.
Id.
411 See MISS. MODELJURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL § 11.13 (2002), WL MSPRACJIG §11.14. This
instruction provides in relevant part:
In assessing the amount of punitive damages, if any, which are appropriate in this
cause, you may consider:
1. The financial condition and net worth of the defendant;
2. The nature and reprehensibility of the defendant's wrongdoing, for example, the
impact on the plaintiff, or the relationship of the plaintiff and defendant;
3. The defendant's awareness of the amount of harm being caused and the defen-
dant's motivation for causing the same;
4. The duration of the defendant's misconduct and whether the defendant attempted
to conceal it;
5. Any other relevant factor shown by the evidence.
Id.
412 See NEV. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, No. 10.20 (1986). This instruction provides
in relevant part:
The law provides no fixed standards as to the amount of such punitive damages, but
leaves the amount to the jury's sound discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice.
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, you are to consider the following:
1. The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant;
2. The amount of punitive damages which will have a deterrent effect on the defen-
dant in the light of defendant's financial condition.
Id.
41s See OR. UNIFORM CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION § 75.02 (1997). This instruction provides in
relevant part:
Punitive damages may be awarded to the plaintiff in addition to economic and/or
non-economic damages to punish the wrongdoer and to discourage the defendant and
others from engaging in wanton misconduct.
... [Y]ou may award punitive damages, although you are not required to do so be-
cause punitive damages are discretionary.
If you decide to award punitive damages, you may properly consider the following
items in fixing the amount:
(1) The character of the defendant's conduct;
(2) The defendant's motive;
(3) The sum of money that would be required to discourage the defendant and
others from engaging in such conduct in the future; and
(4) The income and assets of the defendant. The amount of punitive damages
may not exceed the sum of $___
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c. Multifactor Instructions
Twenty-two states instruct the jury to consider multiple factors in
setting the amount of punitive damages. 7 In addition to the Haslip-
Id. (for claims arising on or after Sept. 27, 1987 and before Sept. 9, 1995); id. § 75.02A (provid-
ing similar instruction for actions accruing on or after Sept. 9, 1995).
4 See S.C. RECOMMENDED CML JURY CHARGES No. 14.01 (1989) ("Punitive damages are
awarded to punish the person causing the injury, to vindicate the injured person's rights, and to
make an example of the person causing the harm so that he will not do it again nor will other
people engage in similar conduct."); id. No. 14.04 ("'In assessing punitive damages, considera-
tion should be given to the character of the (wrong) committed, the punishment which should
be meted out and the ability of the wrongdoer to pay.'").
415 SeeTEX. PATERNJURYCHARGES 8.6B (2002). This instruction provides in relevant part:
"Exemplary damages" means any damages awarded as a penalty or by way of punish-
ment. Exemplary damages include punitive damages.
In determining the amount of exemplary damages you should consider evidence, if
any, relating to:
a. The nature of the wrong.
b. The character of the conduct involved.
c. The degree of culpability of the wrongdoer.
d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned.
e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense ofjustice and propriety.
f. The net worth of [the defendant].
ld.; see also id. § 8.6A (providing similar instruction for actions accruing before 1995).
416 SeeWYO. CIVIL PATIERNJURY INSTRUCTIONS, REVISED ED. No. 4.06 (1994) ("Punitive dam-
ages are allowable, in a proper case, to punish the defendant and to deter the defendant and
others similarly situated from engaging in similar conduct in the future."). No. 4.06A provides
in relevant part:
The law provides no fixed standard as to the amount of such punitive damages, but
leaves the amount to the jury's sound discretion to be exercised without passion or
prejudice. The financial condition of the defendant, and therefore [his] [her] [its] abil-
ity to pay, may be considered in fixing the amount of punitive damages.
Id. No. 4.06A. In 1998, the Wyoming Supreme Court set forth factors that must be given to the
jury, rendering this instruction insufficient under state law. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Shirley,
958 P.2d 1040, 1052 (Wyo. 1998); see also discussion infra accompanying notes 495-501.
417 The following states use a multifactor approach: Alaska, California, Delaware, Idaho,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The MPDA likewise proposes a multifactor approach.
Section 7 provides:
(a) If a defendant is found liable for punitive damages, a fair and reasonable amount
of damages may be awarded for the purposes stated in Section 5(a)(3). The court shall
instruct the jury in determining what constitutes a fair and reasonable amount of puni-
tive damages to consider any evidence that has been admitted regarding the following
factors:
(1) the nature of defendant's wrongful conduct and its effect on the claimant and
others;
(2) the amount of compensatory damages;
(3) any fines, penalties, damages, or restitution paid or to be paid by the defen-
dant arising from the wrongful conduct;
(4) the defendant's present and future financial condition and the effect of an
award on each condition;
(5) any profit or gain, obtained by the defendant through the wrongful conduct,
in excess of that likely to be divested by this and any other actions against the defendant
for compensatory damages or restitution;
[Vol. 6:3
INSTRUCTINGJURIES ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
minimum, these instructions typically inform the jury to consider the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the financial condition
of the defendant, and, most importantly, the relationship (or propor-
tionality) of the punitive damages to the plaintifFs harm.
California, another leader in the model jury instruction move-
ment,418 uses a model instruction that provides:
There is no fixed standard for determining the amount of punitive
damages, and you are not required to award any punitive damages. In
deciding the amount of punitive damages, if any, you should consider all
of the following:
(a) How reprehensible was [name of defendant] 's conduct?
(b) Is there a reasonable relationship between the amount of puni-
tive damages and [ name of plaintiff 's harm?
(c) In view of [name of defendant]'s financial condition, what amount
is necessary to punish [him/her] and discourage future wrongful con-
duct?41
(6) any adverse effect of the award on innocent persons;
(7) any remedial measures taken or not taken by the defendant since the wrong-
ful conduct;
(8) compliance or noncompliance with any applicable standard promulgated by a
governmental or other generally recognized agency or organization whose function is to
establish standards; and
(9) any other aggravating or mitigating factors relevant to the amount of the
award.
(b) If an award of punitive damages is authorized or governed by another statute of
this State, any requirement as to amount or method of calculation established by that
statute governs the award.
(c) If the amount of punitive damages is decided by the court, the court upon motion
of a party shall make findings showing the basis for the amount awarded against each de-
fendant and enter its findings in the record.
MPDA, supra note 387, § 7.
418 See NIELAND, supra note 380, at 6-8.
419 See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION No. 3940 (2003) [hereinafter
CACI]; see also id. § 3942 (providing same instruction for individual defendant in bifurcated
trial); id. § 3943 (providing same instruction for principal liable for conduct of agent in non-
bifurcated trial); id. § 3945 (providing same instruction for entity defendant in non-bifurcated
trial); id. § 3947 (providing same instruction for individual and entity defendant in non-
bifurcated trial); id. § 3949 (providing same instruction for individual and corporate defendants
in bifurcated trial). The CACI were the result of a six-year project by the Judicial Council of
California to translate California's longstanding model instructions, the Book of Approved Jury
Instructions ("BAJI"), into "plain, straightforward language." Press Release, Judicial Council of
California, New Plain-English Jury Instructions Adopted to Assist Jurors in California Courts
(July 16, 2003), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR42-
03.htm. The CACI are not mandatory or a replacement to the BAJI, but simply offer an alterna-
tive to the BAJI. See Stuart T. Waldrip, Could You Repeat That, Please?, 43 ORANGE COUNTY LAW.,
Sept. 2001, at 46. Reflecting the project's "plain language" goals, the CACI instruction concern-
ing the calculation of the amount of punitive damages is essentially the same as its BAJI coun-
terpart:
The law provides no fixed standards as to the amount of such punitive damages, but
leaves the amount to the jury's sound discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice.
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, consider the following factors:
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Several states, including Delaware 4 2  Idaho 421  owa, 4 2 2 Kentucky, 423
Massachusetts, 424 Montana, 425 New Mexico,4 26 New York4 2 7  North
(1) The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant.
(2) The amount of punitive damages which will have a deterrent effect on the defen-
dant in light of defendant's financial condition.
[(3) That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to the injury, harm, or
damage actually suffered by the plaintiff.].
CAL. CIVILJURY INSTRUCTIONS (BAJI) § 14.71 (2004), WL CA BAJI 14.71; see also id. § 14.72.2,
WL CA BAJI 14.72.2 (providing same instruction for bifurcated trial). As this Article went to
press, however, the BAJI Committee on Standard Jury Instructions published supplemental
puntitive damages instructions that attempt to address State Farm. See id. § 14.71.1, WL CA BAJI
14.71.1 (instructing jury not to award punitive damages for conduct that occurred outside of
California); id. § 14.71.2, WL CA BAJI 14.71.2 (instructing jury of factors to consider in deter-
mining the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct). For a discussion of these
and other recent changes to instructions prompted by State Farm, see infra note 636.
420 See DEL. CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 22.27 (2000), WL DE-JICIV 22.27. This in-
struction provides in relevant part:
The law provides no fixed standards for the amount of punitive damages but leaves the
amount to your sound discretion, exercised without passion or prejudice. In determin-
ing any award of punitive damages, you must consider the following: the reprehensibility
or outrageousness of [defendant's name]'s conduct and the amount of punitive damages
that will deter [defendant's name] and others like [him/her] from similar conduct in
the future. You may consider [defendant's name]'s financial condition for this purpose
only. [Defendant's name]'s financial condition must not be considered in assessing
compensatory damages. Any award of punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation
to [plaintiff's name] 's compensatory or nominal damages.
Id.; see also id. § 22.15, WL DE-JICIV 22.15 (providing similar instructions for defamation cases).
421 See IDAHO JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 9.20 (2003), available at http://www2.state.id.us/
judicial/juryinstcov.htm. This instruction provides in relevant part:
Punitive damages are not a matter of right, but may be awarded in the jury's sound
discretion, which is to be exercised without passion or prejudice. The law provides no
mathematical formula by which such damages are to be calculated, other than any award
of punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to the actual harm done, to the
cause thereof, to the conduct of the defendant, and to the primary objective of deter-
rence.
Id. For cases where evidence of the defendant's wealth was presented to thejury, an alternative
instruction includes the language above, but adds the following:
(You have been permitted to hear evidence pertaining to defendant's wealth and fi-
nancial condition. This evidence was admitted for your consideration only with refer-
ence to the question of punitive damages in light of all other evidence before you if you
determine that such an award should be made in this case.)
Id. No. 9.20.5.
422 SeeIOWA CIVILJURYINSTRUcTIONS No. 210.1 (1998). This instruction provides in relevant
part:
There is no exact rule to determine the amount of punitive damages, if any, you
should award. In fixing the amount of punitive damages, you may consider all the evi-
dence including:
1. The nature of defendant's conduct.
2. The amount of punitive damages which will punish and discourage like conduct by
the defendant in view of [his] [her] [its] financial condition.
3. The plaintiffs actual damages.
Id.
423 See 2 Ky. INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES-CIVIL § 39.15 (Cum. Supp. 2003). This instruction
provides in relevant part:
In determining the amount, if any, of punitive damages you shall consider the follow-
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(a) the harm to P as measured by the damages you have awarded under Instruction
__ and the potential of further harm to P created by D's [failure to comply with his
duties] [conduct to P1,
AND;
(b) The degree, if any, to which you find D's [conduct toward PI [failure to comply
with his duties] to have been reprehensible.
Id.; see also City of Middlesboro v. Brown, 63 S.W.3d 179, 180 n. 1 (Ky. 2001) (advocating use of §
39.15).
424 Massachusetts generally bars punitive damages unless authorized by statute. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 1-106 (West 1998). Accordingly, Massachusetts has no general model in-
struction for punitive damages. It does, however, have a punitive damages instruction for dis-
crimination actions, which directs the jury to consider multiple factors when setting the amount
of the award:
In determining the amount of a punitive damage award, if any, you should consider:
1. the character and nature of the defendant's conduct;
2. the defendant's wealth, in order to determine what amount of money is needed to
punish the defendant's conduct and to deter any future acts of discrimination;
3. the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff; and
4. the magnitude of any potential harm to other victims if similar future behavior is
not deterred.
If you do award punitive damages, you should fix the amount by using calm discretion
and sound reason.
1 MASS. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL PRACTICEJURY INSTRUCTIONS § 5.3.5 (2001), WL CIVJII MA-CLE
5-1. Massachusetts also has a less descriptive model instruction for civil rights actions. See 2
MASS. SUPERIOR COURT CML PRACTICEJURY INSTRUCTIONS § 19.2.6 (2001), WrL CIVJII MA-CLE
Forms 157 ("[Y]ou may award in addition to actual damages an amount you agree to be proper
as punitive damages in order to punish the defendant for extraordinary misconduct and to
serve as an example or warning to others not to engage in such conduct.").
425 See MONT. PATrERN INSTRUCrIONS (CIVIL) No. 25.66 (Jan. 2003 ed.). This instruction
provides in relevant part:
In determining the amount of punitive damages, you should consider all of the atten-
dant circumstances, including the nature, extent and enormity of the wrong, the intent
of the party committing it, the amount allowed as actual damages, and, generally, all of
the circumstances attending the particular act involved, including any circumstances
which may operate to reduce without wholly defeating punitive damages.
Punitive damages should be of such an amount as will deter the defendant from and
warn others against similar acts of misconduct. Thus, the wealth of the defendant is a
fact to be considered by you in determining the amount of punitive damages.
Id. For a discussion of this instruction from the perspective of a Montana trial judge, see
Harkin, supra note 29, at 395-99.
426 See N.M. STAT. ANN., UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 13-1827 (Michie 1999). This
instruction provides in relevant part:
Punitive damages are awarded for the limited purposes of punishment and to deter
others from the commission of like offenses. The amount of punitive damages must be
based on reason and justice taking into account all the circumstances, including the na-
ture of the wrong and such aggravating and mitigating circumstances as may be shown.
The amount awarded, if any, must be reasonably related to the injury and to any dam-
ages given as compensation and not disproportionate to the circumstances.
Id.; see also id. § 13-861 (providing same instruction for contracts and UCC sales cases); id. § 13-
1718 (providing same instruction for bad faith cases); id. § 13-1011 (providing same instruction
for defamation cases).
427 See N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 2:278 (Dec. 2003), WL NY PJI 2:278. For
negligence actions, this instruction provides in relevant part:
In arriving at your decision as to the amount of punitive damages you should consider
the following factors:
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Carolina,428 Rhode Island," and South Dakota40 have adopted in-
structions comparable in many respects to the California model.
1. The nature and reprehensibility of what the defendant did. That would include the
character of the wrongdoing ([state the factors that are applicable, such as:j whether the de-
fendant's conduct demonstrated an indifference to, or a reckless disregard of, the health
or safety of others, whether the plaintiff was financially vulnerable, how long the conduct
went on, the defendant's awareness of what harm the conduct caused or was likely to
cause, any concealment or covering up of the wrongdoing, how often the defendant had
committed similar acts of this type in the past). In considering the amount of punitive
damages to award, you should weigh this factor heavily.
2. The actual and potential harm created by defendant's conduct. The amount of pu-
nitive damages that you award must be both reasonable and proportionate to the actual
and potential harm suffered by the plaintiff, and to the compensatory damages you
awarded the plaintiff.
3. The defendant's financial condition and the impact your punitive damages award
will have on the defendant.
Id.; see also id. § 3:30, WL NY PJI 3:30 (providing similar instruction for defamation cases); id. §
3:50, WL NY PJI 3:50 (providing similar instruction for malicious prosecution cases).
428 See N.C. PATrERNJURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES No. 810.98 (1996). This instruction
provides in relevant part:
Whether to award punitive damages is a matter within the sound discretion of the jury.
Punitive damages are not awarded for the purpose of compensating the plaintiff for his
[injury] [damage], nor are they awarded as a matter of right.
If you decide, in your discretion, to award punitive damages, any amount you award
must bear a rational relationship to the sum reasonably needed to punish the defendant
for egregiously wrongful acts and to deter the defendant and others from committing
similar wrongful acts. In making this determination, you may consider only that evi-
dence which relates to
[the reprehensibility of the defendant's motives and conduct]
[the likelihood, at the relevant time, of serious harm (to the plaintiff or others simi-
larly situated) ]
[the degree of the defendant's awareness of the probable consequences of his con-
duct]
[the duration of the defendant's conduct]
[the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff]
[any concealment by the defendant of the facts or consequences of his conduct]
[the existence and frequency of any similar past conduct by the defendant]
[whether the defendant profited by the conduct]
[the defendant's ability to pay punitive damages, as evidenced by his revenues or net
worth ].
Id. (footnotes omitted). North Carolina imposes a statutory cap on punitive damages, but pro-
vides that the jury cannot be informed of the cap. N.C. GEN. STAT. § ID-25(c) (1996).
429 See MODEL CIVILJURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR R.I. No. 10403 (2002 ed.). This instruction pro-
vides:
You may consider a defendant's wealth in determining the appropriate amount of pu-
nitive damages. Nevertheless, the amount of punitive damages you award must reasona-
bly relate to:
a) the character and degree of defendant's wrongful conduct;
b) the amount of compensatory damages which you award;
c) the impact of the punitive damages on third parties; [and
d) the severity of any civil penalties which the state government could impose on de-
fendant for such wrongdoing.]
Id.
430 See S.D. PATrERN INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) No. 35-01 (1995). This instruction provides in
relevant part:
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These states differ, however, in their approach to a reasonable re-
lationship instruction. Unlike California, many states do not ex-
pressly instruct the jury that punitive damages must bear a "reason-
able relationship" to the plaintiffs harm, but instead simply direct
the jury to consider the amount of the plaintiffs actual damages• • •431
when assessing the punitive award. Conversely, a few states-
Maine,4 32 Maryland, 4 3 and Wisconsin 1-Use multifactor instructions
If you find that punitive damages should be allowed, then in determining the amount,
you should consider the following factors:
(1) The amount allowed in actual damages;
(2) The nature and enormity of the wrong;
(3) The intent of the defendant;
(4) The defendant's financial condition; and
(5) All of the circumstances concerning the defendant's actions, including any miti-
gating circumstances which may operate to reduce, without wholly defeating, punitive
damages.
Id.
431 See supra notes 422-25, 428, 430 (providing instructions for Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Montana, North Carolina, and South Dakota).
432 See ME.JURY INSTRUCTION MANUAL § 7-114 (4th ed. 2003), LEXIS, 1-7 Maine Jury Instruc-
tion Manual § 8. This instruction provides in relevant part:
In deciding whether to award punitive damages and in determining the amount of any
such damages, you may consider the following:
1. All aggravating and mitigating factors present by the evidence, including the
outrageousness of the defendant's conduct;
2. The amount of damages that will have a deterrent effect [and the ability of the de-
fendant to pay such an award]; and
3. [Any criminal punishment that may have already been imposed for the conduct in
question which may be considered as mitigating the amount of damages.]
Id.
433 See MD. CVIL PATrERN JURY INSTRUCrIONS § 10:12 (4th ed. 2002), WL MPJI MD-CLE 10-
313. This instruction provides in relevant part:
An award for punitive damages should be:
(1) In an amount that will deter the defendant and others from similar conduct.
(2) Proportionate to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct and the defendant's
ability to pay.
(3) But not designed to bankrupt or financially destroy a defendant.
Id.
4M See 2 WIS. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL No. 1707.2 (2002 Supp.). For products liability ac-
tions after May 1995, this instruction provides in relevant part:
If you determine that punitive damages should be awarded, you may then award such
sum as will accomplish the purpose of punishing or deterring wrongful conduct. Factors
you should consider in answering this question include:
1. the seriousness of the hazard to the public;
2. the profitability of the misconduct;
3. the attitude and conduct on discovery of the misconduct;
4. the degree of the manufacturer's awareness of the hazard and of its excessiveness;
5. the employees involved in causing or concealing the misconduct;
6. the duration of both the improper behavior and its concealment;
7. the financial condition of the manufacturer and the probable effect on the manu-
facturer of a particular judgment; and
8. the total punishment the manufacturer will probably receive from other sources.
Id. Interestingly, the instructions for non-products liability actions provide different instruc-
tions that advise the jury to consider the amount of actual and potential damages. For non-
products liability actions after May 1995, Section 1707.1 provides in relevant part:
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that do not provide any guidance on the proportionality of the award.
Indeed, the comments to the Maryland model expressly acknowledge
this omission:
While the committee realizes that an award for punitive damages
must bear a reasonable ratio to the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff,
under current procedure the trial judge is required to review the jury
award to make sure that such a ratio is present. Because of this, and the
inherent complexity of the concept, no modification of the instruction is
435made to reflect this constitutional requirement.
The Pennsylvania model instruction-providing a clear illustration of
how state law-based instructions often conflict with constitutional lim-
its on punitives-expressly advises the jury that it need not consider
the relationship of the punitive damages to compensatory damages. 6
Despite similarities to the California model, many of these and
other multifactor jurisdictions often add factors not included in Cali-
fornia's instruction. In addition to elements comparable to the
If you determine that punitive damages should be awarded, you may then award such
sum as will accomplish the purpose of punishing or deterring wrongful conduct. Factors
you should consider in answering this question include:
1. the grievousness of the defendant's acts,
2. the degree of malice involved,
3. the potential damage which might have been done by such acts as well as the actual
damage, and
4. the defendant's ability to pay. You may consider the defendant's wealth in deter-
mining what sum of punitive damages will be enough to punish the defendant and deter
the defendant and others from the same conduct in the future.
Id. § 1707.1.
MD. CVIL PATTERNJURYINSTRUCTIONS § 10:12 cmt. A.1 (4th ed. 2002), WL MPJI MD-CLE
10-313.
436 See 2 PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVILJURY INSTRUCTIONS § 14.00 (Jan. 2003 ed.), WL PA-
JICJV 14.00 ("[Y]ou may award punitive damages, as well as any compensatory damages, in or-
der to punish the defendant for [his] [her] conduct and to deter the defendant and others
from committing similar acts"). Section 14.02 provides in relevant part:
If you decide that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages, it is your
job to fix the amount of such damages. In doing so, you may consider any or all of the
following factors:
* the character of the defendant's act,
" the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or in-
tended to cause [; in this regard you may include the plaintiff's trouble and expense in
seeking to protect [his] [her] interests in legal proceedings and in this suit], and
* the wealth of the defendant insofar as it is relevant in fixing an amount that will pun-
ish [him] [her] [it], and deter [him] [her] [it] and others from like conduct in the fu-
ture. [The amount you assess as punitive damages need not bear any relationship to the
amount you choose to award as compensatory damages, and it] [It] is not necessary that
you award compensatory damages to the plaintiff in order to assess punitive dam-
ages ....
The amount of punitive damages awarded must not be the result of passion or preju-
dice against the defendant on the part of the jury. The sole purpose of punitive damages
is to punish the defendant's outrageous conduct and to deter the defendant and others
from similar acts.
Id. § 14.02, WL PA-JICIV 14.02.
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California model, Alaska,"' Minnesota,"' New Jersey,39 North Da-koa440 , 441 W
kota, Tennessee, and West Virginia44  also instruct the jury to
437 See ALA. CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCrIONS No. 20.20B (1999), http://www.state.ak.us/
courts/art20.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). For "actions accruing on or after August 7, 1997,"
this instruction provides:
The law provides no fixed measure as to the amount of punitive damages, but leaves it
to you to decide an amount that will fairly accomplish the purposes of punishing the de-
fendant and deterring the defendant and others from repeating similar acts. In deter-
mining the amount of punitive damages to be awarded, you may consider:
* the likelihood at the time of the conduct that serious harm would result from
the defendant's conduct;
* the degree of the defendant's awareness of the likelihood at the time of the
conduct that serious harm would result from the defendant's conduct;
* the amount of financial gain that the defendant gained or expected to gain as a
result of the defendant's conduct;
9 the duration of the defendant's conduct and any intentional concealment of the
conduct;
" the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the conduct;
" the financial condition of the defendant; and
" the total deterrence of other damages and punishment imposed on the defen-
dant as a result of the conduct, including compensatory and punitive damage
awards that have been made to other persons in situations similar to that of the
plaintiff, and any criminal penalties to which the defendant has been or may be
subjected.
The amount that you award for punitive damages may not exceed [insert the greater
of $500,000 or three time the amount of compensatory damages], unless you decide that
the conduct that formed the basis for your award of punitive damages was motivated by
financial gain, and the adverse consequences of the conduct were actually known to the
defendant, or to the person responsible for making policy decisions on behalf of the de-
fendant. If you decide that the conduct that formed the basis for your award of punitive
damages was motivated by financial gain, and that the adverse consequences of the con-
duct were actually known to the defendant, or to the person responsible for making pol-
icy decisions on behalf of the defendant, the award of punitive damages may not exceed
the greater of [insert the greater of $7,000,000 or four times compensatory damages] or
four times the financial gain that the defendant received as a result of the defendant's
misconduct.
Id. For "actions accruing on or afterJune 11, 1986 and before August 7, 1997," Instruction No.
20.20 provides in relevant part:
The law provides no fixed measure as to the amount of such damages, but leaves it to
you to decide an amount that will fairly accomplish the purposes of punishment and de-
terrence. In assessing such damages you may consider the magnitude and flagrancy of
the defendant's offense, the importance of the policy violated, the wealth of the defen-
dant, and the amount of compensatory damages.
Id.
438 See MINN. PRACTICE SERIES JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES-CIVIL § 94.10 (2003), WL 4A
MNPRAC ClVJIG 94.10. This instruction provides in relevant part:
If you decide to award punitive damages, consider, among other things, the following
factors:
[1. The seriousness of the hazard to the public that may have been or was caused by
(defendant) 's misconduct]
[2. The profit (defendant) made as a result of the misconduct]
[3. The length of time of the misconduct and if (defendant) hid it]
[4. The amount (defendant) knew about the hazard and of its danger]
[5. The attitude and conduct of (defendant) when the misconduct was discovered]
[6. The number and level of employees involved in causing or hiding the misconduct]
[7. The financial state of (defendant)]
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[8. The total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed on (defendant) as a re-
sult of the misconduct. This includes compensatory and punitive awards to (plaintiff)
and other persons]
[9. The severity of any criminal penalty (defendant) may get.]
Id.
439 See N.J. MODEL CIL CHARGES No. 6.20A (2000), WL NJ-JICIV 6.20A. For actions after
October 1995, this instruction provides in relevant part:
In determining the amount of punitive damages, you must consider all relevant evi-
dence, including, but not limited to, evidence of the four factors that I previously men-
tioned to you in connection with your determination as to whether punitive damages
should be awarded at all. As you may recall, these factors are (1) the likelihood, at the
relevant time, that serious harm would arise from the defendant's conduct; (2) the de-
fendant's awareness or reckless disregard of the likelihood that such serious harm would
arise from the defendant's conduct; (3) the conduct of the defendant upon learning
that its initial conduct would likely cause harm; and (4) the duration of the conduct or
any concealment of it by the defendant. In addition to these factors, you should also
consider the profitability of the misconduct to the defendant; consider when the mis-
conduct was terminated; and consider the financial condition of the defendant or the
defendant's ability to pay the punitive damages iward.
Finally, you should make sure that there is a reasonable relationship between the ac-
tual injury and the punitive damages.
Id.; see also id. No. 5.34J, WL NJ-JICIV 5.34J (providing similar instruction for products liability
actions). NewJersey has a statutory cap on punitive damages of "five times the amount of com-
pensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is greater," but provides that the jury cannot be in-
formed of the cap. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.14, 5.16 (West 2000).
440 See N.D. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS C-72.00 (2002). This instruction provides in rele-
vant part:
[Mlou must find by clear and convincing evidence that the amount of exemplary dam-
ages awarded is consistent with the following:
1) Whether there is a reasonable relationship between the exemplary damage award
claimed and the harm likely to result from the Defendant's conduct as well as the
harm that actually has occurred; and
2) The degree of reprehensibility of the Defendant's conduct and the duration of
that conduct.
[The Court has determined that there has been evidence presented which permits you
to also consider the following factors:
1) Defendant's awareness of and any concealment of the conduct;
2) Profitability to the Defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of re-
moving that profit and of having the Defendant also sustain a loss;
3) Criminal sanctions imposed on the Defendant for the same conduct that is the ba-
sis for the exemplary damage claim are to be taken into account if offered in mitiga-
tion of the exemplary damage award.]
Id.
441 SeeTENN. PATTERNJURY INSTRUCTION-CIVIL No. 14.56 (2002), WL 8 TNPRAC CIV 14.56.
This instruction provides in relevant part:
In making your decision [regarding the amount of punitive damages] you must con-
sider the instructions I have already given you and also the following:
1. The defendant's net worth and financial condition;
2. The objectionable nature of defendant's wrongdoing, the impact of defendant's
conduct on the plaintiff, and the relationship of the parties;
3. The defendant's awareness of the amount of harm being caused and the defen-
dant's motivation in causing the harm;
4. The duration of the defendant's misconduct and whether the defendant attempted
to conceal the conduct;
5. The amount of money the plaintiff has spent in the attempt to recover the losses;
6. Whether defendant profited from the activity, and if so, whether the punitive award
should be in excess of the profit in order to deter similar future behavior;
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consider the "profitability" of the defendant's conduct and/or advise
the jury to consider prior civil or criminal punishments against the
defendant when determining the amount of the punitive award.
d. Unique Instructions for States That Place Limits on Punitive Damages
The model instructions in several states reflect state law limits on
punitive damages. Colorado44 s and Oklahoma,4" for instance,
7. The number and amount of previous punitive damages awards based upon the same
wrongful act;
8. Whether, once the misconduct became known to the defendant, the defendant
tried to remedy the situation or offered a prompt and fair settlement for the actual harm
caused; and
9. Any other circumstances shown by the evidence that bear on determining the
proper amount of the punitive award.
Id.
442 See W. VA. PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTOMOBILE AND ROAD LAw PERSONAL
INJURY DAMAGE No. VIII (2000), at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/jury/auto.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2004). This instruction provides in relevant part:
In awarding punitive damages you may consider the following factors:
(1) Punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm that is likely
to occur from defendant 's conduct as well as to the harm that actually has oc-
curred. If defendant 's actions caused or would likely cause in a similar situation
only slight harm, the damages should be relatively small. If the harm is grievous, the
damages should be greater.
(2) You may consider whether defendant __[']s conduct was reprehensible, and
in doing so you should take into account how long defendant __ continued in his
actions, whether defendant _ was aware that its actions were causing or were likely
to cause harm, whether defendant __ attempted to conceal or cover up his actions
or the harm caused by such actions, whether/how often defendant __ engaged in
similar conduct in the past.
(3) You may consider whether defendant __ profited from' [sic] his wrongful
conduct, and if you find defendant __ did profit from his conduct you may remove
the profit and your award should be in excess of the profit, so that the award discourages
future bad acts by defendant .
(4) As a matter of fundamental fairness, punitive damages should bear a reasonable
relationship to compensatory damages.
(5) In determining the amount of punitive damages, the financial position of defen-
dant is relevant.
Id. This instruction has not been adopted, but only proposed for a six-month provisional usage
and comment period. See W. VA. PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL & CRIMINAL TRIALS,
Introduction, at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/jury/intro.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
443 See COLO. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 5:3 (4th ed. 2001) ("If you find beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant acted in a (fraudulent) (malicious) (willful and wanton) manner,
you may award a reasonable sum as punitive damages that may not be more than the amount
awarded as actual damages."). By statute, Colorado limits the amount of punitive damages to
no more than the amount of the compensatory award. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(l)(a)
(2002). Under certain circumstances, the court may increase the award to no more than three
times the amount of actual damages. Id. § 13-21-102(3). Conversely, the court "may reduce or
disallow an award of punitive damages." Id. § 13-21-102(2). Some states prohibit courts from
informing the jury about a statutory cap. See supra notes 428, 439 (discussing the North Caro-
lina and NewJersey approaches respectively).
444 See OKLA. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 5.9 (Vernon 2003), WL VRN-OKFORM
OUJI-CIV INSTR. 5.9. This instruction provides in relevant part:
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incorporate a statutory cap on punitive awards into their model in-
structions. The Connecticut instruction, consistent with state law,S445
limits the amount of punitive damages to the plaintiff's cost of trial.
The instructions in Kansas reflect that state's practice of permitting
only the court to determine the amount of a punitive damages
award.446
Finally, Nebraska447 and New Hampshire, 44s which generally bar
punitive damages, understandably have no model instructions.
In determining the amount of punitive damages, you may consider the following fac-
tors:
1. The seriousness of the hazard to the public arising from [Defendant]'s misconduct;
2. The profitability of the misconduct to [Defendant];
3. How long the conduct lasted and whether it is likely to continue;
4. Whether there were attempts to conceal the misconduct;
5. How aware [Defendant] was of the conduct and its consequences and how aware
[Defendant] was of the hazard and of its excessiveness;
6. The attitude and conduct of [Defendant] upon finding out about the miscon-
duct/hazard;
7. The financial condition of [Defendant];
8. (If the defendant is a corporation or other entity) The number and level of employ-
ees involved in causing or concealing the misconduct.
In no event should the punitive damages exceed the greater of: (Select One)
[$100,000.00 or the amount of actual damages you have previously awarded].
OR
[$500,000.00, or twice the amount of actual damages you have previously awarded, or
the increased financial benefit derived by the defendant as a direct result of the conduct
causing the injury to the plaintiff and other persons or entities].
Id.; id. § 22.7, WL VRN-OKFORM OUJI-CIV INSTR. 22.7 (providing similar instruction for
claims against insurers); id. § 12.12, WL VRN-OKFORM OUJI-CIV INSTR. 12.12 (providing
similar instruction for products liability cases).
M5 See I CONN. JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 256(b) (4th ed. 1993) ("The measure of these
damages is the reasonable expense which he has incurred, including counsel fees, in prosecut-
ing this action, less the taxable costs . . . ."); see also id. § 256(c) (providing similar instruction for
violent conduct but includes that the purpose of exemplary damages is to punish and deter).
446 See PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS KAN. CIVIL No. 171.44 (3rd ed. 2001) ("If you determine puni-
tive damages should be allowed, your finding should be entered in the verdict form. After the
trial the court will conduct a separate hearing to determine the amount of punitive damages to
be allowed."); see also Trendel v. Rogers, 955 P.2d 150, 152 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that
Kansas does not permit the jury to assess the amount of punitive damages).
447 See 1 NEB. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 2D, ch. 4, pt. 4 (2002) (noting absence of instruc-
tion). See generally Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb.
1989) (stating that punitive damages are prohibited by state constitution).
448 New Hampshire does not have punitive damages, but instead has "enhanced damages,"
which may be awarded for certain types of malicious conduct. See N.H. CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 9.14 (4th ed. 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997) ("No punitive dam-
ages shall be awarded in any action, unless otherwise provided by statute."). The model instruc-
tion for these enhanced damages provides only that they are not compulsory. See N.H. CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCrIONS § 9.14 (4th ed. 2001).
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2. Federal ModelJuiy Instructions
The federal courts' approaches to model jury instructions on pu-
nitive damages mirror those taken by the states. The leading federal
jury instruction handbook, for instance, provides a Haslip-like com-
mon law instruction:
In addition to actual damages, the law permits a jury, under certain
circumstances, to award the injured person punitive and exemplary dam-
ages in order to punish the wrongdoer for some extraordinary miscon-
duct and to serve as an example or warning to others not to engage in
such conduct.
Whether or not to make any award of punitive and exemplary dam-
ages, in addition to actual damages, is a matter exclusively within the
province of thejury ....
... You should also bear in mind, not only the conditions under
which, and the purposes for which, the law permits an award of punitive
and exemplary damages to be made, but also the requirement of the law
that the amount of such extraordinary damages, when awarded, must be
fixed with calm discretion and sound reason, and must never be either
awarded, or fixed in amount, because of any sympathy, or bias, or preju-
dice with respect to any party to the case. 449
The Eighth Circuit's model instruction for civil rights claims provides
equally minimal guidance. 450 The Eighth Circuit's model instructions
committee noted that it "believes that this punitive damages instruc-
tion meets the requirements of Haslip."
45' The Fifth452 and Eleventh
453
Circuits, on the other hand, use Haslip-plus-wealth instructions.
449 3 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 128.81 (Kevin F. O'Malley et al. eds., 5th
ed. 2000) (concerning instructions for diversity cases). In Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), the
Supreme Court upheld the portion of this instruction dealing with the imposition of punitive
damages, but did not address the validity of the portions advising on how to determine the
amount of the award. See id. at 51 (holding that imposition of punitive damages in a civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not require proof of actual malicious intent); see also FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, supra, § 128.81 notes.
450 EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.53 (West 1999). This
instruction provides in relevant part:
[T]he law permits the jury under certain circumstances to award the injured person pu-
nitive damages in order to punish the defendant for some extraordinary misconduct and
to serve as an example or warning to others not to engage in such conduct.
. . [[I]f you find the conduct of that defendant.., was recklessly and callously indif-
ferent ... ] then, in addition to any other damages to which you find plaintiff entitled,
you may, but are not required to, award plaintiff an additional amount as punitive dam-
ages if you find it is appropriate to punish the defendant or deter the defendant and
others from like conduct in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages and
the amount of those damages are within your sound discretion.
Id. (internal notes omitted).
451 Id. § 4.53 cmt.
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit takes the multifactor approach, which
includes the Haslip-minimum, as well as an instruction to consider
the relationship of the punitive damages to the plaintiffs harm:
If you find that punitive damages are appropriate, you must use rea-
son in setting the amount. Punitive damages, if any, should be in an
amount sufficient to fulfill their purposes but should not reflect bias,
prejudice or sympathy toward any party. In considering punitive dam-
ages, you may consider the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct and the relationship of any award of punitive damages to any ac-
tual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.'
B. Due Process Challenges to Jury Instructions
1. Blind Adherence to the Haslip-minimum
Not surprisingly, given the Haslip procedural due process regime,
most challenges to the constitutional sufficiency of punitive damages
instructions have failed. After Haslip, most courts bypassed whether a
challenged instruction provided meaningful guidance to the jury and
instead merely analyzed whether the instruction contained the three
minimal factors approved in Haslip. Hence, both federal455 and
452 See FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 15.13 (West 1999). This
instruction provides in relevant part:
In making any award of punitive damages, you should consider that the purpose of puni-
tive damages is to punish a defendant for shocking conduct, and to deter the defendant
and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. The law does not require
you to award punitive damages, however, if you decide to award punitive damages, you
must use sound reason in setting the amount of the damages. The amount of an award
of punitive damages must not reflect bias, prejudice, or sympathy toward any party.
However, the amount can be as large as you believe necessary to fulfill the purposes of
punitive damages. You may consider the financial resources of the defendant in fixing
the amount of punitive damages ....
Id.
453 See ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 2.1 (West 2000). This
instruction provides in relevant part:
[I]f you further find that the Defendant did act with malice or reckless indifference to
the Plaintiffs [federally protected] rights, the law would allow you, in your discretion, to
assess punitive damages against the Defendant as punishment and as a deterrent to oth-
ers.
If you find that punitive damages should be assessed against the Defendant, you may
consider the financial resources of the Defendant in fixing the amount of such dam-
ages ....
Id.
454 NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL CIVILJURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.5 (West 2001).
455 See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1380 (3d Cir. 1993) (relying on Haslip); A.R. Braswell
v. Conagra, Inc., 936 F.2d 1169, 1176 (11th Cir. 1991) ("The district court's jury instructions are
similar to those approved by the Supreme Court in [Haslip]."); Am. Employers Ins. Co. v. S.
Seeding Servs., Inc., 931 F.2d 1453, 1458 (l1th Cir. 1991) (upholding an instruction that told
the jury to consider punishment purpose, but otherwise left the amount to "best judgment and
good discretion" because the instruction was "substantially similar to the one in Haslip").
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state 45 courts repeatedly have upheld vague Haslip-like instructions.
The Third Circuit, for example, "acknowledge[d] that the district
court could have given the jury more guidance on the issue of puni-
tive damages,"4 57 but upheld a vague punitive damages instruction be-
cause "it contained all of the elements identified by the Court in
Haslip.",4 5 Likewise, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld its former
Haslip-like instruction touting the jurisdiction's "venerated practice"
of providing "bare-bones" jury instructions. 59
456 See, e.g., S. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 586 So. 2d 854, 857 (Ala. 1991) ("This instruc-
tion makes clear that the purpose of punitive damages is punishment of the wrongdoer and
deterrence of similar wrongful conduct.... In Haslip, a similar instruction was held [suffi-
cient]."); Spence v. Howell, 890 P.2d 714, 724 (Idaho 1995) ("[A] lthough the jury instruction
given by the trial court did not include the entire [language of Idaho model instruction regard-
ing consideration of defendant's financial condition], the instruction approved of in Haslip did
not include this language either."); Kochan v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 610 N.E.2d 683,
695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (addressing instruction comparable to Illinois model instruction and
finding "that the discretion exercised here was within reasonable constraints and due process
was satisfied" under Haslip); Bennett v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 896 S.W.2d 464, 465
(Mo. 1995) (noting language of Missouri model instruction "very similar to language found in
the approved exemplary damages instructions" in Haslip); Wolf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
808 S.W.2d 868, 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (finding instruction virtually verbatim to Missouri
model instruction "address[ed] the same matters which the instruction in Haslip addressed,"
and upheld instruction which "for all intents and purposes [was] the same as the instruction in
Haslip."); Markowitz v. Re/Max Preferred Props., No. 143782, 1997 WL 1070600, at *4 (Va. Cir.
Ct. May 21, 1997) (finding Virginia Model Instruction No. 9.080 sufficient under Haslip because
the instruction "'enlighten [s] the jury as to the nature and purpose, identifie[s] the damages as
punishment for civil wrongdoing... and explain[s] that their imposition was not compulsory'"
(quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19(1991))); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle,
935 P.2d 555, 566-67 (Wash. 1997) (upholding instruction as sufficient under Haslip); cf Jacobs
Mfg. Co. v. Sam Brown Co., 19 F.3d 1259, 1265 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding Missouri's model in-
struction met Haslip criteria and rejecting district court's conclusion that jury should also have
been instructed that punitive damages should be reasonably related to compensatory damages).
457 Dunn, I F.3d at 1380.
458 Id.
459 Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483, 493 (Ky. 2002), vacated sub nom.,
Ford Motor Co. v. Estate of Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2072 (2003) (remanding for reconsideration un-
der State Farm). The Kentucky Supreme Court explained:
A practice of long-standing in this Court's jurisprudence, indeed a venerated practice, is
the giving of "bare-bones" instructions. The instructions given here were taken from
Palmore's Kentucky Instructions to Juries and included the language of [the statute govern-
ing the assessment of punitive damages]. Moreover, counsel for the [plaintiff] reminded
the jury time and again that the purpose of punitive damages was to punish wrongdoing.
We discern no shortcoming in the instructions given that violates the standards set forth
in Hanson [v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 865 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Ky. 1993), which
upheld the model instruction as "adequate under Haslip"] ....
Id. (footnotes omitted). Kentucky, however, recently amended its model punitive damages in-
struction to add "the BMW criteria." 2 PALMORE'S KENTUCKY INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 39.15,
cmt. (Cum. Supp. 2003). The revision was based in part on the determination that "[i]t would
be nonsensical for the jury to fix the amount of punitive damages using criteria substantially
different than those used by appellate courts in determining de novo whether the award was
'grossly excessive.'" Id.
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Courts also have upheld multifactor instructions because they
meet the Haslip-minimum.4° In some cases, the courts simply as-
sumed that providing factors in addition to the Haslip-minimum-
regardless of the content of those factors-affords defendants greater
constitutional protection.
46
1
2. Looking Beyond the Haslip-minimum
Despite the majority of cases treating the Haslip-minimum as the
de facto constitutional test, a few courts determined that juries
should be given more detailed instructions concerning the constitu-
tional limits on punitive damages. Some decisions voiced concern
4W See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 781 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The district court's
instructions here provided the same information to the jury [as the Haslip instructions].");
Cont'l Trend Res., Inc. v. Oxy USA Inc., 44 F.3d 1465, 1475 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding instruc-
tions that advised the jury of the purpose of punitive damages, the discretionary nature of puni-
tive damages, and that the award must bear relationship to the injury (but not necessarily actual
damages) "were similar to those approved in Haslip" and constitutional); Morgan v. Woessner,
997 F.2d 1244, 1256 n.13 (9th Cir. 1993) (approving a multifactor instruction under Haslip);
Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 930 F.2d 1342, 1347 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding the
issue was waived but concluding the Arkansas model jury instruction "was comparable to that
approved in Haslip"); Guzman v. Tower Dev., Inc., Civ. No. 93-00005A, 1994 WL 549860, at *4
(D. Guam App. Div. Oct. 3, 1994) ("The court finds that in comparison with the instructions
upheld by the Supreme Court in Haslip and [TXO] ... the instructions given in this case were
constitutionally adequate."); Viking Ins. Co. v. Jester, 836 S.W.2d 371, 379 (Ark. 1992) ("Both
[the proposed instruction and the instruction given] identify the damages as punishment for
civil wrongdoing, and both provide that it was within the discretion of the jury to award such
damages. Under the Haslip examination, there is no material difference between the instruc-
tion given and the proposed instruction." (citation omitted)); McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613
N.W.2d 225, 233 (Iowa 2000) (holding that the defendant "has demonstrated no violation of
the Haslip holding and therefore has demonstrated no constitutional or legal error"); Aken v.
Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc., 49 P.3d 662, 667 (N.M. 2002) ("The jury
instructions employed in the instant case meet the standard of Haslip."); Suffolk Sports Ctr.,
Inc. v. Belli Constr. Corp., 664 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (noting that instruction
"properly instructed [the jury] on the assessment of punitive damages" under Haslip); Rode-
bush v. Okla. Nursing Homes, Ltd., 867 P.2d 1241, 1251 (Okla. 1993) (comparing instructions
to those given in Haslip and concluding that "the instructions clearly did not leave the jury un-
bridled to award punitive damages without guidance"); Heideman v. Am. Family Ins. Group,
473 N.W.2d 14, 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding an instruction as similar to the Haslip
charge); see also Marlen C. Robb & Son Boatyard & Marina, Inc. v. The Vessel Bristol, 893 F.
Supp. 526, 544 & n.13 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (implicitly finding pattern instruction consistent with
Haslip).
461 Hilgedick v. Koehring Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76, 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that
California's multifactor instruction provided "greater constraints on the jury's discretion than
the instructions in Haslip and, in so doing, did more to ensure due process in the initial in-
stance"); accord Boyle v. Lorimar Prods. Inc., 13 F.3d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[BAJI 14.71]
go[es] somewhat beyond the Alabama instructions approved in Haslip by explicitly (rather than
implicitly) directing the jury to fashion an award bearing a relationship to the actual harm and
to consider the defendant's financial condition in determining whether the award is sufficient
to punish and deter."); see also Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301,
323 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) ("We think these instructions offer the same degree of protection
against arbitrary jury decisions as found constitutionally acceptable in Haslip.").
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that post-verdict review of punitive awards under factors not provided
to juries might run afoul of the Seventh Amendment. Others took a
more practical approach, anticipating future instructional mandates
by the Supreme Court. And still others found more instructional
guidance necessary to avoid punitive awards based on improper con-
siderations. None of these decisions directly confronted Haslip.
a. Respect for the Jury
The Fourth Circuit was one of the first courts to address Haslip's
implications for jury instructions. In Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp.
the plaintiffs brought a diversity action under South Carolina law for
injuries resulting from a collision with the defendant's tractor
trailer. Following South Carolina law, the trial court provided a
Haslip-plus-wealth 64instruction.465 The Fourth Circuit ruled that the
instruction failed to provide the jury meaningful standards to deter-
mine the amount of the award.416 Implicitly following Haslip,4 7 the
court found that only sufficient post-verdict review could permit the
use of such vague "n .utos
At the time of trial, neither state nor federal procedures afforded
searching post-verdict review. 46 While the Mattison appeal was pend-
ing, however, the South Carolina Supreme Court revised the state's
462 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991).
463 Id.
464 See supra Part II.A.1.b.
465 The trial court gave the following instruction on punitive damages: "The amount of puni-
tive damages assessed against any defendant may be such sum as you believe will serve to punish
that defendant and deter it and others from like conduct." Mattison, 947 F.2d at 100. The court
also instructed the jury to consider the defendant's "ability to pay." Id. at 101.
466 Id. at 105-06. The court explained:
When ajury is left to its own devices to take property or mete out punishment to what-
ever extent it feels is best in the course of the process, our sensibilities about that process
are offended. It is just this aspect about the South Carolina process that leads us to con-
clude that the scheme violates the first principle of due process .... The court in-
structed the jury to enter punitive damages in such "sum as you believe" will punish and
deter. Because no guidance is required by South Carolina law, a reviewing court could
not rationally decide that the amount was excessive without simply substituting its notion
of excessiveness for that of thejury....
... [A] n award of punitive damages which is entered without a legal standard is unac-
ceptable, regardless of the amount.
ld.
467 Earlier in the decision, the court criticized Haslip, noting that the Supreme Court
.pass[ed] lightly" over the minimal Alabama instructions. Id. at 99. The Mattison court found
that Haslip's "unusual approach of emphasizing post-verdict review to the extent of perhaps
slighting a review of the pre-verdict process" raised special concerns for federal diversity cases
where district courts reviewing punitive verdicts were required (at that time) to review the ver-
dict under the deferential standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
468 Id. at 106.
469 Id.
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post-verdict standards in light of Halip.4 ° In Gamble v. Stevenson,47'
the court adopted several factors for state post-verdict review based
on the Alabama Green Oil factors discussed in Haslip.472
The Mattison court concluded that in light of this change, "it
would appear that state courts in South Carolina will hereafter oper-
ate under the same process held constitutional in Haslip."47  Still, the
Fourth Circuit held that in federal diversity actions, Gamble's new
state law post-verdict standards did not cure the constitutional defi-
ciencies created by vague jury instructions. 474 Specifically, the court
determined that federal district courts could not apply Gamble as part
of any post-verdict review. Rather, the court reasoned that post-
verdict review in diversity actions would be governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provided a more lenient standard
than Gamble.476 In any event, the court also found that post-verdict
application of the Gamble factors by a federal district court, without
presenting the same standards to the jury, would violate the Seventh
Amendment.47 7 Accordingly, to reconcile the special problems raised
by diversity actions, 8 the Mattison court required district courts to
470 Id.
471 406 S.E.2d 350 (S.C. 1991).
472 See Mattison, 947 F.2d at 106-07 (discussing Gamble and its effects on South Carolina puni-
tive damages law).
473 Id.
474 Id. at 109.
475 Id.
476 Id. at 99. The court explained:
Because the reviews under Rules 50(b) and 59 are more deferential to jury verdicts
than appears to be the process under the state law of Alabama and because the Seventh
Amendment does not permit a federal court to substitute its judgment for that of ajury,
as long as the jury operates within the constraints of the law and the evidence, the guid-
ance provided by the holding in Haslip is of limited assistance.
Id. As one commentator summarized:
[T]he Fourth Circuit was left with an unworkable constitutional catch-22. If the trial and
appellate courts on remand applied the common-law scheme as it is applied in South
Carolina, they would violate the Seventh Amendment and the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. If they disregarded South Carolina's substantive posttrial review factors in favor
of the Seventh Amendment and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they might violate
the Erie doctrine and the defendant's right to due process.
Charles Jared Knight, State-Law Punitive Damage Schemes and the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury
Trial in the Federal Courts, 14 REV. LITIGATION 657, 691 (1995).
477 Mattison, 947 F.2d at 108 ("A Haslip-type post-trial review, insofar as it is a quasi de novo
review by which the court reviews facts, some of which may not have been presented to the jury,
would be inconsistent with the restrictions of the Seventh Amendment.").
478 After Mattison, most courts ignored this problem:
The complexity of application of state punitive damage schemes by federal diversity
courts has resulted in a line of inconsistent cases that, for the most part, ignore the Mat-
tison dilemma. Apparently, the courts have either yet to realize the Seventh Amendment
problem addressed in Mattison or have chosen to ignore it.
Knight, supra note 476, at 695. The Fourth Circuit followed Mattison in addressing Virginia's
punitive damages system. SeeJohnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir. 1992) (fol-
lowing Mattison and holding that federal juries in diversity actions applying Virginia law must be
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include jury instructions on four factors derived from Gamble and
Halip.
479
Similar Seventh Amendment concerns were expressed years later
in Geressy v. Digital Equipment Corp.,48 a products liability federal diver-
sity action brought in the Eastern District of New York. Like Mattison,
the court believed that post-verdict review of considerations not given
to the jury implicated the Seventh Amendment. Unlike Mattison, the
post-verdict factors at issue were now substantive due process re-
quirements (the BMW guideposts), not just state law criteria. The
court determined that "[i]f the jury is to accomplish its task under
the Seventh Amendment, it is entitled to be informed of its role." 4'
As such, the court held that the jury should be instructed on the first
two guideposts: reprehensibility and the reasonable relationship be-
tween punitive damages and the plaintiffs harm. 82  The court de-
cided, however, that the jury should not be instructed on the third
BMW guidepost because "there are too many complicating and
prejudicial factors in asking a lay jury to consider the third ele-
m ent.
,,483
The legal foundation of Mattison and Geressy has since been called
into question by the Supreme Court's decision in Cooper Industries,
provided more detailed instructions than are used in Virginia state courts). But that case later
was deemed inapplicable to state court actions. See Markowitz v. Re/Max Preferred Props., No.
143782, 1997 WL 1070600, at *4-5 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 21, 1997) (distinguishing Johnson and find-
ing Virginia's model instruction sufficient under Haslip for state court actions).
479 Mattison, 947 F.2d at 109-10. These four factors included instructions that (1) "any
penalty imposed should bear a relationship to the nature and extent of the conduct and the
harm caused, including the compensatory damage award made by the jury"; (2) "[a]ny penalty
imposed should take into account as a mitigating factor any other penalty that may have been
imposed or which may be imposed for the conduct involved"; (3) "[t ] he amount of any penalty
may focus on depriving the defendant of profits derived from the improper conduct"; and (4)
"[a]ny penalty must be limited to punishment and thus may not effect economic bankruptcy.
To this end, the ability of the defendant to pay any punitive award entered should be consid-
ered." Id. at 110.
480 950 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
481 Id. at 521.
482 Id.
483 Id. Accordingly, the court approved a modification of the New York model instruction to
incorporate the first two BMWguideposts:
In fixing the amount, if any, you may consider the assets of defendant, what is reasonably
required to vindicate New York State's legitimate interests in punishment and deter-
rence, if any, above the amount of civil damages awarded, the degree of reprehensibility,
if any, the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by plaintiffs and the
difference between punitive damages and the civil awards in this case, and how egregious
the conduct of defendant was compared to that of others in its position.
Id. "This language adequately expresses the law as set out in [BMW] without requiring the jury
to make complex determinations and calculations involving civil and criminal law." Id. Addi-
tionally, the Geressy court concluded that an out-of-state conduct instruction was required in
light of BMWs concerns regarding state sovereignty. Id. at 521-22. Accordingly, the district
court in Geressy instructed the jury that it was "not authorized to impose punitive damages to
protect people outside of the State of New York." Id. at 522.
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which held that punitive awards are not factual determinations impli-
cating the Seventh Amendment. 84 The decisions, however, reflect
still-valid concerns over allowing post-verdict excessiveness review of
factors never considered by the jury in the first instance."'
b. The Spirit of Haslip Requires More
A few state courts determined that the spirit, if not the letter, of
Haslip required greater constraints on jury discretion and held that
trial courts must provide detailed instructions regarding the assess-
ment of punitive damages.4 6 In the leading case, Games v. Fleming
Landfill, Inc.,4s7 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reas-
sessed its punitive damages system after the United States Supreme
Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Haslip. The court
noted that "although Haslip may not have created the clear, bright-
line rules that we would all like, it is the beginning of national com-
mon law development in this area and not the end . 488
Accordingly, the court set forth standards to provide "a reasonable
constraint on jury discretion.""89 Relying on factors derived from
Green Oil and Haslip, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals di-
rected lower courts to instruct juries to consider the relationship of
punitive damages to the plaintiff's harm, the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, the defendant's profit from the wrongdoing,
and the financial position of the defendant. 490 Conversely, the court
determined that other factors derived from Haslip and Green Oil--
such as the costs of the litigation, any criminal sanctions imposed on
the defendant, and the mitigating effect of other civil actions against
the defendant for the same conduct-should be considered only by
484 See discussion supra Part I.F. As noted, the Mattison court also found that more detailed
jury instructions were necessary in federal diversity actions because federal courts would not be
required to apply state law factors for post-verdict review, but instead would apply more lenient
standards under federal procedural rules. That is no longer an issue in light of the Supreme
Court's recognition that punitive damages are matters of federal due process, not just state law,
and BMWs requirement that courts review punitive damages awards under the "guideposts."
485 See infra text accompanying notes 624-29.
486 E.g., Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 908 (W. Va. 1991) (requiringjury to
be instructed on factors regarding punitive damages); see also Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833
S.W.2d 896, 901-02 (Tenn. 1992) (requiringjury to be instructed on nine factors, including the
defendant's financial condition, prior punitive awards, and remedial measures taken by defen-
dant).
487 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991).
488 Id. at 907.
489 Id. at 908.
490 Cf id. at 900 n.1 (setting forth jury instruction). The court required these factors because
"[d]ue process demands not only that penalties be abstractly fair, but also that a person not be
penalized without reasonable warning of the consequences of his acts." Id. at 909.
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the courts during post-verdict review.49' The court reasoned that ju-
ries lack the information necessary to apply these considerations or
might be prejudiced if required to consider them.492
c. The Spirit of BMW Requires More
After BMW, several courts addressed whether jury instructions
should incorporate the guideposts or other substantive due process
limits on punitive damages. Most cases implicitly493 or explicitly494 de-
termined that BMW addressed only post-verdict review, and did not
affect instructional requirements. But just as Games required more
detailed instructions to comport with the spirit of Haslip, a few cases
interpreted BMW in a similar way. In Farmers Insurance Exchange v.
Shirley,95 the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized that "in BMW the
court articulated a majority opinion that permitted Justice O'Connor
to shift from her previous dissenting positions and join in the major-
ity opinion."49 6 Presumably referring to Justice O'Connor's prior ar-
guments for more detailed jury instructions, the court viewed BMWas
a signal for "a future requirement that for due process to be present
those objective [BMW] standards should be given to the jury in the
form of instructions. 4 9 7 Even though the jury instructions at issue sat-
isfied state law, the court concluded that the Green Oil factors that in-
fluenced Haslip and BMW 9 should be provided to Wyoming juries.
The court reasoned that providing the instructions would avoid the
491 Id.
492 Id.
493 See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1996) (implicitly suggest-
ing that BMWaddresses only post-verdict review).
In Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. United States Healthcare, Inc., the court noted:
The Court, however, agrees with plaintiff that [BMW] does not suggest that a propor-
tionality charge must be submitted to the jury, but rather that a federal court must review
punitive damage amounts with due process considerations in mind. No authority cited
by defendants requires this Court to charge the jury on due process considerations gov-
erning proportionality.
No. CIV.A. 95-1698, 1999 WL 200668, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 1999); see also In re New Orleans
Train Car Leakage Fire Litig., 795 So. 2d 364, 380 (La. Ct. App. 2001) ("None of these three
cases [Haslip, TXO, and BMW] holds that the 'reasonable relationship' factor must be consid-
ered by the jury.").
495 958 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1998).
496 Id. at 1043.
497 Id. at 1043-44. The court went on: "BMWdemands that we articulate objective standards
for the imposition of punitive damages that can be communicated to the jury in the form of
instructions and against which the imposition of the punitive award can be weighed in the
process ofjudicial review." Id. at 1045.
498 In discussing the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence, the court noted that
in adopting the "guideposts" the BMWCourt had "alluded to the application by the Supreme
Court of Alabama of the factors articulated in Green Oil Co. v. Horasby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24
(Ala. 1989), which had been approved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip."
Shirley, 958 P.2d at 1044.
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risk of future reversals"' and possible interference with the right to a
jury trial. 00
The Shirley court acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court did
not expressly require these factors to be provided to the jury, but
concluded "that the only sensible approach is to tell the arbiter of
punitive damages what the rules are. Consequently such instructions
should be given."' The dissent disagreed that due process requires
more detailed instructions, arguing that "the discussions in both
Haslip and the BMW concurrence speak of objective factors being
used by the court in the course of reviewing a jury verdict as a means
of imposing a meaningful constraint on the jury's decision, not as be-
ing included in instructions to the jury."
502
d. Legitimate State Interests
A few months before State Farm was decided, the Ninth Circuit
held that due process requires instructions exceeding the Haslip-
minimum to avoid the risk that ajury might base its punitive damages
award on improper considerations. In White v. Ford Motor Co.,5° the
plaintiff in a products liability case argued extensively at trial about
49 Id. at 1045 ("Otherwise we hazard litigants in our courts to future reversal by the Supreme
Court of the United States because of the denial of due process of law resulting from the appli-
cation of our current process.").
W Id. at 1044 ("If the objective standards are not communicated to the jury, then the invoca-
tion of such standards only for the purposes of review would infringe upon the right of the par-
ties to ajury trial.").
501 Id. at 1053. Other courts also have recognized the practical benefits of more detailed in-
structions. See In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 2004 WL 170354, at * 15 (D. Alaska Jan. 28,
2004) (recognizing benefit of jury and court working from the same "script" for assessing puni-
tive damages). In Exxon, a tort action stemming from the infamous Alaskan oil spill, the district
court concluded that courts should instruct juries on the constitutional standards for imposing
punitive damages: "[I]t strikes the court as important to know and be mindful in understand-
ing the second phase of the constitutional analysis (the guideposts) that the trial jury in this
case was working with the very same concepts embodied within the BMWguideposts .... With-
out proper instructions, jury verdicts are patently suspect." Id. at *14-15. The court stated that
it was important to note that the award in that case was "not a situation where the jury awarded
$5 billion in punitive damages based upon one script, with this court second-guessing the jury's
work using a different script." Id. at *15; see also Kunewa v. Joshua, 924 P.2d 559, 568-71 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1996) (analyzing concurring and dissenting views in Haslip and Browning-Ferris in sup-
port of permitting the jury to be instructed that it could consider amount of attorneys' fees in
assessing the award).
502 Shirley, 958 P.2d at 1058 (Lehman, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that "[t]he majority
in BMWdoes not mention the Haslip seven factors, much less mandate that those factors be in-
corporated into jury instructions in order to satisfy due process requirements." Id. at 1057. The
dissent concluded that "I do not disagree that it may be appropriate to provide the jury with the
more specific instructions articulated by the majority. However, I do disagree insofar as such a
requirement is imposed on this case to render the jury award invalid." Id. at 1058.
503 312 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2002), amended on denial of reh 'g, 335 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Ford's alleged misconduct in other states. °4 Ford, in turn, requested
an instruction that "would have barred the jury from punishing Ford
for impact other than on Nevadans." 505 The district court refused,
relying instead on Nevada's model instruction on punitive damages.
5 0 6
The Ninth Circuit reversed.5 7  The Court of Appeals reasoned that
BMW not only set forth guidelines for the size of the award (the
guideposts), but also established that courts should consider whether
a state has a legitimate interest in punishing or deterring the conduct
upon which the award was based. The court explained that since
states have no interest in punishing out-of-state conduct,509 the jury
should have been instructed that it could not use its award to punish
conduct that occurred in other states.5 '0 Finding that no amount of
post-verdict remittitur could cure an award tainted by improper
considerations,51 ' the Ninth Circuit remanded for a new trial,
concluding that "[a] punitive damages award that encompasses a
defendant's extraterritorial conduct may be unconstitutional even if
the size of the award itself, as compared to the compensatory
damages, is not outside the bounds of due process......
The dissent in White argued that because the instruction at issue
513adhered to the Haslipminimum, it satisfied procedural due proc-
ess.5 14 The dissent also took issue with the majority's claim that an
award based on impermissible considerations could not be remedied
by a post-verdict reduction. 51 5 Specifically, the dissent noted that
BMW expressly allowed courts to remedy the jury's improper
504 Id. at 1015.
505 Id. at 1013.
506 See id. (refusing to punish Ford for impact on out-of-state residents based on federalism
and state sovereignty concerns expressed in BMW).
507 Id. at 1020.
508 Id. at 1013 & n.56.
509 Id. at 1017-18.
510 Id. at 1016 & n.69.
51 Id. at 1016.
512 Id.
513 Id. at 1025-26 (Graber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Graber ex-
plained:
Read together, Haslip and Honda [Motor Co. v. Oberg] teach that, while due process im-
poses some requirements on how a jury must be instructed on punitive damages, those
requirements are minimal and general. Instead, it is the availability of post-verdict re-
view of punitive damages awards that provides the most substantial procedural check on
punitive damages.
Id. at 1025.
514 Id. at 1026 ("Nevada instructions meet the standards articulated in Haslip. they informed
the jury that punitive damages were discretionary, that their purpose is to punish and to set an
example, and that the amount must bear some relation to the blameworthiness of the defen-
dant's conduct.").
515 Id. at 1028-29.
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consideration of out-of-state conduct by post-verdict review. 5 6 Ac-
cordingly, the dissent believed that the jury's reliance on Ford's ex-
traterritorial conduct could be remedied by post-verdict review and
that ajury instruction was not required. 57
In sum, while never articulating a unified approach to the issue,
the decisions requiring more detailed jury instructions voiced legiti-
mate concerns about whether courts should conduct post-verdict re-
view of factors never considered by the jury and whether such review
protects against arbitrary decision making.
III. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Co. v. CAMPBELL
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell 518 brought
together the Court's procedural and substantive due process punitive
damages rulings, and held that a $145 million award against an insur-
ance company was unconstitutionally excessive. The decision clari-
fied many of the issues that had plagued consistent application of the
BMWguideposts, leading many to conclude that the decision has the
potential of "restoring order to the administration of punitive dam-
ages." 19 State Farm not only refined the standards for post-verdict re-
view, it also signaled that juries must be instructed on these substan-
tive due process limitations in the first instance.
First, State Farm provided courts more concrete guidance on the
second BMW guidepost, the relationship between punitive damages
and the plaintiffs harm or potential harm. Again disclaiming a
516 Id. at 1028.
517 Id. at 1031 ("Substantive due process does not necessarily require an instruction on non-
extraterritoriality; rather, that is a factor to consider in excessiveness review."); see also id. at 1029
("The district court's computation thereby cured the jury's erroneous 'bonus' for extraterrito-
rial conduct."). Judge Graber believed, however, that the award was excessive under the BMW
guideposts. Id. at 1030-31.
518 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
-9 Evan M. Tager, The Implications of State Farm v. Campbell for the Future of Punitive Damages
in Bad Faith Litigation, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: INSURANCE, Apr. 22, 2003, at 9 (providing an over-
view of State Farm and its potential impact on unclear pre-State Farm punitive damages issues);
accord James Dabney Miller, Ending the Punitives Riot, N.J. L.J., June 2, 2003, at 27 (discussing
State Farm and its potentially significant impact). But see Ned Miltenberg & Erwin Chemerinsky,
Punitive Damages After Campbell, Smith, and Romo, TRIAL, Aug. 2003, at 18, WL 39-AUG
JTLATRIAL 18 (questioning the extent of State Farm's influence on future of punitive dam-
ages). Although StateFarm clarified many issues, commentators have argued that several remain
unclear. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Michael G. Nast, A Plaintijfs Perspective on the Effect of
State Farm v. Campbell on Punitive Damages in Mass Torts, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: CLASS ACTIONS,
June 19, 2003, at 8 (discussing relevance of a defendant's wealth on punitive damages and other
issues); Alan S. Rutkin, Limiting the Punishment, BEST'S REv., Aug. 2003, at 94 (identifying future
issues under State Farm including what constitutes a "substantial" award justifying a I to 1 ratio);
Don Willenburg, Supreme Court Lays down the Law on Punitive Damages in One Case--But What
About the Future?, RECORDER (S.F.),July 2, 2003, at 4 (identifying numerous issues raised by State
Farm, including the continued relevance of a defendant's wealth).
[Vol. 6:3
INSTRUCTINGJURIES ON PUNITIE DAMAGES
"bright-line ratio, 520 State Farm nevertheless strongly suggested that
awards producing more than a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages will be viewed with a jaundiced eye.5' By ap-
proving single-digit ratios and tying the ratio analysis to the harm to
the plaintiff, the Court effectively eliminated judicial interpretations
comparing punitive damages to speculative harm to nonparties.522
The Court further suggested that when compensatory damages are
"substantial," punitive damages should be no more than the compen-
satory award.5
Second, completing BMWs evolution of assessing both the size of
an award and whether the award is based on impermissible consid-
erations, State Farm made clear that while evidence of a defendant's
misconduct in other jurisdictions may be admissible for the jury to
gauge the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, neither a
court nor ajury may base the amount of a punitive damages award on
a defendant's out-of-state conduct. Additionally, the Court answered
an issue left open in BMW, suggesting that this bar applies regardless
of whether the out-of-state conduct is lawful or unlawful in other ju-
risdictions.524 But perhaps one of the most important aspects of State
Farm's focus on the bases of punitive damages was the Court's clarifi-
cation that the punitive damages analysis should focus on the
520 StateFarm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
521 Id. ("[F]ew [punitive damages] awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process."). To date, courts ap-
pear to be following the single-digit ratio except where the compensatory damages are low. See,
e.g., Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1362 (11th Cir. 2003) (4 to 1 ratio); Motherway, Glenn &
Napleton v. Tehin, No. 02C3693, 2003 WL 21501952, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2003) (4.7 to I
ratio); DeNofio v. Soto, No. Civ.A. 00-5866, 2003 WL 21488668, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 2003)
(2 to 1 ratio); Waits v. City of Chicago, No. 01C4010, 2003 WL 21310277, at *7 (N.D. Il1. June 6,
2003) (3 to 1 ratio and approximately 1 to 1 ratio); Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. CIV.A. 00-5481, 2003 WL 21321370, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2003) (1 to 1 ratio); McHugh v.
Check Investors, Inc., No. Civ.A. 5:02CV00106, 2003 WL 21283288, at *5 (W.D. Va. May 21,
2003) (less than 1 to I ratio); McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1231 (N.D.
Ala. 2003) (multiplaintiff case with ratios ranging from 2 to 1 to 9 to 1); Eden Elec., Ltd. v.
Amana Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 958, 975 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (4.7 to I ratio); Parrish v. Sollecito, 257
F. Supp. 2d 700, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (proposing remittitur with 9 to 1 ratio); Advocat, Inc. v.
Sauer, 111 S.W.3d 346, 361 (Ark. 2003) (4.2 to 1 ratio); Hudson v. Cook, 105 S.W.3d 821, 832
(Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (7 to 1 ratio); Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co. 667 NW.2d 651, 688-70 (S.D.
2003) (new trial granted on 20 to 1 ratio). In contrast, thirty-nine percent of the top 100 ver-
dicts in 2002 had double-digit ratios between the punitive and compensatory award. Marcia
Coyle, New Battles To Come over Punitives Ruling: High Court's Guides Include Ratios, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 14, 2003, at Al (citing National LawJournal "Top 100" Verdict study for 2002).
522 State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1522-23; see also supra text accompanying notes 373-75 (discussing
expansive interpretations of the ratio guidepost).
523 State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 ("When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser
ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due
process guarantee.").
524 Id. at 1521-23.
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plaintiff. 5 5 Contrary to the common practice of looking to the "total
harm" of a defendant's conduct in determining the appropriate
amount of punitive damages, the Court determined that punitive
damages should be awarded only to vindicate the rights of the plain-
tiff, not nonparties who also may have been injured by the defen-
dant's conduct.w
Third, with regard to the comparable penalties guidepost, the
Court retreated from its prior suggestion in Haslip that criminal pen-
alties provide a meaningful comparison for the amount of a punitive
damages award, rejecting an interpretation of the guidepost that
promoted limitless punitive awards for personal injury torts.
Fourth, the Court again did not adopt a defendant's wealth as one
of the measures of an award's excessiveness. Instead, State Farm stated
that "[t] he wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise uncon-
stitutional punitive damages award"5 2 8 and that wealth "bear[s] no re-
lation to the award's reasonableness or proportionality to the
harm.,, 529
Finally, and most notable for this Article, the Court dedicated an
entire section of the opinion to voice its increased "concerns over the
imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems are adminis-
tered. 3 0 The Court acted on this concern by requiring that juries be
instructed on one of the substantive due process limits on punitive
awards discussed in BMW: "A jury must be instructed... that it may
not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant for ac-
tion that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred."03' The
Court thus connected its procedural due process holdings with its
substantive due process refinement of the guideposts.
A. The Facts
State Farm involved a suit by Curtis Campbell against his insurer,
State Farm, for its refusal to pay claims resulting from a car accident
525 Id. at 1523.
526 See Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he court
in State Farm went beyond the 'guideposts' . .. and articulated a constitutional due process limi-
tation on both the goal and the measure of punitive damages. Further, the result is a punitive
damages analysis that focuses primarily on what defendant did to the present plaintiff.... .").
527 State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526 ("The existence of a criminal penalty does have bearing on
the seriousness with which a State views the wrongful action. When used to determine the dol-
lar amount of the award, however, the criminal penalty has less utility."); accord Romo, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 804 (recognizing that State Farm "fundamentally altered" the third guidepost).
528 State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1525.
529 Id.
530 Id. at 1520.
53 Id. at 1522-23.
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caused by Campbell."' While driving on a two-lane highway, Camp-
bell passed six vans and began driving on the wrong side of the road.
To avoid a collision with Campbell, an oncoming car swerved and col-
lided with another vehicle. Campbell was not injured in the incident,
but one motorist was killed and another injured. 3 ' The victims
brought a wrongful death action against Campbell, who was insured
for $50,000 by State Farm. Despite evidence that the accident was
caused entirely by Campbell's unsafe driving, State Farm contested
liability. 34 State Farm assured Campbell that he had nothing to worry
about by going to trial and that his assets were safe. State Farm was
wrong. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and
awarded compensatory damages of $185,849, more than $135,000
over Campbell's policy limit."53
State Farm refused to cover the excess liability or to post a bond
allowing Campbell to appeal. State Farm's counsel even told Camp-
bell "to put for sale signs on your property."5 6 Campbell thereafter
retained his own counsel to appeal the judgment. The judgment
against Campbell was affirmed, and State Farm ultimately paid the
entire amount, including the portion that exceeded Campbell's pol-
icy limits.
53 7
Campbell and his wife then filed suit against State Farm, bringing
claims for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The trial court granted State Farm's request to bifurcate the
trial into two phases, which were conducted before different juries . 3
In the first phase of the trial, the jury found State Farm's refusal to
settle unreasonable. In the second phase, the jury considered State
Farm's liability for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, as well as punitive damages. At this stage, the trial court permit-
ted the plaintiffs to introduce evidence spanning a twenty-year period
regarding "fraudulent practices by State Farm in its nationwide op-
erations. "539 The jury found in favor of the Campbells, awarding $2.6
million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive dam-
ages. The trial court reduced the compensatory award to $1 million
and reduced the punitive damages award to $25 million.5 4 0 The Utah
532 Id. at 1517-18.
Id. at 1517.
53 Id. at 1517-18.
5 Id. at 1518.
536 Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 65 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2001)).
537 Id.
538 Id.
539 Id. at 1519.
540 Id.
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Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award
based on State Farm's "massive wealth" and nationwide practices.54'
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the 6-3 majority opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and
Breyer. The decision found a more unified Court with Chief Justice
Rehnquist shifting from his BMW dissent to the majority opinion.542
Likewise, Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer felt no need to file
separate concurring opinions as they did in BMW.5 4  Describing the
case as "neither close nor difficult,"'" the Court held that the $145
million punitive damages award was "an irrational and arbitrary dep-
rivation of the property of the defendant.
54 5
1. Punitive Damages Procedures
The Court dedicated the first section of its analysis to expressing
concerns about punitive damages procedures. As a threshold matter,
the Court reaffirmed that "it is well established that there are proce-
dural and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards."546
In light of due process and the quasi-criminal nature of punitive
damages, the Court expressed increasing "concerns over the impre-
cise manner in which punitive damages systems are administered.,
547
Quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, the Court noted that jury instruc-
tions typically provide only vague guidance to the jury, and the evi-
dence often submitted in support of punitive claims, such as the de-
fendant's wealth, increases the risk of biased decision making.
"Vague instructions... do little to aid the decisionmaker in its task of
assigning appropriate weight to evidence that is relevant and evi-
dence that is tangential or only inflammatory."054  The Court ex-
plained that these concerns about punitive damages procedures
prompted its holdings in both BMW 549 and Cooper Industries,
541 Id.
542 See discussion supra Part I.E.4 (noting ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dissenting vote in BMW).
543 See discussion supra Part I.E.2.
5" State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521. Justice Kennedy's language was reminiscent of his assess-
ment of TXO, which he characterized as a "close and difficult" case. TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 468 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576 (1996) (quotingJustice Kennedy's "close and difficult" lan-
guae from TXO).
State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
546 Id. at 1519.
547 Id. at 1520.
548 Id.
549 Id. The Court explained:
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mandating heightened post-verdict protections:550  "Exacting appel-
late review ensures that an award of punitive damages is based upon
an 'application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice. ' ' '5 ' The
Court then reviewed the case in light of the guideposts.
2. The Reprehensibility Guidepost and Punishing Out-of-state Conduct
The Court emphasized that reprehensibility remains "the most
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award," 552 and reiterated the reprehensibility factors discussed in
BMW' Notably, the Court announced that the existence of only one
reprehensibility factor may be insufficient to sustain a punitive dam-554
ages award, and that the absence of all of the factors renders an
award suspect.555  While acknowledging that State Farm's conduct
merited no praise, the Court concluded that "a more modest pun-
ishment for this reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the
State's legitimate objectives, and the Utah courts should have gone
no further.,
556
As part of its reprehensibility analysis, the Court focused on
whether evidence relevant to the assessment of the reprehensibility of
State Farm's conduct resulted in the company being punished based
on improper considerations. First, the Court determined that the
$145 million punitive award improperly was assessed in an effort to
punish State Farm for out-of-state conduct committed against non-
parties. The Court reaffirmed BMWs determination that a state has
no legitimate interest or power to punish out-of-state conduct that
may have been lawful where it occurred.5 5 ' But resolving an issue left
open in BMW the Court further stated that a state likewise
In light of these concerns, in Gore we instructed courts reviewing punitive damages to
consider three guideposts: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's mis-
conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff
and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.
Id. (citation omitted).
550 Id.
551 Id. at 1520-21 (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 436
(2001) (Breyer,J., concurring)).
552 Id. at 1521 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
553 Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 273-78.
554 State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
555 Id.
556 Id.
557 Id. at 1522 ("A State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful
where it occurred.").
558 SeeWhite v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing the lawful
versus unlawful conduct issue left open in BMWand finding that a state has no legitimate inter-
est in punishing either), amended on denial of reh 'g, 335 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2003).
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generally has no legitimate interest in punishing a defendant for out-
of-state conduct that is unlawful where it occurred. To avoid the
misuse of out-of-state conduct evidence, "[a] jury must be in-
structed... that it may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to
punish a defendant for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction
where it occurred."560 More broadly, the Court explained that the
states have no interest in punishing a defendant for harm to nonpar-
ties: "Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of puni-
tive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical
claims against a defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility
analysis ... .""' Doing so, the Court reasoned, unfairly subjects a de-
fendant to the risk of multiple punishments for the same wrongdo-
ing.
Second, although the Court recognized that out-of-state conduct
remains relevant to a jury's assessment of reprehensibility,563 the
Court announced an important limitation: such "conduct must have
a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff. ', 56 The Court
determined that punitive damages cannot be based on "[a] defen-
dant's dissimilar acts.,,56 5 The Court explained that punishing a de-
fendant for prior wrongdoing unrelated to a plaintiffs harm risks
penalizing a defendant merely for being "an unsavory individual or
business., 6 6  Because the Utah courts justified the punitive award
based on misconduct completely unrelated to the Campbells' harm,
the Court concluded that the award was based on improper consid-
567erations. In sum, "[t]he reprehensibility guidepost does not permit
courts to expand the scope of the case so that a defendant may be
punished for any malfeasance, which in this case extended a 20-year
State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1522 ("Nor, as a general rule, does a State have a legitimate con-
cern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside
of the State's jurisdiction.").
56Id. at 1522-23.
561 Id. at 1523.
562 See id. ("Punishment on these bases creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages
awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not bound by the judgment
some other plaintiff obtains.").
563 Id. at 1522. The Court noted that evidence of prior misconduct remains relevant under
the five-factor reprehensibility scale to assessing the defendant's deliberateness and culpability,
as well as to whether the misconduct was an isolated incident or repeated behavior. Id.
564 Id.
W Id. at 1523. The Court stated that "[a] defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the
acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages." Id.
But, at the same time, "evidence of other acts need not be identical to have relevance in the
calculation of punitive damages." Id. Some practitioners have criticized this standard as "so
vague as to be virtually no standard at all." Cabraser & Nast, supra note 519, at 7.
56 State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1523.
567 Id. at 1523-24.
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period. 5 68 Having established no evidence of similar misconduct by
State Farm, the Court concluded that the only conduct pertinent to
the reprehensibility analysis was the conduct that harmed the Camp-
bells.'
3. The Ratio Guidepost
Turning to the second guidepost, the Court reiterated its refusal
since Hashlp5 70 to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages
award cannot exceed.' 57' At the same time, however, the Court an-
nounced that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree,
will satisfy due process.', 72 The Court noted only one exception when
a higher ratio may be appropriate: where particularly egregious con-
duct results in only a small amount of compensatory damages. 7' Re-
fining BMW, the Court announced that the converse also is true:
"When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio,
perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outer-
most limit of the due process guarantee. 74 The Court explained that
compensatory damages often include a punitive element, 75 and
noted that the Campbells' award included compensation for emo-
tional distress, an amount likely duplicated in the punitive award.576
While "the precise award in any case ... must be based upon the facts
and circumstances of the defendant's conduct and the harm to the
plaintiff," the Court found that "[i]n the context of this case, we have
5 Id. at 1524.
569 Id.
570 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) ("[W]e have consistently re-
jected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula.");
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993) (plurality opinion) ("We
need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally
acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case." (quoting Pac. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991))).
571 StateFarm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
57 Id. Discussing BMW the Court referenced the long legislative history of double, treble, or
quadruple sanctions. The Court concluded that "[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to
comport with due process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution,
than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1, or, in this case, of 145 to 1." Id. (citation omitted).
Some commentators have argued that StateFarm leaves room for higher ratios in personal injury
cases on the ground that the Supreme Court has not addressed punitive damages where the
plaintiff suffered physical injury or death from the defendant's wrongdoing. See Cabraser &
Nast, supra note 519, at 6.
573 StateFarm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
574 Id.
575 Id. at 1525.
576 Id.
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no doubt that there is a presumption against an award that has a 145-
to-1 ratio.,
57
4. The Comparable Penalties Guidepost
The Court strongly suggested that future analysis of this guidepost
should consider only civil penalties. The Court applied this guide-
post solely in terms of civil penalties s'7 and-retreating from ap-
proaches used in Haslip and BMW 579---expressly noted that criminal
penalties are of "less utility" as a reference point for determining the
amount of a punitive damages award .
5. Defendant's Wealth
In addition to the guideposts, the Court touched on the recurring
issue of what role a defendant's wealth plays in the constitutional
analysis. The Court noted that the Utah Supreme Court justified the
$145 million punitive award based on a number of factors, including
State Farm's wealth.581  The Court determined that wealth and these
other factors "bear no relation to the award's reasonableness or pro-
portionality," but rather, are "arguments that seek to defend a depar-
ture from well-established constraints on punitive damages.",5 2  Re-
garding wealth, the Court stated that "[t] he wealth of a defendant
cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages
award."5 8 3 That said, the Court did not bar ajury's consideration of a
defendant's wealth.
Ultimately, based on its application of the guideposts, the Court
concluded that the "substantial" $1 million compensatory award
"likely would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount
57 Id. at 1524.
578 See id. at 1526 ("The third guidepost in Gore is the disparity between the punitive damages
award and the 'civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.'" (quoting BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996))).
579 See supra text accompanying notes 296-300 (discussing the Court's reference to the crimi-
nal penalty of incarceration in Haslip and the statutory fines for unfair trade practices in BMW
in analyzing the third guidepost).
W See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1526. The Court explained:
The existence of a criminal penalty does have bearing on the seriousness with which a
State views the wrongful action. When used to determine the dollar amount of the
award, however, the criminal penalty has less utility. Great care must be taken to avoid
use of the civil process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the
heightened protections of a criminal trial have been observed, including, of course, its
higher standards of proof.
Id.
58 Id. at 1525.
582 Id.
583 Id.
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of compensatory damages, 584 and remanded the case to the Utah
courts for further proceedings.
C. Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas's Separate Dissents
In separate, one-paragraph dissenting opinions, both Justices
Scalia and Thomas maintained their prior positions that due process
does not constrain the size of a punitive damages award and that the
Court's jurisprudence on this issue was not entitled to stare decisis ef-
fect.
585
D. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg also dissented, adhering to her view in BMWthat
punitive damages issues should be left to the states.586 She expressed
concern that the majority had converted the flexible BMWguideposts
into "marching orders. Mostly, however, she criticized the major-
ity's evaluation of State Farm's rerehensibility, concluding that the
record contained ample evidence s that State Farm's "egregious and
malicious" policies were responsible for the plaintiff's harm, as well as
harm to many other Utah consumers.89 In her view, the majority
simply substituted its view of State Farm's conduct for that of the
Utah jury and courts.9 0 Reiterating her position in BMW that "this
Court has no warrant to reform state law governing awards of puni-
tive damages," she concluded that the $145 million punitive award
should stand.9
IV. STATE FARM AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
REASSESSING THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS
In State Farm, the Court expressed heightened concerns over the
procedural safeguards used to constrain punitive damages, including
the vague instructions often provided to juries. Acting on these
concerns, the Court for the first time expressly stated that a specific
584 Id. at 1526.
585 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Only the Scalia dissent mentions
stare decisis.
586 Id. at 1527 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
587 Id. at 1531.
588 Id.
589 Id. at 1530-31.
590 See id. at 1527 ("Neither the amount of the award nor the trial record, however, justifies
this Court's substitution of itsjudgment for that of Utah's competent decisionmakers.").
591 Id. at 1531.
.92 See id. at 1522-23 (discussing the Court's concern with the jury's use of factors such as out-
of-state conduct in determining awards).
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punitive damages instruction must be given to the jury.95 The
Court's requirement of an out-of-state conduct instruction represents
a significant departure from Haslip. If nothing else, this change
should prompt courts to abandon the pre-State Farm practice of re-
jecting instructional challenges with little more than a dismissive "this
is no worse than Haslip."594  But more important than rejecting a
rogue adherence to the Haslip-minimum, State Farm's instructional
mandate and concern about punitive damages procedures suggest
that it is time to revisit the concepts of "adequate guidance" and "rea-
sonableness" in a post-Haslip world. All told, after State Farm there is
no sound reason to instruct juries on only one substantive due proc-
ess protection and not others.
A. State Farm Rejected Haslip ' PrincipalJustification
for the Use of Vague Jury Instructions
In Haslip, the Court upheld the use of vague instructions largely
because Alabama provided a detailed, post-verdict check on the jury's• • 595
discretion. However, by requiring jury instructions on at least one
substantive due process limitation on punitive damages, State Farm
implicitly rejected this principle. Simply stated, if post-verdict review
always provided an adequate constraint on the jury's discretion, there
would be no need to require an instruction in the first instance.
State Farm's jury instruction requirement is consistent with the
Court's gradual recognition that the reasonableness of a punitive
damages award is not merely a question of the size of the award, but
also an issue of whether the award was based upon unconstitutional• • 596
considerations. In other contexts, the Supreme Court long ago
recognized that post-verdict reduction of an award cannot cure a
tainted verdict, such as where ajury acts out of passion or prejudice.597
For the same reasons, if a jury bases its punitive damages award on
593 Id.
594 Cf TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 472 (1993) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (finding the court's lack of guidance and approval of a large punitive award would permit
future cases to "be disposed of simply with the observation that 'this is no worse than TXO'").
5 See discussion supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
596 See supra notes 170-71, 263-66 and accompanying text (discussing consideration of such
factors as bias, passion or prejudice, state interests, and out-of-state conduct).
597 See Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521 (1931) (remittitur can-
not remedy verdict under federal statute that was the result of passion and prejudice). To be
sure, courts occasionally have remitted awards because of "passion or prejudice." But in these
instances, the passion or prejudice inquiry was usually just a legal fiction to challenge awards
suspect in size alone. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 425 & n.4 (1994) (discuss-
ing early history of punitive damages review and noting that "because of the difficulty of prob-
ing juror reasoning, passion and prejudice review was, in fact, review of the amount of awards.
Judges would infer passion, prejudice, or partiality from the size of the award.").
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improper considerations-such as punishing the defendant for out-
of-state conduct committed against individuals not parties to the
case-post-verdict remittitur can do nothing to cure the award's im-
proper foundation. In other words, an award based on unconstitu-
tional considerations is still improper even if reduced to one dollar.
Just a few months before State Farm was decided, the Ninth Circuit
reached this conclusion in White v. Ford Motor Co9 There, the court
ordered a new trial on punitive damages because the district court re-
fused to give an instruction prohibiting the jury from punishing the
defendant for out-of-state conduct."m The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that post-verdict review of the size of the award could not cure a ver-
dict based on improper grounds:
The jury was encouraged by argument to award damages for Ford's
wrongs to the entire country, and the court rejected an instruction that
would have told the jury to vindicate only the wrongs done in Nevada.
Possibly the jury would have chosen as large an award had it been told to
vindicate only the rights of Nevadans, but possibly it would have chosen a
substantially lower award. For all we know, the jury would have applied a
much lower ratio than the thirty to one the court chose, or the sixty-six to
one that the jury initially chose, had it been told that it should limit its
scope to the interests of Nevadans. A punitive damages award that encom-
passes a defendant's extraterritorial conduct may be unconstitutional even if the
size of the award itselfoas compared to compensatory damages, is not outside the
bounds of due process.
The White court thus determined that the only check on awards based
on improper considerations is to send the case back to the jury and
provide adequate procedural protections in the first instance.
6 0
1
Beyond the inability of post-verdict review to remedy a verdict
tainted by improper considerations, State Farm warrants re-
examination of a point made by Justice O'Connor in her Haslip dis-
sent concerning the inability to remedy flawed procedures by review-
ing the size of an award: "Post hoc review tests only the amount of the
award, not the procedures by which that amount was determined....
Any award of punitive damages rendered under these procedures, no
598 312 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2002), amended on denial of reh'g, 335 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2003). But
see Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 805-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (finding instruc-
tional error under State Farm, but summarily concluding that reduction of award satisfied due
process).
White, 312 F.3d at 1019-20.
6o Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).
601 Id. at 1020. Although not cited in State Farm, the White decision was the subject of sup-
plemental briefs and also was discussed during oral argument. See Supplemental Brief for Peti-
tioner, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003) (No. 01-1289); Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 49-52 (Dec. 11, 2002), State Farm (No. 01-1289), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument_transcripts/01-1289.pdf.
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matter how small the amount, is constitutionally infirm."6°' Put an-
other way, post-verdict review of the size of an award addresses a dif-
ferent error; it cannot remedy the independent problem of trial pro-
cedures that foster improper decision making. In analogous
contexts, the Supreme Court has acknowledged as much. In Ward v.
Village of Monroeville,60 3 the Supreme Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of a system that permitted a village mayor to act as the judge
in adjudicating traffic offenses.0 4 The Court considered whether the
system deprived the defendant of his due process right to a trial be-
fore an impartial decision maker. The defendant argued that be-
cause the mayor was responsible for revenue generating for the vil-
lage, the mayor could not impose fines in an impartial manner.5
The village countered that any due process violation at the trial level
could be corrected by an appeal or a trial de novo in the county state
court. 6 The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was enti-
tled to fair procedures in the first instance:
This "procedural safeguard" does not guarantee a fair trial in the mayor's
court; there is nothing to suggest that the incentive to convict would be
diminished by the possibility of reversal on appeal. Nor, in any event,
may the State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally accept-
able simply because the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial
adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in
607the first instance.
In short, State Farm's jury instruction requirement comports with
the Court's due process focus on both the proper bases of punitive
damages awards as well as the size of these awards. State Farm recog-
nizes that a court cannot "subtract" improper considerations from a
punitive damages award simply through a monetary reduction, and
after-the-fact protections aimed at correcting substantive due process
violations cannot replace fair procedures in the first instance.
W2 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1991) (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
603 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
W4 Id. at 57-58.
605 Id. at 58.
W6 Id. at 61.
607 Id. at 61-62. Ward was decided before Haslip, but is conspicuously absent from the deci-
sion. See Melsheimer & Stodghill, supra note 387, at 339 (discussing Ward). Ward can be read to
conflict with Haslip's position that vague instructions can be cured through post-verdict review.
On the other hand, unlike the common law punitive damages system in Haslip, the mayor's
court system in Ward was inherently biased in that the risk of improper influences over the
process existed in every case. In any event, Ward has current relevance given the post-Haslip
recognition of substantive due process limits on punitive damages, the focus on whether an
award is based on improper considerations, and the Court's heightened concern of quasi-
criminal punitive sanctions being awarded without comparable criminal procedural protec-
tions.
[Vol. 6:3
INSTRUCTING JURIES ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
B. State Farm's Convergence of Substantive and Procedural Due Process
Requires that Juries Receive More Guidance
By holding that a substantive due process limit must be provided
to the jury, State Farm recognized that-in the context of punitive
damages-substantive due process influences the requirements of
procedural due process. At a minimum, the Court's recognition of a
correlation between procedural and substantive due process indicates
that the concept of "adequate guidance" to the jury has evolved since
Haslip.
State Farm's convergence of substantive and procedural due proc-
ess requirements again comports with the Court's evolving approach
to punitive damages. First, the Court has used the same due process
test for both substantive and procedural due process. Specifically,
when Haslip was decided, the Court had not yet recognized substan-
6081tive due process limits on punitive awards. Moreover, even though
Alabama provided substantive standards in its post-verdict review (the
Green Oil factors),6 those factors were only state limitations, not con-
stitutional protections. But in TXO, the plurality opinion recognized
that substantive due process imposes limits on the amount of a puni-
tive damages award. In determining the standard for assessing a sub-
stantive due process violation, the TXO Court adopted Haslip's pro-
cedural due process reasonableness test. In BMW, the Court retained
that test, but took the first step toward clarifying substantive due
process reasonableness by announcing the guideposts. In the end,
the Court adopted the same test for both aspects of due process, but
refined the reasonableness standard only in the context of substan-
tive due process.
Second, the Court's punitive damages decisions repeatedly have
blended the concepts of substantive and procedural due process. For
example, BMWframed the ostensibly substantive due process issue in
terms of notice, a procedural due process concept. ° In Haslip, a
procedural due process case, the Court discussed the size of the
award as part of the procedural review.61' The Court's mingling of
these concepts has led one commentator to conclude that the distinc-
tion between substantive and procedural due process in the Court's
punitive damages cases is a "false perception.
608 See supra notes 93-95, 139-44 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
610 See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (stating that a person should receive
"fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity
of the penalty that a State may impose").
611 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
612 Neil B. Stekloff, Note and Comment, Raising Five Eyebrows: Substantive Due Process Review of
Punitive Damages Awards AfterBMW v. Gore, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1797, 1823-25 (1997).
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In State Farm, the Court took the logical, if not inevitable, step of
recognizing that the factors relevant to assessing reasonableness for
post-verdict substantive due process review guide the concept of rea-
sonableness for procedural due process. By mandating an out-of-state
conduct instruction, the Court recognized that a defendant's substan-
tive due process right to a nonexcessive/nonarbitrary award requires
better constraints on the jury's discretion. That one step both coun-
termanded the lower courts' standard practice of simply upholding
instructions as adequate so long as they included the Haslip-
minimum, and also addressed a post-BMW argument that additional
instructions are not required because the guideposts and other limi-
tations concerned only post-verdict review.
C. Protecting Substantive Due Process Rights Requires
Heightened Procedural Protections
State Farm's recognition that due process requires more than the
Haslip-minimum is consistent with the Court's acknowledgment that
heightened protections, akin to criminal procedural protections, are
required to protect the recently identified (post-Haslip) substantive
due process limits on punitive damages. In Cooper Industries, the
Court determined that while the "abuse of discretion" appellate stan-
dard of review was sufficient for considering whether a punitive award
comported with state law, courts must apply a less deferential stan-
dard when assessing federal constitutional limits.6 1 4  The Court
adopted the de novo standard of review used in "analogous" cases
"involving deprivations of life. . . and deprivations of property."
6 1 5
Building on Cooper Industries, the State Farm Court expressed concern
that while punitive damages serve the same purposes as criminal pen-
alties, "defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have
not been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceed-
ing., 61 6 Moreover, the Court stated that these concerns were "height-
ened when the decisionmaker is presented.., with evidence that has
little bearing as to the amount of punitive damages that should be
awarded."61 7  It was these concerns, the Court reiterated, that
613 See cases cited supra notes 455-56, 460-61, 493-94.
614 See supra notes 341-49 and accompanying text. Thus, Haslip's reliance on the state law
post-verdict Green Oil factors as a sufficient check on the jury's discretion never addressed the
fact that as a matter of substantive due process a jury's discretion is constrained. In other
words, the process may have provided adequate procedural protections when considering the
award in light of state substantive law, but that never addressed whether it adequately protected
constitutional rights.
:15 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 434-36 (2001).
16 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1520 (2003).
617 Id.
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prompted its creation of post-verdict protections, including the
"guideposts" and de novo appellate review.1.
The same reasoning warrants heightened pre-verdict procedural
protections. For instance, the Supreme Court repeatedly has recog-
nized that in capital cases--one of the "analogous" contexts Cooper
Industries used to support the de novo appellate standard of review-
the jury must be provided information that will permit it to make a
rational punishment determination. Specifically, courts must instruct
juries about a defendant's ineligibility for parole where the state
urges the jury to impose the death penalty based on the defendant's
"future dangerousness."69 The Court has reasoned that "[t]he trial
court's refusal to apprise the jury of information so crucial to its sen-
tencing determination... cannot be reconciled with our well-
established precedents interpreting the Due Process Clause."62 0 The
621same could be said for punitive damages cases. Similarly, "it is a fa-
miliar principle that, when evidence is admitted for one purpose, but
would violate the Constitution for the jury to consider it for a differ-
ent purpose, the court should instruct the jury not to consider the
evidence for the impermissible purpose., 62 That risk is ever-present
in punitive damages cases where evidence of a defendant's prior simi-
lar misconduct may be admissible to establish the scope and "repre-
hensibility" of the defendant's conduct, but could also be misused by
the jury to punish the defendant for harm to nonparties who were in-
jured by that conduct. Indeed, in State Farm, the Court recognized
that "lawful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demon-
strates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's action in
the State where it was tortious," but the 'jury must be instructed...
that it may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a de-
fendant.",1
618 Id.
619 See, e.g., Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S.
36 (2001); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994). Each of these cases held that due
process requires that the sentencing juries in capital cases be informed that the defendant is
parole ineligible where the state relies on future dangerousness in support of the death penalty.
620 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 164.
621 Outside the death penalty context, the Court similarly has recognized that juries must be
instructed on constitutional safeguards. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (mandat-
ing jury instruction in criminal cases regarding presumption of innocence); see also Brief of
Ford Motor Company as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19-27, State Farm, 123 S. Ct.
1513 (2003) (No. 01-1289) (arguing that Taylor and other cases require jury instructions con-
cerning the constitutional limits on punitive damages).
622 Colby, supra note 374, at 676 (citing criminal instructional cases).
623 State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1522.
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D. RequiringJuiy Instructions on the Constitutional Limits
on Punitive Damages Under State Farm Respects the Role of the Jury
State Farm's instruction requirement also reconciles the post-
BMW/ Cooper Industries oddity of requiring post-verdict review, includ-
ing de novo review by appellate courts, of punitive damages factors
never considered by the jury.624 While unlikely rising to the level of a
Seventh Amendment violation,626 courts (and some model jury in-
struction committees) 626 understandably have been troubled by the
idea that post-verdict application of the guideposts effectively substi-
tutes the court's view of the defendant's reprehensibility for that of
the jury.627 This concern is not unwarranted considering that empiri-
cal data suggests "that over half of punitive damages awards were ap-
pealed, and that more than half of those apealed resulted in reduc-
tions or reversals of the punitive damages."6
But these concerns aside, it just makes little sense to have courts
conduct "searching" post-verdict review of punitive damages awards
under principles juries were never told about. As one model jury in-
struction committee concluded, "It would be nonsensical for the jury
to fix the amount of punitive damages using criteria substantially dif-
ferent than those used by appellate courts in determining de novo
whether the award was 'grossly excessive.'- 6 9
E. Some Counterarguments
Notwithstanding the above, one could argue that had the Court
intended to require instructions across the board, it easily could have
said so. Additionally, the Court's out-of-state conduct instruction re-
quirement could be interpreted solely as a federalism constraint, in-
dependent of the due process limits on punitive damages. And fi-
nally, requiring specific instructions deviates from the common law
method of providing juries minimal guidance.
The Court's jurisprudence provides a response to each of these
points. First, the Court unquestionably could have noted that other
instructions were required. But the issue presented on appeal fo-
cused primarily on whether the award improperly was based on
624 See supra text accompanying notes 341-49.
625 See supra text accompanying notes 350-51.
626 See discussion supra note 459.
627 See supra discussion accompanying notes 477-83.
628 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 433 n.1 1 (1994). See generally Robbennolt, supra
note 3, at 165-66 (discussing studies showing high rate of post-verdict reductions of punitive
damages awards).
612 2 PALMORE'S KENTUCKY INSTRUCTIONS TOJURIES § 39.15, cmt. (Cui. Supp. 2003).
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dissimilar out-of-state conduct,630 not a general argument that better
instructions were required by due process. The Court repeatedly has
declined to address punitive issues not squarely or properly before
it.6"' Accordingly, it is no surprise that the Court's opinion went only
as far as it did.
Second, while informed by principles of federalism, comity, and
state sovereignty, the Court's out-of-state conduct holding remains a
due process ruling. As the Court explained in BMW, "the federal ex-
cessiveness inquiry appropriately begins with an identification of the
state interests that a punitive award is designed to serve."6 2 This in-
quiry is a matter of substantive due process, not a separate sovereignty
or federalism analysis. This was confirmed in Cooper Industries, where
the Court expressed concern that the jury may have based the puni-
tive award on conduct that was lawful even though no federalism
concerns were at stake. 3 Accordingly, the Court's holding supports
jury instructions on all the substantive due process limitations on pu-
nitive damages.
Finally, there is history. To be sure, the Haslip-minimum reflects
the common law approach to instructions.6 34 But if the last decade of
Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects anything, it is that history is
635not determinative on the question of punitive damages. The major-
ity of the Court repeatedly has rejected Justice Scalia's refrain that
substantive and procedural due process requirements should be de-
fined by history. To this end, the Court has not hesitated to change
common law practices when necessary. In Cooper Industries, for in-
stance, the Court held that due process required de novo review of
punitive damages awards, a change from the common law standard.
Indeed, State Farm itself implicitly rejected the idea that history con-
trols the instructions applicable to punitive damages. The Court did
630 The petitioner in State Farm set forth the question presented as follows:
Whether the Utah Supreme Court, in direct contravention of this Court's decision in
[BMW], and fundamental principles of due process, committed constitutional error by
reinstating a $145 million punitive damage award that punishes out-of-state conduct, is
145 times greater than the compensatory damages in the case, and is based upon the de-
fendant's alleged business practices nationwide over a twenty-year period, which were
unrelated and dissimilar to the conduct by the defendant that gave rise to the plaintiffs'
claims?
Brief for Petitioner at i, State Farm, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003) (No. 01-1289), available at
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supremecourt/docket/2002/december.html#OI-1 289.
631 See supra text accompanying notes 45-59, 164-65.
632 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
633 See supra text accompanying notes 353-54.
634 See supra text accompanying notes 67-70, 96-101.
635 The Court itself has recognized that twenty-first century punitive damages are not the
same creature that they were at common law. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437 n.l (2001) ("Until well into the 19th century, punitive damages fre-
quently operated to compensate for intangible injuries .... .").
Mar. 20041
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
not even consider for a moment the fact that the common law did
not require an instruction on the permissible use of evidence of a de-
fendant's out-of-state conduct.
In sum, after State Farm, all signs point to the need to reassess
procedural due process and to require jury instructions that inform
the jury of the standards that should guide and limit their awards.
Courts and litigants that fail to take notice do so at their peril.6 6
636 Courts do appear to be taking notice. See Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793,
805 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (finding model instruction directing jury to consider defendant's fi-
nancial condition improper after State Farm); Snyder v. McCarley, No. 2002-CA-001282, 2003
WL 22025843, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2003) (Knopf, J., concurring) (agreeing with court's
remand for a new trial on the assessment of punitive damages, but noting that failure to provide
more detailed instructions may violate due process as suggested in State Farm and other Su-
preme Court cases); Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co., 667 N.W.2d 651, 671 (S.D. 2003) (remanding
for a new trial on punitive damages and without analysis ordering that the jury should be in-
structed on the guideposts). Similarly, model instruction committees are reassessing punitive
damages instructions in light of State Farm. See FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL
CASES, PD cmt. (2003 Supp.), WLJICIV FL-CLE PD (stating that the "committee is considering
whether these instructions need to be revised in light of State Farm"). New York and California
already have revised their model instructions in an attempt to address State Farm. Specifically,
the New York instruction modifies the prior reprehensibility factors and clarifies to some extent
the focus on harm to the plaintiff, not third parties. See N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CIVIL § 2:278 (2003), WL NY PJI 2:278; see also supra note 427 (providing text of the instruc-
tion). Moreover, citing State Farm, the comments to the instruction note that "[w]hen relevant,
ajury must be instructed that it may not use evidence of out of state conduct to punish a defen-
dant for conduct that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred." Id. § 2:278 cmt., WL NY
PJI 2:278. As this Article went to press, California published supplemental instructions, includ-
ing an out-of-state conduct instruction and an instruction clarifying the factors juries should
consider in determining the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. The out-of-state con-
duct instruction provides:
Evidence has been received of defendant's conduct occurring outside California. This
evidence may be considered only in determining whether defendant's conduct occur-
ring in California was reprehensible, and if so, the degree of reprehensibility. The evi-
dence is relevant to that issue, if it bears a reasonable relationship to the California con-
duct which is directed at or acts upon plaintiff, and demonstrates a deliberateness or
culpability by the defendant in the conduct upon which you have based your finding of
liability. Further, acts or conduct wherever occurring, that are not similar to the conduct
upon which you found liability cannot be a basis for finding reprehensibility.
However, you must not use out-of-state evidence to award plaintiff punitive damages
against the defendant for conduct that occurred outside California.
CAL. CIVILJURY INSTRUCTIONS (BAJI) § 14.71.1 (2004), WL CA BAJI 14.71.1. The new repre-
hensibility instruction provides:
In determining whether the conduct upon which you have based your finding of liabil-
ity is reprehensible, and if so, the degree of reprehensibility, you should consider
whether:
1. The harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;
2. The wrongful conduct demonstrated an indifference to or reckless disregard of the
[rights,] health or safety of others;
3. The plaintiff[s] [was] [were] financially vulnerable;
4. The conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and
5. The harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, rather than mere
accident.
Id. § 14.71.2, WIL CA BAJI 14.71.2. As discussed infra Part V, while the New York and California
revisions should have gone much further, they are a step in the right direction.
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V. WHAT GUIDANCE SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO THEJURY
AFTER STATE FARM
State Farm suggested that factors considered in substantive due
process review should be provided to the jury in the first instance.
The decision also clarified those standards so that they can in fact be
used to do so. By clarifying the BMW guideposts and the types of
conduct upon which an award cannot be based, the Court in effect
has reshaped the contours of "adequate guidance" under Haslip.
For jurisdictions using Haslip-like common law instructions, State
Farm can be used to devise instructions that accurately reflect proper
due process limitations on punitive awards. For Haslip-plus-wealth or
multifactor jurisdictions, State Farm's standards provide a baseline by
which to measure and reevaluate existing instructions. Specifically,
few jurisdictions appear to have analyzed whether the "extra" factors
included in their model instructions really constrain juries from bas-
ing awards on improper considerations. This is understandable,
given that many of these instructions merely incorporate state law
punitive damages factors that were developed before the Supreme
Court decided and clarified the constitutional considerations, such as
the guideposts or the Court's discussion of the appropriate use of a
defendant's wealth.637 Potential conflicts between state law and con-
stitutional factors reflect a larger question the Court someday may
have to address under Supremacy Clause principles. Forjury instruc-
tions, it means that the model instructions used in some jurisdictions
637 Recently, the California Court of Appeal has determined that the California model in-
struction is improper after State Farm. See Romo, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 805. The model instruction
used at trial directed the jury to consider the defendant's "financial condition" in setting the
amount of the award. Id. The court concluded that this instruction improperly permitted the
jury to base the award on harm to nonparties. Id. at 805 n.7. Another district of the same court
of appeal-based on another aspect of State Farm--concluded that the consideration of a de-
fendant's financial condition is constitutionally suspect after State Farm. See Henley v. Philip
Morris Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("Defendant correctly notes that the
constitutional soundness of the third consideration has been rendered uncertain by [State
Farm's] seemingly categorical rejection of the Utah Supreme Court's reliance on the defen-
dant's 'massive wealth' as one justification for the award there." (citation omitted)). Other
courts, however, have not addressed potential inconsistencies between the constitutional stan-
dards and state factors. A few courts, for instance, have recognized that the BMW/State Farm
constitutional factors must be addressed during post-verdict review. But these courts simply
have adopted a combined test incorporating both state and federal considerations without ad-
dressing whether the state factors, such as considering a defendant's wealth, may conflict with
constitutional limits. See Roth, 667 N.W.2d at 666 (incorporating state's "five-factor test" with the
guideposts "outlined by the Supreme Court"); see also Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch.-Freistadt v. Tower Ins. Co., 661 N.W.2d 789, 800 (Wis. 2003) (equating the Wisconsin
court's test, including defendant's wealth, to be "virtually identical" to Supreme Court's consti-
tutional test).
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may affirmatively misguide the jury and heighten the risk of arbitrary
or improper punitive damages awards.6
With all this in mind, the following is an overview of the informa-
tion we believe, at minimum, should be given to juries to guide their
assessment of the amount of punitive damages. While the precise
language of such instructions is beyond the scope of this Article,639 we
suggest areas of improvement to the model instructions used in vari-
ous jurisdictions.
A. Factors That Should Be Given to the Jury
1. The Haslip-minimum
As a threshold matter, the Haslip-minimum, for what it's worth,
still should be provided to the jury: (1) the purpose and nature of
punitive damages; (2) the principle that punitive damages constitute
punishment for civil wrongdoing; and (3) an explanation that the
imposition of punitive damages is not compulsory, but within the
jury's discretionii ° Most jurisdictions' model instructions include fac-
tors comparable to the Haslip-minimum.
638 The issue of "extra" instructions was raised in TXO, where the petitioner argued that West
Virginia's instructions directing the jury to consider a defendant's wealth violated due process
by leading the jury to focus on improper factors. See Brief of Petitioner at 35, TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (No. 92-479) ("'Due process may not require a de-
tailed roadmap, but it certainly requires directions of some sort.' Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1059
(O'Connor, J. dissenting). It should be common ground that the jury ought not be given a
roadmap to the wrong destination, which is the 'defendant['s] ... deep pocket.' Id. at 1045.").
The plurality in TXO declined to address the issue because it had not been properly pre-
sented. It did, however, express concern that "the emphasis on the wealth of the wrongdoer
increased the risk that the award may have been influenced by prejudice against large corpora-
tions, a risk that is of special concern when the defendant is a nonresident." TXO, 509 U.S. at
464. At the same time, the plurality recognized that in "Haslip we referred to the 'financial po-
sition' of the defendant as one factor that could be taken into account in assessing punitive
damages." Id. Justice O'Connor was less forgiving. She argued that "the 'additional compensa-
tion' instruction, considered together with the instruction directing the jury's attention to
TXO's massive wealth, encouraged the jury to transfer some of TXO's impressive wealth to the
smaller and more sympathetic respondents .... In fact, the jury] instructions practically en-
sured that this would occur." Id. at 490 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also rec-
ognized that although wealth was a consideration in Haslip, it was only considered by the court
during post-verdict review since Alabama generally barred wealth evidence from being pre-
sented to the jury.
639 No formal drafting committee, such as the group that drafted the MPDA, has yet been
created to devise punitive damages instructions that comport with State Farm. See supra note 387
(discussing MPDA). A well-known punitive damages litigator who argued for the defendants in
BMW, Oberg, and BrowningFerris has drafted instructions that he believes reflect the principles
set forth in State Farm. See Frey, supra note 8, at 24, 27-28 (proposing jury instructions on puni-
tive damages).
640 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
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2. Out-of-state Conduct
State Farm mandates that trial courts give an out-of-state conduct
instruction. Consistent with State Farm, courts should instruct the jury
that it cannot base the amount of a punitive damages award on a de-
fendant's out-of-state conduct, whether lawful or unlawful in that ju-
risdiction. 64' No federal model instruction and only two state models
642currently attempt to address the extraterritoriality issue.
3. Harm to Nonparties
Where a court allows evidence or argument concerning other
similar wrongdoing by the defendant for the purpose of assessing
reprehensibility, the jury should be told that it cannot punish for
harms suffered by nonparties.643 The jury should be informed of the
limited purpose of such evidence and that it cannot set punitive
damages in an amount to vindicate the harms to those not party to
the lawsuit. No jurisdiction includes this limit as part of its model in-
struction. Several jurisdictions implicitly provide such a limitation in
their reasonable relationship instruction, informing the jury that a
punitive award be reasonable in relation to the harm "to the plain-
tiff.", 44 The instructions, however, should be more explicit.
4. Defendant's Wealth
In State Farm, the Supreme Court again did not include wealth as
one of the guideposts, instead noting that wealth has no limiting in-
fluence on jury decision making. To the contrary, the Court
&41 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1522-23 (2003) (holding
that a state does not have a "legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a de-
fendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State's jurisdiction," and additionally, that
"[a] jury must be instructed ... that it may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a
defendant for action that was lawful in thejurisdiction where it occurred").
A See supra note 636 (discussing comments to New York model instruction and recent sup-
plemental California instructions).
643 See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1523. The Court explained:
Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate
the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of
the reprehensibility analysis .... Punishment on these bases creates the possibility of
multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties
are not bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains.
Id. In light of this holding, courts should bar plaintiffs counsel from the common practice of
askingjuries to punish defendants for the total harm caused to anyone other than the plaintiff.
See Colby, supra note 374, at 675 (discussing procedural protections to avoid unconstitutional
punitive damages awards based on harm to nonparties). But even then, courts should instruct
the jury of the limited use of evidence of harm to nonparties that may be relevant for other
purposes, such as ascertaining the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. Id.
See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.c.
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recognized that evidence of a defendant's wealth may improperly in-
fluence the jury.64 At the same time, the Court has not yet taken the
additional step of barring wealth evidence from the jury. While some
646states preclude wealth evidence, other states permit, or even re-
quire, evidence of a defendant's financial condition. In these
states, the jury should be instructed that it cannot increase a punitive
damages award simply because the defendant is wealthy or a large
corporation.65 To avoid constitutional concerns, juries also should
be told that a defendant's wealth should be used only as a limiting
factor in setting the amount of an award.
The majority of model instructions, however, advise the jury to
consider the defendant's "financial condition" or "wealth" when de-
termining the amount of the award649 without also providing any in-
structions on how the jury should do so. This virtually invites the jury
to inflate the award because the defendant is wealthy, particularly
when the defendant is an out-of-state corporation. A few jurisdictions
instruct the jury to consider the defendant's "ability to pay" the
award. 650 This instruction indirectly suggests that the jury should in-
flate the award in relation to the defendant's resources. These in-
structions should be modified to ensure that a defendant is being
punished for its conduct, rather than its size.
Related to a defendant's wealth, several states' model instructions
advise the jury to consider a defendant's "profits" from the wrongdo-
ing in setting the punitive award. 651 Jurisdictions should consider de-
leting profits as a consideration. As with instructions on "financial
condition," a profit instruction invites the jury to inflate an award on
a wealth-based ground. Additionally, without clarification that theS• 652
"profits" must be specifically tied to the wrongdoing and that profits
&45 See supra text accompanying notes 581-83. The Court's concerns about the improper use
of wealth evidence are supported by empirical studies.
The wealth of the defendant matters a great deal to dollar awards. People will impose
significantly higher punitive awards on significantly wealthier defendants-even though
people do not see misconduct by wealthy defendants as more outrageous than equivalent
misconduct by less-wealthy defendants. The lesson-perhaps not surprising, but highly
relevant to legal practice-is that jury awards will be greatly affected by knowledge of
wealth of the defendant.
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 32.
646 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(6) (1992).
647 See, e.g., Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348 (Cal. 1991) (holding that evidence of a de-
fendant's financial condition is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages).
648 See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1525 ("The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise
unconstitutional punitive damages award.").
649 See discussion supra Part II.
See sources cited supra notes 414, 416, 428, 432-34, 439.
65 See sources cited supra notes 437-42.
652 See supra text accompanying notes 355-57.
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must relate to in-state activities, the instructions are constitutionally
suspect. Finally, basing an award on a defendant's financial condi-
tion or profits risks punishing a defendant for harm to nonparties, a
practice barred by State Farm.
In short, the wealth and profit instructions in most jurisdictions
raise serious constitutional concerns and should be scrutinized to as-
sess whether and in what form the instructions should be retained af-
ter State Farm.
5. Reasonable Relationship to Plaintiffs Harm
The jury should be told that any punitive damages award must
bear a reasonable relationship to the compensatory damages award.
A reasonable relationship instruction provides an inherent constraint
on the jury's discretion. In other words, ajury informed that its puni-
tive award must be anchored to the compensatory award and the
plaintiffs harm is less likely to fix the award based on impermissible
considerations, such as out-of-state conduct, a defendant's wealth, or
other potentially improper influences."' Several jurisdictions' model
instructions currently include a reasonable relationship instruction;
6 6
most, however, do not.6 7 And remarkably, the model instructions in
653 Cf supra text accompanying notes 263-69, 557-62.
654 See Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (finding error
where jury was instructed to consider defendant's "financial condition" because it permitted
jury to punish for an entire course of conduct that harmed nonparties, not restricted to the
harm to the plaintiff); see also Colby, supra note 374, at 675-76 (arguing that plaintiffs counsel
should not be permitted to ask jury to take away profits from defendant's entire course of con-
duct and that jury should be instructed that it cannot remove profits based on victims not be-
fore the court). The comments to California's recently amended model punitive damages in-
struction note that "the portion of this instruction that is identified as (2) [consideration of the
defendant's financial condition] is likely to be irrelevant in many situations. However, until
some California court speaks to that issue in light of the State Farm case, it remains in the in-
struction." CAL. CIVILJURYINSTRUcrIONS (BAJI) § 14.71.1 cmt. (2004), WL CA BAJI 14.71.1.
655 For instance, although inconsistent with State Farm, some courts permit plaintiffs' lawyers
to suggest a punitive damages figure to the jury. See TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music
Group, 257 F. Supp. 2d 737, 748-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ruling plaintiffs counsel could suggest a
specific amount of punitive damages to the jury during closing arguments). Empirical data
strongly suggests that juries are far more likely to award excessive punitive damages when they
are given a frame of reference by counsel:
The dollar amounts that are requested by plaintiffs in their closing arguments to ajury
have a dramatic effect on the size of the punitive damages award: the higher the request,
the higher the awards. Almost half of the jurors said that the plaintiff's award request in-
fluenced theirjudgment process; analysis of the data indicates that the greater their reli-
ance on the plaintiff's request, the higher the awards. Judges' instructions that argu-
ments by the plaintiff's lawyer are not evidence did not eliminate this effect.
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 62. Accordingly, a reasonable relationship instruction may
help counter the improper influence of such requests.
See discussion supra Part II.A.l.c.
657 See discussion supra Part II.A. l.a-b.
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some jurisdictions tell the jury that punitive damages do not need to
bear a reasonable relationship to the plaintiff's harm."' At bare
minimum, a clear and explicit reasonable relationship instruction
should be included in all model instructions.
6. Deterrent Effect of Compensatory Damages
State Farm recognized that the deterrent goal of punitive damages
may be satisfied where compensatory damages are substantial or in-
clude a "punitive element." '9 No jurisdiction includes this factor as
part of its model instruction. In light of State Farm, courts should in-
struct the jury that it should consider whether an additional amount
of punitive damages is necessary to achieve the goals of punishment
and deterrence.
7. Reprehensibility
The jury should receive guidance on this proper consideration.
In State Farm, the Supreme Court identified a five factor scale of rep-
rehensible conduct, and many state model instructions already in-
clude comparable instructions concerning the nature of a defen-
dant's conduct. Because the importance of each factor will vary from
case to case, model instructions should not simply adopt the five State
Farm factors. Rather, instructions should advise the jury generally to
consider the "reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct, and allow
the trial court to include the State Farm factors relevant to the particu-
lar case. 2 If all five State Farm factors are provided, however, the jury
should be informed that the existence of only one factor may not be
sufficient to sustain a punitive award and the absence of all factors
renders any award suspect.
B. Factors That Should Be Considered Only by Courts
During Post-verdict Review
Because the ultimate goal is to prevent the jury from basing its
punitive damages award on improper considerations or otherwise
658 See sources cited supra notes 400, 436 (discussing the Vermont and Pennsylvania instruc-
tions).
659 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1525 (2003).
See id. at 1521 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)) ("[T]he
most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.").
61 See supra notes 552-53 and text accompanying notes 273-78.
662 See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 ("The precise award in any case, of course, must be based
upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.").
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acting arbitrarily, certain constitutional factors should be considered
only by the courts during post-verdict review. Specifically, the jury
should not be informed about the availability of comparable penalties
or the existence of other prior punitive damages awards based on the
same harm, or statutory caps on punitive awards. These factors have
the potential to prejudice the jury against the defendant and encour-
age the jury to base its award on improper considerations. Moreover,
these factors are better suited for judicial review, rather than consid-
eration by the jury.
1. The Third Guidepost
The jury should not be instructed on the availability of compara-
ble fines or statutory penalties. As Cooper Industries noted, this factor
"calls for a broad legal comparison,, 66' and is better suited to applica-
tion by judges, not juries.664 Even courts advocating the use of more
detailed instructions have determined that "there are too many com-
plicating and prejudicial factors in asking a lay jury to consider the
third element."665 Some of these complicating factors include identi-
fying "comparable" statutory fines, resolving whether the conduct at
issue constituted a single or multiple violation of the statute, and de-
termining whether a defendant should have had notice that its con-
duct would be subject to penalties under those statutes. Courts have
long struggled with these issues, 666 and juries are ill-equipped to con-
sistently apply the third guidepost.
2. Prior Awards
Unless requested by the defendant, courts should not instruct the
jury on the existence of prior awards against the defendant for the
same conduct. This factor could encourage juries to base a punitive
66 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001).
%4 See discussion supra note 483 and accompanying text.
665 Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Accordingly, the
court approved a modification of the New York model instruction to include an instruction on
the first two guideposts:
In fixing the amount, if any, you may consider the assets of defendant, what is reasonably
required to vindicate New York State's legitimate interests in punishment and deter-
rence, if any, above the amount of civil damages awarded, the degree of reprehensibility,
if any, the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by plaintiffs and the
difference between punitive damages and the civil awards in this case, and how egregious
the conduct of defendant was compared to that of others in its position.
Id. The court stated that "[t]his language adequately expresses the law as set out in [BMW]
without requiring the jury to make complex determinations and calculations involving civil and
criminal law." Id. (citation omitted).
V,6 See discussion supra note 376 and accompanying text.
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damages award on a defendant's out-of-state conduct or on perceived
harm to nonparties-both improper considerations.
3. Statutory Caps/Other Improper Frames of Reference
Several states have enacted statutory caps on punitive damages. In
those states that do not already prohibit the jury from being advised
of the cap,667 model instructions, or, more likely, the comments to
model instructions should advise that the jury not be informed of the
cap. 68 Likewise the jury should not be given any other dollar-figure,
such as the request by plaintiffs counsel or in pleadings of a particu-
lar award, that could be used as an improper influence in setting the
amount of the award.6 9 Studies have suggested that juries may im-
properly rely on such figures in setting the amount of an award.
6
CONCLUSION
While it is unclear whether and to what extent 7l improved jury in-
structions will rein in punitive damages "run wild, 672 few can dispute
that the instructions used in most jurisdictions do nothing to restrain
arbitrary decision making. Relying on post-verdict review as a "check"
on arbitrary awards is both strikingly inefficient and undermines the
jury's role in the process. State Farm not only suggests that due proc-
ess requires more detailed instructions concerning the constitutional
limits on punitive damages, it also provides workable standards to de-
vise those instructions. Courts, litigants, and model jury instruction
committees should take notice.
667 Some states specifically prohibit the jury from being informed of the statutory cap. See
supra notes 428, 439 (discussing approaches by North Carolina and NewJersey).
Accord Central Bering Sea Fishermen's Ass'n v. Anderson, 54 P.3d 271, 281 (Alaska 2002)
("We agree with the appellants that instructing the jury on the punitive damages caps was error.
Putting the caps before the jury carried a substantial risk of suggesting the range of appropriate
punitive awards. Moreover, no countervailing benefit could be gained from the instruction."
(footnote omitted)). See generally Michael S. Kang, Comment, Don't Tell Juries About Statutory
Damage Caps: The Merits of Nondisclosure, 66 U. CHi. L. REv. 469, 479-80 (1999) ("[P]sychological
studies on jury behavior suggest that knowledge of a damage cap exerts an influence on the
amount of an award unrelated to the jury's evaluation of the facts of the case.").
See supra note 413 (noting Oregon model instruction informing jury of amount of plain-
tiffs request for punitive damages set forth in pleading).
670 See supra note 668.
671 See Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 189 ("[T]he impact of these more substantive instructions
on juror decision processes and the resulting punitive damage awards remains largely untested.
Scant research has examined the influence of punitive damages jury instructions.").
672 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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